

History

Answers and commentaries A-level (7042)

2R The Cold War, c1945 — 1991

Marked answers from students for questions from the June 2022 exams. Supporting commentary is provided to help you understand how marks are awarded and how students can improve performance.

Contents

The below content table is interactive. You can click on the title of the question to go directly to that page.

Question 1	3
Question 2	11

Answers and commentaries

Please note that these responses have been reproduced exactly as they were written and have not been subject to the usual standardisation process.

This resource is to be used alongside the A-level History Component 2R The Cold War, c1945-1991 June 2022 Question paper and inserts.

Question 1

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these three sources to an historian studying the relationship between the US and South Vietnam in the years c1960 to 1962.

[30 marks]

Mark scheme

- L5:** Shows a very good understanding of all three sources in relation to both content and provenance and combines this with a strong awareness of the historical context to present a balanced argument on their value for the particular purpose given in the question. The answer will convey a substantiated judgement. The response demonstrates a very good understanding of context. **25-30**
- L4:** Shows a good understanding of all three sources in relation to both content and provenance and combines this with an awareness of the historical context to provide a balanced argument on their value for the particular purpose given in the question. Judgements may, however, be partial or limited in substantiation. The response demonstrates a good understanding of context. **19-24**
- L3:** Shows some understanding of all three sources in relation to both content and provenance together with some awareness of the historical context. There may, however, be some imbalance in the degree of breadth and depth of comment offered on all three sources and the analysis may not be fully convincing. The answer will make some attempt to consider the value of the sources for the particular purpose given in the question. The response demonstrates an understanding of context. **13-18**
- L2:** The answer will be partial. It may, for example, provide some comment on the value of the sources for the particular purpose given in the question but only address one or two of the sources, or focus exclusively on content (or provenance), or it may consider all three sources but fail to address the value of the sources for the particular purpose given in the question. The response demonstrates some understanding of context. **7-12**

L1: The answer will offer some comment on the value of at least one source in relation to the purpose given in the question but the response will be limited and may be partially inaccurate. Comments are likely to be unsupported, vague or generalist. The response demonstrates limited understanding of context. **1-6**

Nothing worthy of credit.

0

Student responses

Response A

Source A makes the argument the US-South Vietnam relations were going smoothly as a result of the brave actions of Diem to protect his nation from Communism while developing it further. It is somewhat valuable when examining the relationship between the USA and South Vietnam (SV) as the message was sent from one President to another. The fact the President Eisenhower has written this message is very telling of the relations – since he had gone back on his predecessors policy of containment, this letter provides insight into the new doctrine he had brought to his government. Indeed, during this period the nature of the US-SV relationship was more diplomatic than militaristic, while the Eisenhower administration had provided \$400m in economic aid for development until 1961 they did not commit any troops. This, alongside with the emphasis on optimistic development in the source as exemplified in the 'challenge of building your country', shows how Eisenhower viewed American bilateral relations as being laid on a foundation of economic cooperation. This the source is valuable in informing us the reasons for their close economic relationship. At the time, the fact that Eisenhower had claimed 'Vietnam's ability to defend itself from Communism has grown' which is a valuable insight when examining US-SV relations as it was this belief by the US during the Eisenhower presidency which kept the development of troops back. It is evident that the reluctance of Eisenhower to aid SV militarily rested on his assumption that as long as the US helped them develop economically and further their nation's ability to resist the north with their own resources – the situation in Indochina would play out favourable to US interests.

However, the fact that the message was made public by the white house 3 days after it was sent also makes it clear that this was likely a publicity stunt. As the VietCong's foundations were laid in the October of 1960 (after the Paris Peace Agreement that ended Vietnam's war of independence outlawed the stationing of communist troops in South Vietnam) – this was likely a pre-emptive message to warn North Vietnam of the dangers of attacking a US ally and therefore has less value as a tool of examining the nature of US-SV relations in private. But perhaps the least valuable part of the source is Eisenhower's claim that 'Vietnamese people have developed their country in almost every sector' as the government of President Diem was an ineffective one. Diem was incompetent, autocratic and a nepotist who appointed his own brother Nhu as the prime minister to the detriment of the country. In fact SV had gone backwards since democracy when it came to the promotion of tolerance – with the Buddhist majority in the country being oppressed greatly by Diem who was a Roman Catholic. In fact, the government of Diem had conducted the 'Pagoda Raids' which led to the burning and destruction of many Buddhist Temples and this had become major news in the West to the disdain of USA since even the Communists in the North had respected the Buddhists in the country against their own ideology. This put a very tense strain on US-SV relations between 1960 and 62, despite what Eisenhower would claim as the clear distaste for Human Rights by the government of Diem contrasted with the relative tolerance by Ho Chi Minh in the north.

