Mark schemes are prepared by the Lead Assessment Writer and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all associates participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students’ responses to questions and that every associate understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each associate analyses a number of students’ scripts. Alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, associates encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to their Team Leader, who will, if necessary, refer them to the Lead Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students’ reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year’s document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

Further copies of this mark scheme are available from aqa.org.uk
Level of response marking instructions

Level of response mark schemes are broken down into levels, each of which has a descriptor. The descriptor for the level shows the performance at the mid-point of the level. There are marks in each level. For the 3 and 5 mark questions that have only 1 mark in each level you need only apply step 1 below.

To support you in your marking, you will have standardisation scripts. These have been marked by the Lead Examiner at the correct standard. Generally, you will have a standardisation script to exemplify the standard for each level of the mark scheme for a particular item.

Before you apply the mark scheme to a student’s answer read through the answer and annotate it (as instructed) to show the qualities that are being looked for. You can then apply the mark scheme.

Step 1 Determine a level

Start by reading the whole of the student’s response and then, using the mark scheme level descriptors and the standardisation scripts, place the response in the level which it matches or best fits.

When assigning a level you should look at the overall quality of the answer and not look to pick holes in small and specific parts of the answer where the student has not performed quite as well as the rest.

Step 2 Determine a mark

Once you have assigned a level you need to decide on the mark. Start with the middle mark of the level and then look at the student’s response in comparison with the level descriptor and the standardisation script. If the student’s response is better than the standardisation script, award a mark above the mid-point of the level. If the student’s response is weaker than the standardisation script, award a mark below the mid-point of the level.

For the 25 mark questions examiners should bear in mind the relative weightings of the assessment objectives and be careful not to over/under credit a particular skill. This will be exemplified and reinforced as part of examiner training.

Guidance

You may well need to read back through the answer as you apply the mark scheme to clarify points and assure yourself that the level and the mark are appropriate.

Indicative content in the mark scheme is provided as a guide for examiners. It is not intended to be exhaustive and you must credit other appropriate points. Students do not have to cover all of the points mentioned in the Indicative content to reach the highest level of the mark scheme.

An answer which contains nothing of relevance to the question must be awarded zero marks.
### Section A - The metaphysics of God

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question number</th>
<th>Question</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>Explain the difference between the claims ‘God is eternal’ and ‘God is everlasting’.</td>
<td>3</td>
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**AO1 = 3**

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**Indicative content**

- To say that God is eternal means that God exists outside time. He is timeless or atemporal. God has no beginning/end, since these make sense only in time (something starts/stops existing in time).
- To say that God is everlasting means that God exists in time. He exists throughout all time with no beginning or end.

**Note:** no more than 1 mark for an answer which addresses only one of eternal/everlasting, as there is no attempt to explain the ‘difference.’

**Note:** This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.
Explain the evidential problem of evil.

AO1 = 5

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Indicative content

**Students might refer to the evidential problem of evil as the 'inductive' problem of evil and/or the 'a posteriori' problem of evil.**

**Students might make a contrast with the logical problem of evil, but there is no requirement to do so. If students do and if it helps to clarify what is meant by the evidential problem of evil, then they should receive credit. Credit should not be given for reference to the logical problem of evil alone.**

- The quantity (and quality and distribution) of evil/suffering, although logically consistent with the existence of an omnibenevolent (all-loving, all good) and omnipotent (all-powerful) God, counts against the existence of such a God by lowering the probability that such a God exists.
- His being omnipotent (all-powerful) means that he has the capacity to reduce the amount of suffering and his being omnibenevolent (all-loving, all good) means that he has the desire to do so.
- Such a God would want to and be able to (and therefore would) reduce the amount of suffering to the absolute minimum.
- Students might add that his being omniscient (all-knowing) means that he is aware of the evils that exist.

**Note:** This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.
Outline Aquinas' Third Way.

AO1 = 5

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Indicative content

*Students can articulate the argument in a number of ways. As long as the articulation is consistent with the Aquinas text (which is given below, for ease of reference), then credit should be given.*

P1: Contingent beings exist in the universe.

P2: If everything were contingent there would be a time when nothing existed.

P3: If this were so, there would be nothing now as nothing comes from nothing.

P4: Since contingent things do exist now (P1), there must be something that exists necessarily.

C: Therefore there must be something that exists necessarily.

Students might continue this argument in the following way:

P5: Every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another or not.

P6: An infinite regression of causes is impossible.

C: There must be a necessary being (ie a being that has, of itself, its own necessity) and this all people call God.

*Students might contextualise the argument, explaining that it is an a posteriori argument, in which Aquinas argues that the existence of contingent things in the universe is in need of explanation by a being that cannot be conceived not to exist. There is no requirement for them to do this but, if they do, this should not be counted as irrelevance or redundancy.*

**The Aquinas text:** The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for
that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence — which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God. (Summa Theologica, part 2, art 3).

