



A-level History 7042
Guide to the extract question on Component 1
V1.0

Introduction

This Guide has been produced to show how the mark scheme for the Component 1 extract question (Question 1) will be applied and to illustrate approaches to assessment, to assist teachers in preparing their students for the examination. The responses have been kindly provided by schools and were written by students in the course of their studies, although not under timed examination conditions. Consequently, they are not intended to be viewed as 'model' answers, and in some cases are longer than could be reasonably expected in the one hour permitted in the exam. The commentaries are based on the qualities demonstrated in the responses rather than their length. The generic mark scheme for the extract/interpretation question is on the following page.

Assessment objectives and timing

Question 1 on Component 1 targets A03: 'Analyse and evaluate, in relation to the historical context, different ways in which aspects of the past have been interpreted.'

It is advised that students spend one hour answering this question.

Potential approaches to the question

In answering the extract question (Question 1) on Component 1, students may choose to respond to each extract in turn, or to adopt a more integrated approach to common arguments, interpretations or themes. This document contains examples that illustrate how both approaches are acceptable, though the recommended approach – as it is the most straightforward - is to evaluate each source in turn.

Unlike at AS, students are not required to undertake a comparative assessment or evaluation. Rather, students are required to evaluate each extract on its own merits as to how convincing the interpretation is in relation to the question.

Regardless of which approach is adopted, students will be required to identify the arguments in each extract and evaluate them. In doing so, they must apply knowledge and understanding of the historical context to these arguments and interpretations. It is important that the focus is on interpretation and argument rather than the factual content of the extract. Similarly, to argue from the basis of omission (what is **not** said) must be secondary to the assessment of what is said.

Introductions/conclusions

It is recognised that students like, and are trained, to write introductions and conclusions, essential features when answering a 'traditional' essay question, as is found in Section B of the paper. Whilst neither is required in response to the extract/interpretation question, we accept that students may wish to produce them. Such an approach will not be penalised by examiners – an answer with a conclusion which comments on some general issues associated with the interrogation of the extracts might strengthen the answer. However, as shown in the examples below, very good answers without conclusions can be awarded full marks, and it may be most productive for students to begin the evaluation without an introduction. Substantiated judgement should, however, be provided in the evaluation of each extract.

Generic mark-scheme

Target: AO3

Analyse and evaluate, in relation to the historical context, different ways in which aspects of the past have been interpreted.

L5:	Shows a very good understanding of the interpretations put forward in all three extracts and combines this with a strong awareness of the historical context to analyse and evaluate the interpretations given in the extracts. Evaluation of the arguments will be well-supported and convincing. The response demonstrates a very good understanding of context.	25-30
L4:	Shows a good understanding of the interpretations given in all three extracts and combines this with knowledge of the historical context to analyse and evaluate the interpretations given in the extracts. The evaluation of the arguments will be mostly well-supported, and convincing, but may have minor limitations of depth and breadth. The response demonstrates a good understanding of context.	19-24
L3:	Provides some supported comment on the interpretations given in all three extracts and comments on the strength of these arguments in relation to their historic context. There is some analysis and evaluation but there may be an imbalance in the degree and depth of comments offered on the strength of the arguments. The response demonstrates an understanding of context.	13-18
L2:	Provides some accurate comment on the interpretations given in at least two of the extracts, with reference to the historical context. The answer may contain some analysis, but there is little, if any, evaluation. Some of the comments on the strength of the arguments may contain some generalisation, inaccuracy or irrelevance. The response demonstrates some understanding of context.	7-12
L1:	Either shows an accurate understanding of the interpretation given in one extract only or addresses two/three extracts, but in a generalist way, showing limited accurate understanding of the arguments they contain, although there may be some general awareness of the historical context. Any comments on the strength of the arguments are likely to be generalist and contain some inaccuracy and/or irrelevance. The response demonstrates limited understanding of context.	1-6
	Nothing worthy of credit	0

Level 5 responses**Paper 1D Stuart Britain and the Crisis of Monarchy, 1603-1702 (A-level): Specimen question paper****Extract A**

There was nothing necessarily subversive to the established political order in James I's statement, 'The state of monarchy is the supremest thing on earth'. Indeed, it was a truism in a state that had rejected papal monarchy. It has long been established that James and Charles I acted within the common law framework of the constitution as they saw it. The personal exercise of royal power had long been regularised and flowed in particular channels. Royal favourites and monopolists required a legal basis to their grants, legal instruments that were challengeable in the courts. But the key phrase was 'as they saw it': others might see it differently.

Adapted from Michael Hawkins, 'The Government: Its Role and Its Aims', in Conrad Russell (ed), *The Origins of the English Civil War*, 1984

Extract B

One of the most crucial and one of the most difficult questions of the early Stuart period is why distrust developed between Crown and parliament. It is fashionable to blame James' tendency to theorise about the doctrine of divine right, but if James' speeches are compared with those made by members of parliament, it is hard to see how the doctrine of divine right could be at fault, since MPs shared it. They did not, it is true, agree with James that his divine right gave him immunity from having his decisions questioned and it was soon apparent that James could not escape having his decisions questioned. Though religion and money were to become the most explosive issues of the next reign, under James the issue which caused most ill feeling between the King and his parliaments was money.

Adapted from Conrad Russell, *The Crisis of Parliaments: English History, 1509–1660*, 1981

Extract C

Both Crown and Parliament agreed that the King had certain prerogative rights such as the right to mint coins and create peers. What James and Charles also claimed was an absolute prerogative right to take any action outside the law which they thought necessary for national defence or national security as defined by themselves. This prerogative, the House of Commons and the common lawyers denied to the Crown, but it is the ultimate right of sovereignty to act in this way. They denied this prerogative to the King because they had no confidence that he would use it for what they regarded as the interests of the country: and they were quite correct. But from the King's point of view, they were acting in a merely negative and obstructive way.

Adapted from Christopher Hill, *The Century of Revolution, 1603–1714*, 1962

01 Using your understanding of the historical context, assess how convincing the arguments in these three extracts are in relation to divisions between Crown and Parliament in the early Stuart period.

[30 marks]

Student response

Extract A argues that the Political Nation should not have felt threatened by James's statement that 'monarchy is the supremest thing on earth'. In support of this when James declared this in his speech of March 1610 in the second half of the same speech James made clear that he understood the limits of his power by the traditions of the English unwritten constitution. James had, in the first part of his speech, strongly outlined the theoretical absolutism of his position of King of England but James did seek to reassure the Political Nation in the second half of the speech that he recognised their key role in ruling with him and thus, as Extract A argues, he 'acted within the common law and framework of the constitution' and that MPs had some control over the monarch. Extract A refers to monopolists requiring a legal basis and this can be seen in the Monopoly Act of 1624 that had sought to control even Buckingham, James's favourite and his exploitation of monopolies for his family. Extract A also argues that the 'personal exercise of royal power had long been regularised' and this can be seen in the accepted functions of the Privy Council but the extent that personal royal power had actually been 'regularised' is not that clear in the context of the functioning of Personal Monarchy in early modern England. Yet Extract A also points out that views of the constitution were open to interpretation and it is clear that towards the end of James's reign MPs such as Coke were becoming increasingly concerned about the exploitation of the prerogative leading to his attempts to codify the Common Law and, under Charles I, MPs use of the Three Resolutions. The 1621-22 dispute over the Commons Protestation under James I strongly shows that both the Crown and many in Parliament could have very different views of the constitution, in that specific case the issues of free speech and the extent of the prerogative in relation to foreign policy. What the 1624 Parliament showed, however, is that while Extract A points out that views could be different both James and the majority of the Political Nation recognised they had a vested interest in not letting any division between them getting out of control.