Thus overall, it is evident that the source is not very convincing as the message acts as public reinforcement of a relationship that was considered not very important to Eisenhower militarily.

Source B makes the argument that the US-SV relations have been heightened to a very limited form of military cooperation by Kennedy but remain largely economic in nature. The source is very convincing when examining the initial American response to the breakout of the Vietnam War and the reluctance of the USA commit troops to Diem in order to repel the northern assault. The fact that the conference was delivered by Kennedy only a year after the assumed office and with the memory of the Cuban Missile Crisis (CMC) from a few months earlier still in mind provided a valuable context to the reason for heightened involvement in South Vietnam. Kennedy's approach to levelling up US-SV relations can be seen as an outcome of his campaign promise to be harder on Communism as well as the distrust he had left behind for Communists from the CMC. Furthermore, as the tone of his answer is very matter-of-factly, it becomes more valuable as it is clear that he seeks to keep the American public informed of the US entanglement in SV. This also provides another reason for the reluctance of the USA to commit troops as of yet because which took place in Oregon and New York after the CMC and had created public pressure against foreign intervention for President Kennedy. In terms of the content of the source, it is valuable when examining the belief Kennedy held in the early stages of the war which shaped his relationship to SV. He believed that he was 'assisting in every way we can', when he provided economic and advisory aid to Vietnam in order to advise Diem in the war – most of whom had fought in the Philippines and had experience of guerrilla warfare as well as ammunition and money.

However, the information provided in Source B is made less valuable by the fast paced war in Vietnam and the American escalation during the later part of the Kennedy administration. As a response to the assassination of high ranking generals of the SV Army, ARVN, including General Nguyen which the VietCong claimed responsibility for – the USA was already involved in ground operations with the CIA directing a counter-attack of bombings and assassinations in North Vietnamese cities. In fact the suicide bombings in Hanoi in Dec 1961 and Jan 1962 would not have been possible without the cooperation of the CIA with SV. This clearly shows that by this time, the US had already committed to supporting Vietnam more directly in their war with the North and Kennedy had ordered the Joint Chiefs to draw up OPLAN 34A in order to destroy the forces of North Vietnam. This clearly shows that in secret Kennedy had committed himself to preservation of SV at all costs and the military connection of the US to the Vietnam war was in the process of being ramped up with the groundwork being laid for the eventual bombing operations that would come after 1962. In fact it is obvious that the emphasis of support to Vietnam who possess 'the greatest courage' was likely an attempt by Kennedy to manufacture consent for further intervention in Vietnam and the purpose of the highly publicised nature of a top-secret US involvement in SV (which would jeopardise relations with communist countries) was an attempt by the President to lay the public groundwork for the troop deployment which would begin in April.

Overall, Source B is somewhat valuable as despite the covert escalations of US presence in Vietnam Kennedy was largely honest about the level and justifications for the US-SV relations.

Source C, which provides the disadvantages of US-SV relations through the political capital necessary to achieve US aims is perhaps the most valuable source when looking at US-SV relations. As the note was confidential advice from one of the President's advisors, its contents are plain, free of propaganda and actual in order to ensure that the decision taken

by Kennedy was grounded on reality rather than hope. This makes it very convincing, as the tone of the note is incredibly pessimistic about the future of the conflict and the relations between US-SV are examined without emotional attachment on the basis of purely politics. Galbraith had foresaw all of the problems which the US would face – showing the reason for the retrained support offered by the USA between 1960-62. The reluctance of the USA to commit troops had been drawn from Galbraith's analysis of the French intervention – which had become costly that the USA had to foot 50% of the bill by the end, only to end in humiliation of the battle of Dien Bien Phu – where he feared US soldiers would 'bleed as the French did'. Which is what happened, as by the conclusion of the war almost 58,000 Americans had dies in Vietnam – a fate that was avoided in this period as the brunt of the NV attack was directed to the ARVN which engaged them. In fact, the reluctance to support Diem's projects outright was clear in the price they'd have to pay as Galbraith even foresaw the consequences of relocating 4m villagers into 3000 hamlets in the Strategic Hamlets Program as the resulting famine and societal collapse pushed many in SV to join the VietCong. This makes clear why the USA did not takes these steps in 60-62, as the communists were seen as aggressors throughout the conflict, especially with the Tet Offensive in 1961 which created a horrible image for Vietnam and rallied the south Diem for the time being.