**Note:** This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.
Compare and contrast Paley’s and Swinburne’s versions of the design argument.

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The content is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding.  
Points are made clearly and precisely. Relevance is sustained, with very little or no redundancy.  
Philosophical language is used precisely throughout. |
| 7-9   | The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form.  
The content of the answer is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. The content is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. Any lack of clarity with respect to particular points is not sufficient to detract from the answer.  
Relevance is largely sustained. There may be some redundancy, though not sufficient to detract from the answer.  
Philosophical language is used correctly throughout. |
| 4-6   | The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified.  
The content of the answer is largely correct and most points are made clearly.  
Relevance is not always sustained and there is some redundancy.  
Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the response. |
| 1-3   | There are some relevant points made, but no integration.  
Some points are clear, but there is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant.  
Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately. |
| 0     | Nothing written worthy of credit. |
**Indicative content**

Students do not need to set out either or both arguments, but, if they do so in such a way that they are identifying/clarifying similarities and differences, then credit should be given.

**Empirical – identifying a feature of the world/universe …**

**Paley:** Spatial order (regularities of copresence). Parts put together (in a complex/intricate way) so that they can achieve a purpose eg the eye …

**Swinburne:** Temporal order (regularities of succession governing how events occur over time) ie laws of nature

… and then making an inference from those features.

**Paley:** We explain human products which have this feature in terms of a designer. So we infer that the world has a designer

**Swinburne:** We need to explain these laws of nature and have two possibilities: scientific explanations and personal explanations. Scientific explanations presuppose fundamental laws, so we are left with a personal explanation – God

**Argument forms:** the interpretation of Paley is philosophically contested, so please credit whichever (appropriate) reading the student takes.

**Paley:** traditional reading (TR): an argument from analogy, which is inductive (broadly, ie abductive).

Alternative reading (AR): not an analogy, but a deductive argument.

On either view, there seem to be two ‘analogies’: (a) watch vs. stone: their dissimilarity is the focus; (b) watch vs. universe: their similarity is the focus. The issue is over where to place (b) in the argument.

- TR: Paley (i) identifies design-like-features (DLFs) in artefacts; (ii) argues that they can only come to exist through intelligent design; and (iii) says that natural phenomena are analogous DLF-wise, thus enabling us (iv) to conclude that there is an analogous designer.
- AR: Paley (i) identifies design-like-features (DLFs) in artefacts; (ii) argues that they can only come to exist through intelligent design; then (iii) argues that exactly the same kind of DLFs are to be found in nature, thus enabling us (iv) to conclude that there is an intelligent designer.
- The difference is that, in the first case, the watch is directly involved: similarities between it and eyes are at issue; whereas in (ii) the watch is indirectly involved: it is used to establish the existence of a certain kind of property – one which reflects intelligent designer, and thereafter the argument focuses just on how often this property is found in nature.

**Swinburne:** His argument makes use of (a) an argument to the best explanation (personal explanation over no explanation, having eliminated the scientific explanation) which is further supported by (b) an analogy between temporal regularities like ‘the notes of a song sung by a singer’ on the one hand and the laws of nature on the other. Both (a) and (b) are needed.

**Note:** This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.
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| 21-25  | The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is sustained.  
The student demonstrates detailed and precise understanding throughout.  
The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of it stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended.  
Arguments and counter-arguments are stated in their strongest forms.  
Reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument. Crucial arguments are clearly identified against less crucial ones.  
Philosophical language is used precisely throughout. |
| 16-20  | The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is largely sustained.  
The content is correct and detailed – though not always consistently.  
The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments supporting it.  
Arguments are generally stated in their strongest forms. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated clearly, integrated coherently and defended.  
There may be trivial mistakes, as long as they do not detract from the argument.  
Philosophical language is used correctly throughout. |
| 11-15  | A clear response to the question, in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent.  
The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated.  
A conclusion and reasons are given and those reasons clearly support the conclusion. There might be a lack of clarity/precision about the logic of the argument as a whole.  
Arguments and counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance. Not all arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Stronger and weaker arguments are noted and there are attempts to identify the weight to be given to different arguments, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion.  
Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the argument. |
### Indicative content

Students should respond in the form of an argument, to a clear conclusion. They might argue:

- **Yes** – religious language is meaningful
- **No** – religious language is not meaningful
- Or possibly a more nuanced response, such as ‘Some religious language is and some is not meaningful’ or ‘It depends what you mean by meaningful …’

- **Verificationists/Logical Positivists (such as Ayer):** The Verification principle, either the weak or the strong form (as distinguished by Ayer); a proposition is only meaningful if either:
  - (1) analytic: conceptual, tautological, logical. **Or**
  - (2a) its probable truth could be empirically verified potentially/in principle (the weak version) **or**
  - (2b) its truth could be conclusively empirically verified actually/in practice (strong version).