Extract B argues that it is 'difficult' to explain 'why distrust developed between Crown and parliament'. It claims that James's view of Divine Right were shared by MPs in general terms. It is indeed clear, as Extract B argues, that the Political Nation had a vested interest in accepting the doctrine of Divine Right in general terms as it underpinned the contemporary concept of the 'great chain of being' and thereby their own elevated position in the political hierarchy above the majority of the people. Extract B argues that 'religion and money were to become the most explosive issues of the next reign' and the immediate Crown-Parliament disputes in 1625 under Charles I over tonnage and poundage and the Arminian cleric Montagu strongly support this view. For Russell in Extract B it was 'money' not 'James' tendency to theorise' that 'caused most ill feeling between the King and his parliaments'. This can clearly be seen in 1610 with the Great Contract or concern over monopolies in 1621. At root of this was James' own extravagance which made MPs even more reluctant to vote subsidies. It could be argued, however, that while money was a source of contention this, despite what Extract B argues, was also rooted in James' Divine Right as his exploitation of his prerogative to raise income, for example, the division between Crown and Parliament over Impositions that was an issue on 1606, 1610 and 1614.

Extract C argues that there was dispute over the interpretation of the nature and limits of the prerogative. This is clear across both the reigns of James and Charles from Shirley's Case of 1604 to Hampden's Case of 1637. Extract C also indicates that MPs denied the Crown had the 'prerogative right to take any action outside the law' and part of the questioning of Ship Money was

the extent of 'emergency' claimed by the Crown after the treaties of Susa and Madrid. As Extract C argues men like Lord Saye and Sele or Pym doubted the motives of Charles, their distrust of his actions with regard to fiscal feudalism shaped by his support for the enforcement of anti-Calvinist Arminianism which for them was a means to introduce Catholicism and thereby absolutism. Extract C also argues that the King believed that MPs were 'acting in a merely negative and obstructive way' and this can clearly be seen in the wording of Charles' Declaration of 1629 after he had dissolved Parliament where he focused on the actions of a few evil men who believed subverted the well-meaning majority. Hill's value judgement that it was the MPs who 'were quite correct' is probably more a reflection of his Marxist interpretation of a 'Century of Revolution' favouring an anti-Crown view when in fact the unwritten nature of the constitution meant that the actual extent of the prerogative could not really be determined. Extract C also does not make the distinction between the approaches of James and Charles. James I was much more careful in his claims for his prerogative and balanced the theoretical scope of his powers by a public recognition of the scope of parliamentary privilege.

Commentary – Level 5

This response shows a very good understanding of the interpretations of all three extracts. It is able to isolate the main point made by each author but also the sub-sections of their arguments. There is direct support and evaluation of the weaknesses of each interpretation through very precisely selected contextual knowledge that is deployed in a convincing manner.

Paper 1E (A-level) Russia in the Age of Absolutism and Enlightenment, 1682 – 1796: Additional specimen question paper**Extract A**

Catherine, familiar with the Enlightenment belief in the Rights of Man, was intellectually opposed to serfdom. While still a grand duchess, she had suggested a way to reform and eventually abolish the institution, although it might take a hundred years to accomplish. The crux of the plan was that every time an estate was sold, all serfs on the estate should be freed. If she accepted the iniquity of serfdom, why did Catherine, on reaching the throne, award thousands of serfs to her supporters? Put in its best light she may have believed that this reversal of her belief was temporary. She had to deal with the immediate situation. The landowning nobility, along with the army and the church, had put her on the throne. She wished to reward them. In Russia in 1762, wealth was measured in serfs, not land. If she was going to reward her supporters granting titles and distributing jewellery, she gave them wealth. Wealth meant serfs.

Adapted from Robert K Massie, *Catherine the Great*, 2012

Extract B

The Legislative Commission opened Catherine's eyes as never before to the immensity, the stupendous variety and diversity, of the Empire that she had planned to reform so rapidly and so fully. Her attempt at codification and reform of the laws proved to be far more complicated than she had imagined while composing the Great Instruction in the privacy of her study. Her enlightened sentiments seemed forgotten when they collided with fundamental issues of the multinational hierarchical society of her giant realm. The problems turned out to be larger than the Empress had anticipated. From the Legislative Commission she reaped abundant publicity at home and abroad, presenting herself as an enlightened practical philosopher-sovereign seated firmly on a brilliant throne. Yet its leisurely progress tried her patience, just as its sporadically acrimonious debates tested her nerves. If the Legislative Commission disappointed, Catherine, must bear some responsibility for its inadequate preparation and confused proceedings.

Adapted from John T Alexander, *Catherine the Great*, 1989

Extract C

Although Pugachev was gone, the discontent remained. Mistrust and hatred rose like a fog between the propertied classes and the under-privileged, between the Empress and those at the bottom of the pile. But Catherine did not care. She could have learned from experience and tried to diminish the people's hostility by applying the principles contained in her Instruction. But she preferred toughness to conciliation. If she had in the past, even very vaguely, considered freeing the serfs, she now recoiled with horror from the idea. What atrocities might these primitive people perpetrate if they were suddenly freed? For the same reason she thought that it would be dangerous at the moment to restrict the nobles' powers over their slave livestock. The nobles and the landlords were the pillars of the Empire. And this was not the moment to reduce taxes either, with famine raging in the provinces devastated by the rebels, and the state coffers empty! Let everything remain as it was. Immobility would be Russia's salvation, at least for the time being.

Adapted from Henri Troyat, *Catherine the Great*, 1993

01 Using your understanding of the historical context, assess how convincing the arguments in these three extracts are in relation to why Catherine the Great did not reform the social structure of Russia.

[30 marks]

Student response

The argument put forward on Extract A is that Catherine did not emancipate the serfs, which would have completely changed Russia's social structure, because she needed to reward those who had put her on the throne - the nobility, Church and army. The only way to do this was to give them wealth and 'wealth meant serfs'. The argument in this extract is that Catherine was intellectually opposed to serfdom but that circumstances prevented her from carrying out what she believed in. The extract also suggests that Catherine probably intended to emancipate the serfs in the longer term, once she was fully settled on the throne and that 'the reversal of her (enlightened) belief' was only 'temporary' in 1762, the year she began her rule.

This is quite a convincing argument. As an 'outsider', both German and a female, who had been brought to Russia to marry the weak Tsar Peter III, and whose position as Empress was the result of dubious political intrigue, she could not afford to risk causing offence to the powerful nobility at the beginning of her reign. An attack on the social structure of Russia could have led her lose the throne as quickly as she had acquired it. Nevertheless, the extract rightly comments on her familiarity with the ideas of the Enlightenment philosophies and her concern to bring about social change. It is known that both before and after she seized the throne, Catherine enjoyed exchanging letters with Voltaire, Diderot, Montesquieu and the Grimm brothers.