However, while the note layed out the realities of committing to SV, since the advice was not heeded by the Kennedy and his successors it has little value in assessing the relationship that developed in the face of this adversity. The note was passed to Kennedy on 4 April 1962 – but despite this advice only a few weeks later the first US soldiers would be flown into SV, showing that even the advice of the note becomes outdated within a few weeks as the US ignores the fact that they are 'backing a weak and ineffectual government'. That consideration is particularly valueless as Kennedy publicly absolved Diem of his sins and legitimised his governance when he hosted the President and his wife in the White House in May 1962. Kennedy had committed himself to upholding the SV regime, which he viewed as a necessary evil able to keep the North at bay through dictatorial focus. The Americans in this period even valued the fact that Diem had rounded up and killed 120,000 Communists in the 'White Terror'. Thus Galbraith's involvement in Indochina was only accelerating throughout 1962. The fact that this came despite his warning pf a 'major political outburst' further makes the source less valuable as the large protests that directed at the Republican president Nixon and the conflict undermined both parties equally – providing another reason for understanding why Kennedy ramped up support for SV by 1962 as there was a largely bipartisan support (and thus bipartisan blame sharing) for the war.

Overall, this source is very valuable as despite the fact the Kennedy did not heed Galbraith's advice – the strategic concerns laid out here show why he was initially against more involvement.

This is a Level 5 response

This response has a clear focus on the question throughout and assesses the content of each source individually for its value. There are a range of comments on different aspects of provenance such as author, date and purpose and whilst some comments are less developed, there is an excellent awareness of specific contextual knowledge surrounding the sources. There are clear references to the limitations of each source and crucially, the response focuses precisely on the relationship between the USA and South Vietnam in these years, and makes precise judgements regarding the value of each source.

Response B

Source A has limited value when studying the relationship between the US and South Vietnam in the years 1960-1962, as it provides a warped perspective of the South's successes to Diem himself. Firstly, Eisenhower states that 'You...have used your strength well...resisting communist imperialism', which is less valuable due to the growing strength of the NLF established in 1960 and the influence that the Northern informants were having on the southern workers, students and intellectuals. The statement: 'Vietnamese people have developed their country in almost every sector' further lacks value as due to Diem's Mandarin catholicism, the Buddhist population faced significant oppression throughout 1960-62, resulting in the Buddhist crisis in 1963. There was also still intense poverty among the lower classes, unlike in the North which had undergone mass land redistribution with an agrarian focus under the Chi Minh. Showing that in some respects the North were actually ahead of the South. The source however does have some value, as it is a direct message from Eisenhower to Diem, which indicates that this is how the US-South Vietnam relationship operated at face value, with a tone of flattery and congratulation. The source is also somewhat valuable in the statement 'the United States will continue to assist Vietnam', as US involvement didn't begin to end until Nixon's Vietnamisation policy in 1969, which shows that US has committed to maintain their relationship with South Vietnam. Overall, source A is limited in value in displaying the motive of the relationship between the US and South Vietnam, however does give some insight into how they directly interacted.

Source B is limited in value when studying the relationship between the US and South Vietnam 1960-62, as the details of US involvement are strongly understated. The quote 'we are out there helping with training and transportation' does have some value, as Kennedy committed military advisors to the ARVN, however intentionally disregards the influence of the strategic Hamlet Program initiated by Kennedy, which created over 3000 Hamlets by March 1962. This is most likely omitted due to the failure of the program, at its end by the time of the source – Feb 1962 – as the Hamlets acted as a breeding ground for NLF support. The provenance is further lengthy, as due to the address being to a journalist, the information shared would be common knowledge as to not overstate US involvement to the USSR or China who were involved in North Vietnam, which could've caused conflict earlier. The source however does have some value in stating 'we are assisting the people of South Vietnam...to maintain their freedom.' as it asserts Kennedy's commitment to containment and prevention of Domino in South Asia. Despite this, Source B has limited value in explaining the relationship between the US and South Vietnam, as Kennedy only describes what he wants the public to see rather than his true involvement.

Source C is mostly valuable when studying the relationship between the US and South Vietnam 1960-63, as it is a confidential warning note that almost predicts Johnson's/Nixon's war. The source states 'we are backing a weak and ineffectual government and corrupt leader.' which is valid as Diem was nepotist and places his members into significant political positions, such as his Brother. Diem was also unable to control the growing influence of the NLF in the South, further adding value to the source's argument. The source is also valuable in detailing the 'growing military commitment' under Kennedy, as the expression of conventional forces such as helicopters was increasing and moving away from a nuclear umbrella style of pressure. This is valuable as it shows that the US were truly distrustful of the South and were

cautious of maintaining their relationship. The fact that the source is a confidential note to the president from his advisor further adds value, as it expresses the genuine concerns over South Vietnam felt by the Kennedy administration. The source however is somewhat limited in value as Galbraith uses the fear of a 'major political outburst about a new war' to scare Kennedy after the failure of operation Mongoose on the Bay of Pigs in 1961, attempting to pressure him to end US commitment in Vietnam.

The source also states that 'we should end our commitment to [Diem]' which limits its value as those steps were not taken, possibly indicating an extreme view from within Kennedy's administration rather than a consensus opinion. Over all however, source C is mostly valuable in studying the relationship between the US and South Vietnam 1960-62 as it expresses genuine and confidential fears over what the relationship could lead to.

This is a Level 3 response

This response assesses each source in turn for value but judgements are undeveloped and do not fully explain why the sources are valuable in relation to the question. There are some comments on provenance and content but these are quite simplistic and generalised. There is a general awareness of contextual knowledge, but this is not always used to assess the value of each source specifically. The response does make an attempt to answer the question but overall lacks detail and precision.

Question 2

'American involvement in Europe, in the years 1945 to 1949, was primarily driven by the desire to advance US economic interests.'

Assess the validity of this view.

[25 marks]

Mark scheme

- L5:** Answers will display a very good understanding of the full demands of the question. They will be well-organised and effectively delivered. The supporting information will be well-selected, specific and precise. It will show a very good understanding of key features, issues and concepts. The answer will be fully analytical with a balanced argument and well-substantiated judgement. **21-25**
- L4:** Answers will display a good understanding of the demands of the question. It will be well-organised and effectively communicated. There will be a range of clear and specific supporting information showing a good understanding of key features and issues, together with some conceptual awareness. The answer will be analytical in style with a range of direct comment relating to the question. The answer will be well-balanced with some judgement, which may, however, be only partially substantiated. **16-20**
- L3:** Answers will show an understanding of the question and will supply a range of largely accurate information, which will show an awareness of some of the key issues and features, but may, however, be unspecific or lack precision of detail. The answer will be effectively organised and show adequate communication skills. There will be a good deal of comment in relation to the question and the answer will display some balance, but a number of statements may be inadequately supported and generalist. **11-15**
- L2:** The answer is descriptive or partial, showing some awareness of the question but a failure to grasp its full demands. There will be some attempt to convey material in an organised way, although communication skills may be limited. There will be some appropriate information showing understanding of some key features and/or issues, but the answer may be very limited in scope and/or contain inaccuracy and irrelevance. There will be some, but limited, comment in relation to the question and statements will, for the most part, be unsupported and generalist. **6-10**
- L1:** The question has not been properly understood and the response shows limited organisational and communication skills. The information conveyed is irrelevant or extremely limited. There may be some unsupported, vague or generalist comment. **1-5**
- Nothing worthy of credit. **0**

Student responses

Response A

The view that American involvement in Europe in the years 1945 to 1949, was primarily driven by the desire to advance US economic interests is only partly valid. Although economic strength was key to US foreign policy due to the benefits that this provided for as US trade and its own domestic interests, the more significant foreign policy aim of the US between 1945 and 1949 was containment in Europe, with the aim to stop the spread of communism and the USSR's influence in Europe and therefore this was what drove American involvement in Europe, the advancement of economic interests was a secondary policy to complement this, making this view only partly valid.