Although the Extract suggests that Catherine's enlightenment ideas went into reverse once she became Empress, this argument could be challenged. Catherine tried to put some reforms into effect, compiling the 'Great Instruction' in 1767 - which expressed her views on matters such as education and fair punishment and by summoning an elected Legislative Commission to revise Russian Law in 1767-69. These measures showed a positive attempt to bring about social reform. She included almost all groups in society, from the nobility and Church to state peasants, although not the privately-owned serfs, in her Legislative Commission.

However the argument in Extract A is again confirmed by noting that the 'Great Instruction' merely repeated traditional views of society, stating that that a 'fixed order' was necessary, with some to govern and others to obey. It also talked about the danger of sudden emancipation, which is the point made in the extract. This would confirm that whilst Catherine had reforming intentions, she did not, at that stage of her reign, have any thoughts of serf emancipation. The pressures from the nobility and the need to suppress popular revolts would help to explain this behaviour and corroborate the view in Extract A.

Extract B offers the argument that Catherine was unable to effect change because 'the problems turned out to be larger than the Empress had anticipated'. It also argues that Catherine was herself to blame for the failures of the Legislative Commission because she did not prepare adequately for it and allowed its proceedings to be 'confused'.

It is certainly true that Catherine had little real knowledge of the state of her empire when she came to the throne. Her life had been sheltered and lived behind palace walls, so Extract B has some validity in arguing that the Empire's problems were probably greater than she had expected. She did make an attempt to get to know her Empire, however, after becoming Empress. For example, she went on expeditions into the Russian provinces, attended meetings of the Senate, studied Russian

finances and reviewed the fleet. All these activities must have shown how difficult it would be to impose Enlightenment values on a very traditional and backward country.

However, Extract B is too critical of Catherine's failure to make the Legislative Commission work. Summoning it in the first place was a sign of her commitment to progress and its failures were more to do with her praiseworthy attempt to bring together a diverse range of interests, than from her failure to 'plan'. She produced the Great Instruction for the Commission to work from and supplied it with clear guidelines for action. The Commission provided plenty of opportunity for discussion and some of its ideas were used in the later legislation which reformed local government so it is unfair to suggest it was a complete write-off, as Extract B does. Its closure was more to do with the demands of the war with Turkey and the issue of Poland, than disorganisation and an abandonment of the whole idea of social reform.

Extract C is different from Extract A and B because it refers to a later period in Catherine's reign - after the Pugachev revolt of 1773-4. The argument of this extract is that the revolt ended any ideas Catherine might previously have had, to emancipate the serfs and reorganise society, because she needed the nobles solidly behind her in the aftermath of the revolt. It argues that she thought emancipation would be 'dangerous' after 1773 and suggests that the nobles and landlords were the 'pillars of the Empire'. It also argues that the revolt reinforced conservatism in Russia - so other possible reforms, such as reform of taxes were also abandoned in favour of 'immobility'.

The argument given in Extract C is supported by knowledge of the fears brought about by Pugachev's revolt. The rebel's claim to be Peter III produced a widespread and, for Catherine, potentially devastating rebellion in the south of Russia during which Kazan was seized and set on fire giving rise to fears that St Petersburg would be next. Around 3 million serfs gave their support and it is not surprising that Catherine rapidly concluded the Turkish War in 1774 in order to deal heavy-handedly with the uprising. The legislation Catherine passed following the crisis was, as Extract C suggests, an understandable reaction to a dangerous time. Provincial and municipal government were overhauled and in the Charter to the Nobility in 1785, the nobles' absolute power over their serfs was confirmed along with other long-standing rights such as the nobles' exemption from personal taxation. These rights were proclaimed without any comparable need for the nobility to serve the state (as had happened in the past).

Source C argues that Catherine 'preferred toughness to conciliation' but she had very little choice. Catherine had only survived the Pugachev revolt because of the loyalty and superiority of her military and she was determined to prevent further peasant revolt by repression. The Charter was issued to ensure full noble support for the autocracy and this had become particularly important by this stage because of the expansion of the empire also. Although Extract C does not point this out, Catherine desperately needed loyal nobles to take control of here conquered territories and land was of no use to nobles without serfs to work it.

Commentary – Level 5

This is a very effective answer, though it is considerably longer than could be reasonably expected in the one hour permitted in the exam. It demonstrates comprehensive awareness of the arguments advanced and, in each case, assessing the extent to which the arguments are convincing. The answer is controlled and consistently focused with appropriate deployment of knowledge of context. It would be quibbling to suggest that the knowledge of context could be developed further. This is a controlled, analytical answer with clear judgements and is clearly a Level 5 answer.

Paper 1C (A-level) The Tudors: England, 1485-1603: Specimen question paper**Extract A**

The dynastic threat to the Tudor regime must not be exaggerated. There was no one to cause rival political tensions amongst Henry VII's relations and no obvious focus for political discontent. It is true, the supporters of Simnel and Warbeck dressed their ambitions in dynastic clothes, but the most important revolt in Henry VII's reign, the Cornish Rising of 1497, was not dynastic. On the contrary, it was sparked by the parliamentary grant of that year to finance an invasion of Scotland. The tax revolt erupted in the south west because Cornishmen refused to underwrite a campaign against Scotland for which, they believed, a scutage or land tax levied in the north was the correct source of finance.

Adapted from John Guy, *Tudor England*, 1990

Extract B

In May 1502 Sir James Tyrell and several other persons were arrested and executed for treason. At the same time Lord William de la Pole, brother of Suffolk, and Lord William Courtenay, son of the earl of Devon, were taken into prison from which they did not emerge until after Henry's death. It must be supposed that this is because Henry expected a far reaching conspiracy. Perhaps Henry's agents were inventing these threats in order to advance their own positions, but it is nevertheless hard to avoid the conclusion that there was a spirit of disaffection among the old families. No doubt the ambitions of the great families were also aroused by the deaths of the king's sons, Edmund on 12 June 1500 and Arthur on 2 April 1502, but even without the disturbing influence of dynastic interests there was wavering support for the King in the ranks of the old nobility.

Adapted from J D Mackie, *The Earlier Tudors*, 1987

Extract C

Whilst Henry VII used every means at his disposal to reduce the pretensions of mighty subjects, he also did his utmost to build up his own power. The restoration of royal finances was a key element in this. The King recognised that the secret of recovering royal authority lay in making himself richer than his subjects. This was one reason why, unlike Edward IV, he retained possession of the Crown lands. But there was another reason. Land was the basis of local power. By keeping royal estates in hand and administering them through his own household servants, Henry maintained a direct royal presence throughout his kingdom.

Henry VII was not as ruthless, consistent or as continuously successful as this brief account implies. He faced major rebellions, especially in 1497, and was never entirely secure on the throne. His preferred approach to the control of the provinces by divide and rule created crises and tensions in some parts of the kingdom and stored up trouble for his successor in others. But by ceaseless vigilance and unrelenting pressure on all his subjects, great and small, Henry made himself respected, feared and obeyed.

Adapted from A J Pollard, *The Wars of the Roses*, 2001

01 Using your understanding of the historical context, assess how convincing the arguments in these three extracts are in relation to the threats to Henry VII's position in the years 1485 to 1509.

[30 marks]

Student response

There were many threats to Henry's position during his reign, some however were more significant than others.

John Guy in source 1 argues that there was no significant dynastic threat to Henry's reign and he argues the threats that occurred should not be "exaggerated". This is certainly true in regard to Perkin Warbeck, who it could be argued was the most significant threat to Henry in that he was welcomed to the court of both Margaret of Burgundy, Charles V of France and James of Scotland, who married him to a relative. Their support gave Warbeck weight to his identity of being the York heir, and yet his attempts to invade England were thwarted. He was not supported by the nobles in Ireland and in Scotland as a consequence of the Treaty of Ayton, James deserted him easily, so he was not such a great threat to Henry. It could be argued that it was Henry who gave weight to Warbeck's attempts on his throne as he took the threat very seriously, making demands from other foreign powers to return him to England. Guy further criticises Warbeck and another usurper, Simnel as not being dynastic threats but "dressed their ambitions in dynastic clothing". This argument can be challenged by the fact that Simnel was given foreign support by the Irish nobles including Earl of Kildare and Margaret of Burgundy who sent financial aid and German soldiers. The Irish even crowned Simnel and so it could be argued that it was a serious threat. However, as soon as the rebellion entered English ground in 1487, it was crushed hence proving it was not a major threat. It appears that with both rebellions it was opportunism of the supporting nobles like Symonds or Charles VIII trying to unsettle Henry's foreign policy towards France, rather than a significant threat to Henry's throne. Guy argues the most serious threat to Henry's reign was not dynastic but from the Cornish rebellion which was a "tax revolt" caused by Henry's intentions to go to war against Scotland, that the Cornish felt was inappropriate for them to finance. It is a valid argument that Guy puts forward as the rebellion raised 10,000 armed men, who marched as far as London. It created so much fear in Henry as the great landowners such as William Stanley did not stop the rebellion, allowing it to pass, hence why it is argued to be the most serious threat, although even with them it must be remembered that it was easily put down by Lord Daubney. Consequently, Henry refrained from similar taxation again and was forced to reach agreement with Scotland. Overall the argument put forward by Guy does appear to be convincing in terms of historical hindsight as it can be proved the rebellions amounted to very little yet to Henry at the time, the threats appeared real and a threat to this throne.

J.D Mackie in source B has an alternative perspective and argues that Henry did fear a conspiracy against his position from the nobility of England, and that he "expected" it. This is a valid claim as Henry had witnessed Richard III betray his nephews after the death of his brother their father Edward. He also knew that during the Battle of Bosworth his father in law Stanley swapped sides, leaving Henry with the impression that families of the English nobility were not loyal and could not be trusted, hence his paranoia regarding usurpers and the imprisonment of De La Pole and Courtenay. Furthermore Mackie argues that Henry was so concerned by threats to his throne that he executed James Tyrell in 1502 and this could be linked to his later point that there were dynastic interests and threats from nobles "aroused by the deaths of the King's sons". Tyrell's execution in 1502 would have been within the context of the death of Edmond and Arthur, leaving only second son Henry as the solitary heir, showing that even towards the end of his reign Henry felt his position was under threat. This may have caused concerns amongst the nobles that the Tudor dynasty was not secure and

therefore a potential route to the throne was available. This would have also caused anxiety for Henry who had not married after Elizabeth and was fearful for his family name, hence his overzealous and aggressive actions towards the end of his reign. However, Mackie states that Henry's agents could have "invented these threats in order to advance their own positions". Yet, it is hard to avoid the dissatisfaction amongst the nobles due to Henry's policies, hence their support of plots. For example Henry's tight control over bonds and his committed policy to allow hereditary titles and funds to die out caused outrage amongst the nobles who felt it was their entitled right to have these such as Sir Walter Herbert who was denied his brothers Earldom of Huntington and so the claim by Mackie is correct in this area. It was Henry's treatment of Stanley who had supported Warbeck that led Stanley to engage in treasonous activities in 1494-5 which resulted in his execution. Stanley's motives were not due a dynastic desire but in complaint at the way he had been treated over not receiving an Earldom despite being the catalytic force for Henry's victory at Bosworth and his rumoured comment to not take arms against Warbeck if he was the true heir led to his execution. To conclude, Mackie's perspective is summed up accurately with "even without the disturbing influence of dynastic interests there was wavering support for the king amongst the ranks of the old nobility". This is most convincing because during the reign, Henry withdrew his need for the nobles, isolating their power through reducing their retainers, imposing bonds upon them, limiting the number of Earls he created and looked to build up the urban professionals through the creation of the Council Learned under Empson and Dudley whilst expanding the merchant middle class through trade agreements with foreign powers because he trusted them far more than the old English noble families is the most valid claim.

Source C argues that to reduce the threats previously discussed Henry saw that it was important to build up his own power. It goes on to say that to achieve this he saw that it was important to restore "royal finances" and so become richer than his subjects. Looking at the evidence this is certainly true as the actions following Bosworth are considered. This decision to alienate finances through the privy chamber was one way in which he was able to increase income to around £42,000pa by the end of the reign showing the importance for both his own reign and that of Henry VIII, further leading us to question Pollard's argument that he "stored up trouble for his successor". It is also true that his use of land to keep control through a "presence throughout his Kingdom" can be supported by the way he used wardship to improve his finances and control lands of whole families. Furthermore, his Act of Parliament that gave more power to JPs was a further measure that supports the argument of him having a significant presence in the country which shows he saw it as important to reduce the threat to his own position. As Pollard is right to point out the threats to Henry from the pretenders show he was never fully secure, although either through military force e.g. Cornish Rebellion or through agreement with foreign nations e.g. Edward de la Pole he successfully and easily neutralised their threat, suggesting the threat may have been greater in his own mind. It must also be concluded in support of Pollard that he died respected and feared. Nobles, such as Stanley who stepped out of line were executed, meaning that he was able to bring an end to the internal conflict that characterised the period of the War of the Roses, his lenient dealings, even with pretender Simnel who became his falconer, reveal why he became respected. Yet, the most significant evidence that shows he dealt with all threats to secure his throne was his handing over to his son Henry, who was betrothed to Catharine of Aragon, a significant foreign dignity. This ability to enable an heir to succeed him shows that although the threats may have been significant for some of his reign, his skill in restoring the finances, ensuring an heir, controlling the nobility and foreign alliances reveal that by the end the threats had been removed.

In conclusion, the most convincing argument is put forward by Pollard when he states that Henry was "never entirely secure on the throne". Given how Henry came to the throne through the usurpation of Richard and also the history of the Wars of the Roses, noble discontent and schemes to take the

throne, as evidenced by the Pretenders, would have to have been expected by Henry throughout his reign. Consequently, his actions in removing these threats in terms of dealings with the nobles, financial developments and interaction with foreign powers were all part of Henry's "ceaseless vigilance and unrelenting pressure", that meant he was a monarch who became "respected, feared and obeyed", which allowed him to remove the threats he faced and pass on his throne to his heir.

Commentary – Level 5

This is a carefully structured and effective response, though it is considerably longer than could be reasonably expected in the one hour permitted in the exam. The interpretations of the three Extracts are accurately identified and knowledge of context used effectively to challenge and corroborate these. Occasionally, points are not fully developed; for example, it would have been useful to explain the significance of Henry not re-marrying after the death of Elizabeth. Overall, however, this is a Level 5 answer.