Firstly, the view that American intervention in Europe between 1945 to 1949 was primarily driven by the desire to advance US economic interests is only partly valid as the US intervened in Europe was to stop the spread of communism and to stop the Soviet Union expanding in Europe. This can clearly be seen in the US policy of containment that was outlined by the Truman doctrine in March 1947. Prior to this Kennan, in his long telegram in February 1946, expressed his concern for the aggressive nature of the USSR especially in Eastern Europe, and his telegram to Truman emphasised the need for increased US involvement in Europe and the fact that the US should be prepared to use force against the USSR to stop the rate at which it was expanding. The Truman doctrine was a result of numerous concerns that were expressed from ambassadors to Moscow, such as Kennan, and even Churchill in his Iron curtain speech March 1946. By 1947, when the policy of containment was announced, it was clear that the USSR were using their salami tactics to dominate eastern Europe and were committed to forming a group of satellite states in Europe, as Kennan had described in his telegram. Soviet expansion in to Europe was a direct threat to the power of the US as following the end of World War two there was a power vacuum in Europe and both powers were keen to gain influence and power in Europe to increase their prestige and super power status on a world stage. As such it was important that the US intervened in Europe, not just for economic interests, but mainly to increase its power against the USSR and to stop the spread of communism which is highlighted in the final discussion of Germany in May 1949 when West Germany was formed and the US had successfully created a Western bloc in Europe and this stopped the further spread of communism into Europe, making this view only partly valid.

However, the view that American involvement in Europe in the years 1945 to 1949 was primarily driven by the desire to advance US economic interest does have some validity due to the weakness of Europe's economy after world war two and the fact that trade and global economic strength was key to the US foreign policy in 1945. This desire to advance US economic interest can be seen through the implementation of the Marshall plan in June 1947. This offered economic aid to all countries in Europe. In total the Marshall plan gave \$13.5 billion to 16 countries in these years, which did prove to improve the state of Europe's economy and thus ensure Europe maintained trade with the US and therefore advanced the USA's own economic interests, which was amply important to the US given by 1945 it produced 50% of the world's goods. However, despite the fact that Marshall aid was offered to all European countries, including ones 'behind the Iron curtain', it was a carefully calculated attempt to stop the spread of communism in Europe and thus ensure the US maintained its

capitalist power in Europe. Marshall and Truman knew that if Europe had a weak economy it would be much more inclined to them to communism and the USSR for help, this was a real threat to the US interest in Europe and would undermine their power and presence there. Therefore despite the fact the the Marshall plan and increased US involvement in Europe did clearly complement the US desire to advance its own economic interests, they were clearly calculated attempts to undermine and threaten the USSR's control of eastern Europe and to limit the spread of communism, therefore this view is still only partly valid.

Lastly, the view that American involvement in Europe between 1945 to 1949 was driven by the desire to advance US economic interests is only partly valid as US involvement in Europe was also to protect democracy. The USA's capitalist views were based upon the idea of democracy and the Truman doctrine was also an attempt to portray the US as protector of global freedom with it's policy of containment. The USSR's actions in Eastern Europe undermined agreements at Yalta in February 1945 as they did not carry out free elections in Poland, as agreed in the declaration on liberated Europe and instead supported the Lublin poles that were established in 1944. They also used Salami tactics rigged elections and merged political parties in Eastern Europe to increase their control and form a strong buffer zone. This clear aggression by the USSR meant that American involvement in Europe between 1945 to 1949 needed to be motivated by more than just to pursue the USA's economic interests, As shown when the USSR threatened Czechoslovakia not to accept marshall aid in 1948, leading to the Czech coup. This clearly highlighted the US need to help protect democracy in Europe in order to maintain its international reputation as a global power and this desire is shown when NATO was formed in 1949 to provide political and military unity in Europe and to ensure US control over western Europe. Therefore US involvement in Europe had to be driven by much more than to just advance its own economic interests due to the aggression of the USSR in Eastern Europe, and therefore this view is only partly valid.

Overall, the view that American involvement in Europe in the years 1945 to 1949 was primarily driven by the desire to advance US economic interests is only partly valid. Although Europes economy was significantly weakened following world war two and this could prove to be a threat to the USAs own economic interests. The aggression of the USSR's actions in Eastern Europe and the desire of the USA to maintain its superpower status and global image of protector of democracy, meant that it has to intervene in Europe for much more than to advance its own economic interests, as it needed to protect democracy and stop the advancement of the power of the USSR in Europe, US outlined in containment, therefore this view is only partly valid.

This is a Level 5 response

This response makes a very clear initial judgement and sustains this judgement throughout. There is a wide range of precise contextual knowledge concerning American involvement in Europe and the candidate expresses different factors to provide a balanced judgement. Throughout the response, there is clear analysis where the candidate links each factor back to American economic interests, which is the focus of the question. The response presents a strong argument regarding the USA being motivated by preventing Soviet expansionism and returns to this specific judgement in the conclusion

Response B

America's involvement in Europe had many reasons behind it including economic interest, containing communism and perhaps to create dominance of their power after WW2. Additionally, it could be argued that it's presence in Europe was a reaction to the USSR and their actions between the years 1945 to 1949. However, arguably it was the threat of the spread of communism that was the main reason for US presence in Europe.