Level 4 responses**Paper 1L (A-level) The quest for political stability: Germany 1871-1991: Specimen question paper****Extract A**

It is sometimes said that Weimar Germany experienced boom conditions between 1924 and 1929. Certainly iron and steel, coal, chemicals, and electrical products recovered quickly after the war. Recent research suggests, however, that the extent of the 'boom' has been greatly exaggerated. In the late 1920s growth rates were unsteady; capital investment was already falling by 1929; unemployment was never less than 1.3 million and reached 3 million by February 1929.

The relative affluence of these years was reflected politically in a sharp decline of support for parties on the extreme right and left. Middle of the road parties were making steady progress. When the Republic celebrated its tenth anniversary in 1929, there seemed reasonable grounds for optimism. A closer look at political life in the late 1920s quickly destroys these illusions. From the start the existence of a multi-party system made the task of creating a viable democracy difficult. Proportional Representation accentuated the difficulty. It proved immensely difficult to form coalitions with majority support in the Reichstag.

Adapted from William Carr, *A History of Germany, 1815–1985*, 1987

Extract B

The middle years of the Weimar Republic, sometimes referred to as the Roaring or Golden Twenties, saw a temporary return of domestic prosperity. Many western loans were made to Germany creating an impressive boom that persuaded many that the crisis of 1923 had been resolved. Germany used the borrowed capital in two profitable ways: financing a programme of public works and investing in the modernisation of industry. In 1923 German industrial output had fallen to 47 per cent of 1913 levels, but by 1929 it surpassed 1913 levels by 4 per cent.

The return of prosperity brought with it a corresponding improvement in international relations, partly because the Western powers recognised that their economic well-being in an increasingly interconnected economic order rested on cooperation rather than on conflict. This also lowered the political temperature in Germany. In 1925, the Weimar Republic gained new respectability with the election as president of the venerable Paul Von Hindenburg, who would painstakingly observe his oath to the republic despite his monarchist convictions.

Adapted from K Fischer, *Nazi Germany: A New History*, 1995

Extract C

The unemployment insurance bill of 1927 was admirably suited to deal with the problems of moderate unemployment as existed at the time, but was stretched to the limit when the Depression began to be felt in the following year. The Depression had already had a devastating effect on the economy by the spring of 1929 and it was obvious that Germany would not be able to meet the increased payments demanded by the Dawes Plan that year. With 3 million unemployed by February 1929 it was unlikely that the unemployment insurance fund would be able to meet the demands made upon it.

A new reparations commission was formed and the resulting Young Plan, published in June 1929, reduced the annual payments. The right-wing parties mounted a massive campaign against the Young Commission. Hitler and the NSDAP joined the campaign and Hitler's tactics paid handsome dividends. He was now in respectable company and he began to focus his attention on the disaffected middle classes. The response was immediate. Money began to flow into the party's coffers and spectacular gains were made in state elections. All this seems to have escaped the notice of politicians in Berlin.

Adapted from M Kitchen, *A History of Modern Germany*, 2012

01 Using your understanding of the historical context, assess how convincing the arguments in these three extracts are in relation to the economic and political strength of the Weimar republic before 1929.

[30 marks]

Student response

The argument in Extract A is that the traditional picture of Germany between 1924 and 1929, which is one of economic prosperity and political stability, is wrong. These years are often referred to as the 'Golden Years' and are seen as a time when all went well under the careful guiding hand of Gustav Stresemann. These are the years after the hyperinflation of 1923 when American loans under the 1924 Dawes Plan enabled economic growth and brought higher living standards for many. This is usually taken to explain the absence of political putsches (such as occurred during the early years of the Weimar Republic) and relative political quiet of this period.

Whilst Extract A acknowledges that some industries, such as iron and steel, coal, chemicals and electrical products 'recovered quickly' after World War I, it suggests that the subsequent economic growth was 'unsteady'. It is true that there were fluctuations in growth, with the electrical, chemical, car and plane industries far outstripping the expansion of smaller industries and less well-funded industries such as textiles. Although the extract mentions the growth of heavy industry, coal production was only 79% of its 1913 level by 1927 and whilst productivity improved, neither iron nor steel had surpassed their pre-war performance before 1927, so this comment is slightly misleading. Germany's balance of trade had been in deficit since 1926 and there were certainly signs, as the extract suggests, that the German economy was slowing down before 1929 and that capital investment had fallen back. Furthermore, the extract's mention of growing unemployment can also be corroborated by statistics. Unemployment never fell below 1.3 million in these years and by February 1929, it had reached 3 million.

Extract A's interpretation of the difficulties of political life in the late 1920s is also borne out by the facts. Multi-party coalitions (the result of proportional representation which created a mass of different parties within the Reichstag and no one majority ruling group) continued and there was a high turnover of governments with six different coalition governments between November 1923 and June 1928. Extract A singles out 'the existence of a multi-party system' as the key reason for political weakness, ignoring the importance of the growing domination of the right and the division within the Zentrum which also added to the political problems between 1924 and 1929. The SPD, although the largest single party, did not serve in any government between November 1923 and 1928 and it was less than number of parties than their inability to compromise that weakened the political strength of the Republic before 1929. Furthermore, the extract fails to acknowledge that, unlike the economic problems, Weimar's political ones appeared to be improving from 1928 when Muller's 'Grand Coalition' was formed.

In relation to the political and economic strength of Germany between 1924 and 1929 Extract A therefore offers a balanced picture which can mostly be corroborated by evidence. Although some of the detail could be questioned this does not affect the validity of the overall argument

Extract B offers a positive interpretation of Germany's economic and political strengths in the years between 1924 and 1929, although even here, comments such as 'persuaded many that the crisis of 1923 had been resolved' suggest that the author appreciates there is another side to the view of prosperity that the extract gives. Economically, Extract B puts forward the view that foreign investment, which was used to finance public and to modernise industry, was the key factor behind economic strength. It is certainly true that capital was necessary to enable German companies to exploit their country's huge economic potential and that following the 1924 Dawes Plan and the stabilisation of the currency (with the Rentenmark and subsequent reichsmark), foreign investors poured money into the country. The extract rightly links this capital to 'the modernisation of industry'. This involved the rationalisation of production, so that huge cartels came to dominate the growth industries. Modernisation also involved investment in scientific research, for example in chemicals and electricals, both of which had also been stimulated by the war. Investment in public works is also put forward as an important factor, although this had a downside which is not acknowledged in the extract. The calls on government finance, given its commitment to welfare and pensions were enormous and by 1929 Germany was living well beyond its means. Furthermore, Extract B fails to point out that Germany's dependence on foreign loans and export markets was also a liability. When world trade slumped in 1929, loans were recalled and overseas investment came to an abrupt end.

Politically, Extract B suggests that the Weimar Republic flourished thanks to improved international relations and the instatement of President Hindenburg who 'observed his oath despite his monarchical convictions'. This interpretation has some validity but fails to emphasise Hindenburg's strongly conservative and nationalist views which encouraged the growth of the right-wing and the continuation of the right-wing judiciary, civil service and universities. Whilst he may have helped provide an air of respectability, encouraging former opponents on the right to support the regime before 1929, he did nothing to increase commitment to democracy in Germany, so Extract B's praise is rather too simplistic. Furthermore, whilst international relations improved as Germany joined the League of Nations and participated in international treaties such as Locarno and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, this was not a political strength since these actions created more internal political division. The moves gave ammunition to those that opposed fulfilment and suspicion of Stresemann's intentions was a factor weakening the political coalitions before 1929.

Overall, the argument put forward in Extract B is too one-sided to be totally credible. Whilst the author backs his opinions with some factual detail, he ignores both the economic and political weaknesses of the 1924 to 1929 period.

Extract C provides an argument focused on 1927-1929. It suggests that there was an economic crisis in these years and this sapped the Weimar Republic's political strength, allowing the emergence of the Nazis. The Extract's analysis of the economic situation is correct. It is true that a slow-down in the economy was already being felt in 1927 and that by February 1929 unemployment had reached 3 million. However, the extract appears to suggest that it was the acceptance of the Young Plan in June 1929, as a result of the government's inability to meet demands for unemployment benefit and Dawes Plan payments that was the trigger for the growth of the Nazi Party. This is far too simple and the suggestion in Extract C that the Weimar government failed to notice what was happening is highly unconvincing given the Nazis' propaganda efforts and the behaviour of the SA, whose involvement in street brawls would hardly have gone unnoticed. It is true that Hitler won many converts because of the economic crisis from 1929 and that he made a bid for middle-class support, money and votes.

However, to suggest that the Nazis were sapping the political strength of the Republic before 1929 is untrue. The Nazi party only had 12 deputies (following the 1928 elections) and remained a minority party, even if a growing one.

Overall, the argument in Extract C is of limited value in relation to the economic and political strength of the Weimar Republic before 1929 because of its limited time-span and its tendency to anticipate post-1929 developments.

Commentary – Level 4

There is a clear attempt to assess and evaluate the interpretations in the extracts and much appropriate knowledge of context is deployed to support the assessments, though it is longer than could be reasonably expected in the one hour permitted in the exam. The answer is, however, unbalanced, with extensive assessment of Extract A but limited assessment of Extract C. Whilst it offers strong judgments, these are occasionally overstated. For example, Extract A suggests that the traditional picture of Weimar has been 'greatly exaggerated' which is not the same as 'wrong' as suggested in the answer. There could also be further development in places, such as in the comments relating to Stresemann's foreign policy. Overall, it is a solid Level 4 answer.

Paper 1A The Age of the Crusades, c1071-1204 (A-level): Specimen question paper**Extract A**

Economic and social problems touched the knightly class as a whole and taught it to look on the crusade as a way out. There was a crisis in the agricultural economy of Southern France and Italy. Recurring famines, due to production failing to keep pace with the rising population, were due to the custom of dividing an inheritance between all the heirs, producing ever smaller holdings. The position began to improve when the custom was discontinued and Northern France developed the system of primogeniture, the right of the eldest son to succeed to the whole inheritance. Younger sons had to look after themselves, whether by going into the Church or by taking up a military career.

Obviously, the crusade acted as a safety valve for a knightly class, which was constantly growing in numbers. It is within this context that we must see an individual's love of adventure or hunger for loot.

Adapted from H E Mayer, *The Crusades*, 1990

Extract B

Reading the charters that have survived, the picture is one of families making sacrifices in disposing of property to provide cash for departing crusaders. There is very little evidence to support the proposition that the crusade was an opportunity for spare sons to relieve their families' burden or for landless knights seeking to make a fortune for themselves overseas. It was also common for several members of a family to go – Baldwin of Guines took his four sons – and frequently it was the senior rather than the junior members who went.

The disposal of assets to invest in the fairly remote possibility of settlement after a 2000-mile march to the East would have been a stupid gamble. The odds could have been lessened simply by waiting until after the agricultural depression had passed and the flood of properties on the market had subsided. But this was an age when religion benefited from extravagant generosity and it makes much more sense to suppose that they were moved by idealism.

Adapted from J Riley Smith, *The Crusades*, 1996

Extract C

Many knights relied for their livelihoods on decisions made about war and peace by lords to whom they were tied. Great lords, such as the crusade leaders, had to raise armies, and the only means at their disposal was from among the traditional 'feudal' body of knights to whom they were bound in relationships based on marriage, conditions of land tenure, neighbourliness or simple friendship. Urban II's recruitment method was to approach the heads of noble houses who, when they took the cross, recruited from among the warriors who were dependent on them. In theory, taking the cross remained voluntary, but it was natural for large numbers of feudal dependants to accompany their lords on crusade. Peer or kinship pressure was also a factor. Joinville, by his own account, took the cross with other lords, among them his cousin, the count of Saarbruck which suggests that taking the cross worked through existing relationships.

Adapted from A Jotischky, *Crusading and the Crusader States*, 2004

01 Using your understanding of the historical context, assess how convincing the arguments in these three extracts are in relation to the reasons why knights went on Crusade.

[30 marks]

Student response

Extract A, 'The Crusades', is the most convincing of the three provided sources, based on the arguments and evidence it provides. It considers the idea that the non-spiritual rewards many believed to be obtainable from the crusade was one of the key points in why knights travelled on the crusade, and gives exceptional detail into why this was the case. The main reason for this apparent desire for plunder and riches is due to the 'crisis in the agricultural economy of Southern France and Italy', which consisted of droughts and famines occurring in the 1090s. One specific famine which happened in 1095 was made worse for non-nobles, as the wealthy began to store food and rapidly increase the price of it. Although this factor would affect the masses more than the knights, the lands on which they worked probably belonged to these knights, and would therefore begin to also affect them too. The extract also considers the custom of the inheritance of land, and how it would simply be passed onto the eldest son of a family, leaving the rest of his siblings to 'look after themselves'. With no guaranteed source of income, and the probable pressure put on them from their family, knights in these circumstances may have felt inclined to join the crusade in order to gain some form of wealth or reward elsewhere, putting their status as a knight into practice rather than simply joining the ranks of the Church. Despite these reasons provided in the source, it should be noted that it contains no mention of religion as another factor, and therefore is rather one-sided in terms of argument, and lacks range of all the reasons that are being considered.

Extract B on the contrary, does consider the religious reasoning for participating on the crusade, challenging source A's evidence by stating that there is 'little evidence to support the proposition...for landless knights seeking to make a fortune'. This point is backed up by the letters sent by Urban II as in all of the four letters sent out during the period of time after the sermon at Clermont in 1095, not one of these mentions the idea of going on the crusade for plunder. According to Fulcher of Chartres, one key point of Urban's sermon was Canon 9, which focuses on the idea that those who attended, 'prompted by piety alone' would 'suffice for all penance'. Riches and personal gain was never once considered. However, Riley-Smith, the author, states that all evidence towards the salvation reasoning for going on the crusade was found upon 'reading the charters that have survived' and would therefore offer the account of the sermon, and the crusade itself, from the perspective of a churchman. This would, as a result, make this evidence much less impartial and unreliable as a neutral source to explain why knights went on the crusade, as it was presented by an entirely different class of people who may have not been entirely familiar with the motives of the knights at the time.