Despite stopping the spread of Communism being the main reason for US involvement, US economic interests did play a major factor. This is evident by the Marshall Plan in 1948. This was arguably driven by economic factors as the US gave \$13.5 billion in a gift form to 16 countries in Europe. However, in return they had to make profit in the US. Churchill argued that their act was the most 'unselfish act in history'. However it could be argued that this was more for economical benefits for the US. Further evidence of the US trying to advance economic interests in Europe is in the new currency in Germany. This was created after Bizonia was formed and the new Duetsche Mark (1948) was brought into Germany. This meant that the US and UK were able to boost west Germany's economy which allowed for the US and UK to be more dominant in Europe.

However, even though economic interests play as part in American involvement in Europe, the most important drive was to stop the threat of communism. For example this is shown by the Greek Civil War which resulted in the Truman Doctrine in 1947. The UK could no longer afford to support the anti-communists in Greece so America was asked to help. The US gave \$400 million to help Greece and Turkey against Communism. Furthermore, the Truman Doctrine said that countries that were at risk of falling to communism. Continuing on, NATO was established which was a defence treaty against communism in 1949. It included 10 european states and Canada, as well as the US. Therefore, this shows that the US were primarily focused on protecting countries against the spread of Communism. However, it could be considered that spending money on countries to protect against Communism couldn't be done is the US were not focused on a strong economical capital.

Another reason to consider for American involvement in Europe could be because they had to react to the USSR actions in Europe, however other arguments are stronger. This is evident by the Berlin Blockade in 1948 to 1949. The USSR severed roads and railways in Germany (Berlin). This resulted in Berliners starving and suffering. Therefore, the US decided to protect the West Berliners in a non-aggressive way. The US supplied food, equipment etc to 2.2 million west Berliners using 200,000 US and UK planes. This lasted 320 days. Therefore, this shows that the US had to intervene due to the USSR's actions in Europe. Additionally, the threat of communism causing the US to take action could be due to the USSR red scare. For example, the satellite states in eastern Europe were taken over by communism. For example, in Poland Gomulka was overthrown and Communism won 80% of the votes. Furthermore, in Hungary the communists won 60% of the votes. This shows that the US had to intervene in Europe due to the USSR's actions in developing cold war tensions.

Further, despite dealing with the threat of Communism and US actions being more of a drive for US involvement in Europe, another reason to acknowledge could be that it was inevitable. For example, the three superpowers after WW2 (Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill) had a

common enemy, Hitler. However, after the breakdown at Potsdam they no longer had this marriage alliance. This therefore would lead to the US heeding to have a presence in Europe. For example at Yalta in 1945 there were disagreements over what should happen with Germany in terms of reparations. They did decide to split Germany into 4 zones as well as Berlin, however Stalin wanted to cripple Germany due to the damage they caused however the US didn't want to. Disagreements also continued at Potsdam due to their differing ideologies (capitalism vs communism). For example, Stalin believed he should get 25% more reparations. Therefore, it could be argued that the US involvement in Europe was inevitable from the start of the cold war as they were destined for disagreements which continued for many years.

In conclusion, there are many factors to be acknowledged for US involvement in Europe, in the years 1945 to 1949, however the main drive was to stop the threat of communism and protect anti-communist countries.

This is a Level 3 response

This response makes a good attempt to answer the question and provides a balanced judgement. There is an initial judgement made, although this could be developed further. There is a wide range of contextual detail provided, however this is not always evaluative and sometimes lapses into a narrative account of evidence. Furthermore, whilst the evidence provided to suggest there was a reduction in tensions is very strong, there is less evidence to suggest that tensions increased. Therefore, the balance of the response is not fully developed.

Get help and support

Visit our website for information, guidance, support and resources at aqa.org.uk/7042

You can talk directly to the History subject team

E: history@aqa.org.uk

T: 0161 958 3865

Copyright © 2024 AQA and its licensors. All rights reserved.

AQA Education (AQA) is a registered charity (registered charity number 1073334) and a company limited by guarantee registered in England and Wales (company number 3644723).

Registered address: AQA, Devas Street, Manchester M15 6EX.