The final extract, C, is unlike the aforementioned sources in the fact that it provides considerable evidence for both spiritual and non-spiritual reasons as to why the knights went on the crusade. The main reason brought forward concerns the feudal nature of society in this period, and considers the 'tied' status of knights to their lords and landowners. As the knights owed their land to their lords, they were left with almost no choice but to attend the crusade if their lord also wished to do so. As stated in the extract, many lords acted as crusade leaders, due to the lack of kings on the pilgrimage, who instead remained in their respective countries to rule over the remaining masses as willed to by Urban II. This meant that, although other reasons for the knights attending the crusade may have existed, the extract proves of how it was mainly due to the actions of their lords above them, and the mouvancess they formed as a result of Urban's 'recruitment method' that persuaded most nobles to join in. The extract,

however, also briefly mentions how bringing the 'cross remained voluntary', showing that religion was still important to these social rankings and one of the final goals, if not the most essential or most accepted. Not much else is provided on this reasoning, however, so the extract only provides a broad range of views in this argument.

Despite its limited range of views when considering religion, overall, Extract A has to be the most convincing of the three. It is due to its description and explanation as to why the potential rewards of the crusade were so important, to knights and also makes reference to specific events and customs which existed during the period, drawing significant conclusions and arguments as a result.

Commentary – Borderline Level 3/4

It is important to stress that this exercise does not require comparative evaluation and whilst students may wish to offer an opinion as to which extract is the most convincing, this is not required. This answer is effective in that it clearly identifies the interpretations and arguments advanced in the three extracts and offers some comment as to the extent to which they are convincing. There is, however, limited deployment of knowledge of context to challenge or corroborate the interpretations; some is offered, but it is not fully developed. For this reason, it is borderline Level 3/4.

Level 3 responses**Paper 1G (A-level) Challenge and Transformation: Britain 1851 – 1964: Additional specimen question paper****Extract A**

The 1945–51 Labour government introduced extensive welfare legislation and this was followed in the 1950s by a gradual relaxation of wartime austerity. Without a return to the unemployment levels of the inter-war period, many people anticipated the establishment of a more egalitarian society in Britain. If this was measured by a reduction in inequalities of wealth, progress was made. In 1938, the top 100,000 earners in the United Kingdom received 11.7 per cent of all personal income before tax; in 1955 this had fallen to only 5.3 per cent, and the share of the top million fell from 21.5 per cent to 12.3 per cent. Real wages of the bottom 12 million out of a total employed population of around 22 million rose by 24 per cent between 1949 and 1955. In this sense, relative to the pre-war period, the 1950s saw the advent of the affluent working class, leading to the so-called ‘never-had-it-so-good’ years of the late 1950s and 1960s.

Adapted from Edward Royle, *Modern Britain: A Social History 1750–1985*, 1987

Extract B

British working class life in 1939 looked very different from that of 1930. More workers were employed in factories and offices than in domestic service, reinforcing their sense of collective interest and their bargaining power. In the evenings young workers enjoyed their financial independence at cinemas and dance halls. Yet what had not changed was just as evident as what had. Unemployment had not gone away, families still endured the hated means test. Compensation for boring work and continued economic and political subordination came from a new consumer culture. However, Labour’s victory in 1945 and its post-war reforms signalled that the gaping social chasm of 1939 had narrowed slightly. By 1957, according to Harold Macmillan, Britons apparently ‘had never had it so good’. But the voices of working class Britons offer a different view. Far from being a period of unprecedented affluence, the income gap between the rich and the poor, which had dramatically narrowed in the 1940s, widened in the 1950s.

Adapted from Selina Todd, *The Rise and Fall of the Working Class 1910–2010*, 2014

Extract C

From the 1930s a new economy grew up based on mass production and mass consumption, laying the basis of post-war prosperity. In the war years the real wages of workers rose by 81 per cent due mainly to full employment; a 1944 White Paper committed government to ‘maintain a high and stable level of employment’, which was achieved for almost thirty years. Indeed, the welfare state was built on the foundations of full employment as the post-war Labour government poured resources into New Jerusalem projects. However, in 1951 workers rejected the Austerity Britain projected by Labour; the Tories now delivered thirteen years of uninterrupted prosperity, almost doubling living standards in a generation. From the mid-1950s affluence began to re-shape society. There was a big increase in home ownership and a huge growth in the number of private cars, television sets and other consumer

durables. By 1964 the five-day week, plus two weeks' holiday, had become standard. A new economic order had converted capitalism into the great engine of prosperity.

Adapted from Robert Skidelsky, *Britain Since 1900*, 2014

01 Using your understanding of the historical context, assess how convincing the arguments in these three extracts are in relation to the growth of affluence amongst the working classes.

[30 marks]

Student response

These three extracts are all linked to the growth of affluence amongst the working classes in the years after World War II. There is some reference to the period before the war but the arguments are about the postwar years.

Extract A is convincing. It tells us that in 1938, the top 100,000 earners in the UK received 11.7% of all personal income before tax but in 1955 only 5.3% did so and the share of the top million had also fallen. This means that the rich were less well off, suggesting that the working class were more affluent. This is convincing because these are facts and statistics so do not contain opinion. The extract also makes the comment that the real wages of the bottom 12 million of the total employed population of 22 million rose by 24% between 1949 and 1955. This is a very clear statement about growing affluence and shows some figures to support it. It is therefore convincing.

From my own knowledge I know that this links to the post-war boom when workers did well and there was almost full employment.

Extract A makes many convincing statements. It argues that the 1950s saw the advent of the affluent working class which led to the never-had-it-so-good years of the late 1950s and 1960s. I know this to be true from my own knowledge. It links to Macmillan's speech in 1957 when he said that the people had 'never had it so good', and he should have known since he was the Prime Minister. However, I also know from my own knowledge that he also went on to talk about economic problems and asked 'is it too good to be true?' He was worried about inflation and Britain's sluggish growth rates compared to other countries. However, this doesn't alter the argument. The working class had plenty of jobs -including work for women in the growing service industries and jobs for young people who helped their family incomes. The late 1950s and 1960s are called the ~~an~~ age of consumerism and people bought more cars, household goods and luxuries. This shows that this extract has a convincing argument.

Extract B also refers to Macmillan's 'never had it so good' speech but it is much less positive about everything. It says that the income gap widened in the 1950s, even though it had narrowed in the 1940s. This suggests that the working class would be worse off. This goes against the evidence that working people were enjoying more jobs and more affluence. It seems to misunderstand Macmillan's speech and even says that times were better in the late 1930s, ignoring the impact of the 'hungry thirties' which made this a wretched time for many working class people, particularly in the north of England. It may be that the writer does not mean to imply that the working people suffered and only that the rich got even richer but it is not very clear. Therefore I do not find this a very convincing source.

Extract C is a better extract because it explains how the real wages of workers, which increased in the war years when there was full employment. This links to Extract A although it is referring to an earlier period. This is about the impact of total war on Britain which gave workers and especially women new opportunities to earn money. The extract tells us about the government wanting to maintain full employment in a 1944 white paper. It also mentions the beginning of the welfare state, which I know to have been a massive breakthrough for workers providing care 'from the cradle to the grave'. This was provided by the postwar labour government which wanted to help workers who couldn't afford private insurance. This is what is meant by 'New Jerusalem projects' and it is convincing.

Extract C is very convincing when it says that there were 13 years of uninterrupted prosperity under the Tories and that living standards doubled in a generation. This is correct and it ties in with Extract A. The extract is right to say that there was increased home ownership and that people bought cars, TVs and other consumer items. I know that these were boom products in the 1960s. It is also quite convincing when it says that people worked for only 5 days a week, because they used to work on Saturdays as well, but of course this wasn't everybody. It says workers got 2 weeks holiday, which was true for many, and I know that by the 1960s some people were even going on package holidays abroad, particularly to Spain. So this source shows a very convincing picture of the growth of affluence amongst the working classes.

None of these extracts provide very much detail. Extract A is the best because it has a lot of statistics, but Extract C also refers to some government acts. Extract A and Extract C do provide convincing arguments that the working classes became better off after the war and they have enough evidence to support their views. Extract B tries to suggest this was not the case but it isn't written very clearly and the other extracts and my own knowledge prove it wrong. So, I think Extracts A and C provide the most convincing evidence.

Commentary – Level 3

This is a moderately successful answer, but contains weaknesses. Overall, it does recognise the arguments advanced in the extracts, albeit descriptively and there are, on occasions, examples of knowledge of context which support the judgements offered in relation to how far the arguments are convincing. There are, however, some significant weaknesses in the answer. The introduction is descriptive and adds nothing of value and the conclusion is unnecessary as comparative assessment is not required. It is unbalanced, with very limited assessment of Extract B. The use of the first person detracts from what should be an objective assessment and the use of words such as 'true' suggest immaturity of understanding of the nature of historical interpretations. It is also very assertive in its judgements without appropriate reference to context and the references to statistics as 'facts' and to MacMillan being in a position to 'know' simply because he was Prime Minister suggests an unsophisticated appreciation of historical evidence. It is a Level 3 answer.

Paper 1A The Age of the Crusades, c1071-1204 (A-level): Specimen question paper**Extract A**

Economic and social problems touched the knightly class as a whole and taught it to look on the crusade as a way out. There was a crisis in the agricultural economy of Southern France and Italy. Recurring famines, due to production failing to keep pace with the rising population, were due to the custom of dividing an inheritance between all the heirs, producing ever smaller holdings. The position began to improve when the custom was discontinued and Northern France developed the system of primogeniture, the right of the eldest son to succeed to the whole inheritance. Younger sons had to look after themselves, whether by going into the Church or by taking up a military career.

Obviously, the crusade acted as a safety valve for a knightly class, which was constantly growing in numbers. It is within this context that we must see an individual's love of adventure or hunger for loot.

Adapted from H E Mayer, *The Crusades*, 1990

Extract B

Reading the charters that have survived, the picture is one of families making sacrifices in disposing of property to provide cash for departing crusaders. There is very little evidence to support the proposition that the crusade was an opportunity for spare sons to relieve their families' burden or for landless knights seeking to make a fortune for themselves overseas. It was also common for several members of a family to go – Baldwin of Guines took his four sons – and frequently it was the senior rather than the junior members who went.

The disposal of assets to invest in the fairly remote possibility of settlement after a 2000-mile march to the East would have been a stupid gamble. The odds could have been lessened simply by waiting until after the agricultural depression had passed and the flood of properties on the market had subsided. But this was an age when religion benefited from extravagant generosity and it makes much more sense to suppose that they were moved by idealism.

Adapted from J Riley Smith, *The Crusades*, 1996

Extract C

Many knights relied for their livelihoods on decisions made about war and peace by lords to whom they were tied. Great lords, such as the crusade leaders, had to raise armies, and the only means at their disposal was from among the traditional 'feudal' body of knights to whom they were bound in relationships based on marriage, conditions of land tenure, neighbourliness or simple friendship. Urban II's recruitment method was to approach the heads of noble houses who, when they took the cross, recruited from among the warriors who were dependent on them. In theory, taking the cross remained voluntary, but it was natural for large numbers of feudal dependants to accompany their lords on crusade. Peer or kinship pressure was also a factor. Joinville, by his own account, took the cross with other lords, among them his cousin, the count of Saarbruck which suggests that taking the cross worked through existing relationships.

Adapted from A Jotischky, *Crusading and the Crusader States*, 2004

01 Using your understanding of the historical context, assess how convincing the arguments in these three extracts are in relation to the reasons why knights went on Crusade.

[25 marks]

Student response

Extract A is the most convincing of the three extracts as it introduces us to many different reasons for why the knights may have wanted to travel to the Holy Land. Although most motives were religious there were also a variety of reasons why these knights decided to travel to the Holy Land. It reveals both financial issues with the knights in these times but also opportunities to be had in the East and the advantages that there are when travelling these great distances.

Extract A produces many different factors for discussion and a variety of logical reasons why the knights may have gone on this crusade. There was agricultural and economic crisis in Southern France and Italy which would have impacted their lives. Also there was a huge problem with inheritance because originally they split it equally between them but then decided that all the inheritance would go to the oldest so the rest would have to endure without. So there was a huge issue with both food and money which would force you out of the place you're living which is why they may have come on the crusade because they are limited in the way of resources and the East has many benefits to support these issues. The extract draws appropriate conclusions on how this would have resulted in looting in the East because they are taking what they didn't have at home and what they think they deserve.

Extract B offers many valid points that support motives for the reasons why the knights went on crusade. As they may not have had a lot of financial support so by using their assets as an investment allowed for them to have the money to gain more financial support through looting in the East, although this wasn't meant to be the original objective of the crusade. Some saw the crusades as an opportunity to spare sons in order to relieve families burden or landless knights that may see opportunity to gain land. Many knights may also have seen there to be advantages later on in their adventures across the East. By travelling East all their sins would be forgiven at their journey's end allowing them a lot of freedom. I agree with 'the odds could have lessened simply by waiting until after the agricultural depression passed' for if they had done so the actual crusade would have been held back by giving the East time to recover making it far more difficult for the crusaders. I was convinced by this extract because it offers many clear motives as to why the crusaders may have wanted to travel East and the factors pushing them away from home.

Extract C is convincing as it shows how the feudal system may have forced the knights to join the crusade and gives us a clear indication in to the reasons why. Many knights relied on the decisions of their leader or lord and because of the strength of the friendship or authority. They may pressure them to join these crusades and give them a reason why they should fight for that specific cause. One of the largest factors was peer or kinship pressure which could be related to how Godfrey of Bouillon was pressured by his aunt Matilda of Tuscany. One other issue was friends and family would either go or be pressured to go so lots of pressure was placed on people to go in order to repent their sins. This extract has a convincing conclusion because it mentions how 'Joinville took the cross with other lords among them his own cousin the Count of Saarbruck' which suggests that taking the cross worked through existing relationships.

Overall, Extract A is the most convincing because it gives a huge variety of reasons why knights may have travelled to the East and looks at many different factors as to how their lives may be impacted because of this. Bringing them both financial benefits but also religious benefits although not made as clearly in Extract A focusing on physical benefits that may help them. Also it gives clear push and pull

factors as to reasons why this may be a reason to leave and to join the crusade. So extract A is more convincing in my opinion.

Commentary – Level 3

The answer is not fully secure in demonstrating an appreciation of the interpretations of the three extracts and this is especially the case in relation to Extract B. It is inappropriate to suggest that each extract offers many valid reasons when each essentially has strong single interpretations. There is a tendency to summarise what is said with very limited deployment of knowledge of context which places the response in low Level 3.