- Applying this to religious language, some have argued that religious claims such as ‘God loves me’ and ‘God answers my prayers’ would not be meaningful given that they do not meet either of the conditions above.

- **Hick:** religious language is meaningful. This is because religious claims are verifiable – they meet the requirements of the verification principle - but only eschatologically.

- But this might depend on the strength of the argument that eschatological verification is possible. Is the argument for continued post-mortem survival plausible? What if post-mortem experience is ambiguous with respect to the claims subject to verification?
• Flew: religious language is not meaningful. Wisdom’s parable of the gardener shows that the religious believer will not accept anything as falsifying their utterance. Rather than accept that their claims are false, the believer simply qualifies their claim – ‘Death by a thousand qualifications.’

• Hare: religious language is meaningful, but not as assertions/claims about matters of fact, so the requirements of the verification principle do not need to be met. Bliks and the lunatic analogy – religious utterances do not assert propositions, but particular world-views/ways of seeing the world. As such, they are not the kinds of things which can be verified/falsified, because they determine what will (and will not) count as evidence.

• Mitchell: religious language can be interpreted as making claims that are verifiable given what Mitchell regards as a broader and better understanding of what constitutes verification. In the Parable of the Partisan Mitchell suggests that religious believers will allow falsification since they accept that there is evidence which counts against their claim, but not decisively/conclusively.

Students can also receive credit for reference to other approaches to religious language, such as:

• the via negativa (eg Pseudo-Dionysius and the apophatic tradition)
• analogy (eg Aquinas)
• myth/symbol (eg Bultmann, Smart, Tillich)
• other non-cognitive views (eg Wittgenstein, Braithwaite, DZ Phillips)
• our having innate ideas of God permitting us to talk meaningfully about him, despite him being beyond experience (eg Descartes)

As the focus of this question is primarily AO2 do not penalise students for misattributing arguments.

Note: This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.
Section B - The metaphysics of mind

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question number</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>What do eliminative materialists claim about mental states?</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AO1 = 3

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Indicative content

- Some or all of those mental states (phenomena, properties, processes) that are supposed to exist according to a common-sense or folk-psychological theory of the mind do not exist.
- Some or all statements (claims, beliefs) about mental states (phenomena, properties, processes) are false given that the common-sense or folk-psychological theory of the mind is radically mistaken.
- Some students may, in addition, add that what we ought to talk about instead are physical/physiological states or states defined by scientific rather than folk psychology.

Note: This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.
Outline Descartes’ conceivability argument for substance dualism.

AO1 = 5

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**Indicative content**

- This is an argument for substance dualism: the view that there are non-physical/mental substances in addition to physical substances (that minds exist and are not identical to bodies or to parts of bodies).

- The argument might be stated as:
  - (P1) I can conceive of my mind existing without my extended physical body (and indeed the whole physical world) existing.
  - (P2) Anything that I can (‘clearly and distinctly’) conceive of is (metaphysically) possible (*Descartes puts this as: “God could make it so”*)
  - C1: Therefore, my mind existing without my extended physical body (and indeed the whole physical world) is (metaphysically) possible.
  - (P3) If it is (metaphysically) possible for X to exist without Y then X is not identical to Y.
  - (C) Therefore, my mind is not identical with my extended physical body (nor is it identical with any part of the physical world).

- Students might present the argument in terms of clear and distinct ideas (ie I have a clear and distinct idea of mind and body as having distinct essences and thereby as being distinct substances, and, therefore, they are distinct substances).

- P1 is linked to the cogito and the fact that Descartes can doubt the existence of physical reality, but not the existence of his mind.

- It is a deductive and (arguably) a priori argument.

- Students may phrase the argument in terms of what God can do or not (see P2).

**Note:** This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.
Explain how Block’s China thought experiment can be used to argue against functionalism.

AO1 = 5

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Indicative content

- Functionalists claim that if two things are functionally identical (they have all the same functional properties) then they must be mentally identical (they must have all the same mental properties).
- The China thought experiment aims to show that something that is functionally identical to a human mind/brain can lack qualia. This means that functionalism cannot account for / explain qualia (phenomenal properties cannot be explained in terms of (reduced to) functional properties).
- Block explains his thought-experiment as follows:
  - “Suppose we convert the government of China to functionalism, and we convince its officials to realize a human mind for an hour. We provide each of the billion people in China (I chose China because it has a billion inhabitants) with a specially designed two-way radio that connects them in the appropriate way to other persons and to the artificial body mentioned in the previous example. We replace each of the little men with a citizen of China plus his radio. Instead of a bulletin board, we arrange to have letters displayed on a series of satellites placed so that they can be seen from anywhere in China... The system of a billion people communicating with one another plus satellites plays the role of an external “brain” connected to the artificial body by radio... It is not at all obvious that the China-body system is physically impossible. It could be functionally equivalent to you for a short time, say an hour.” (from ‘Troubles with Functionalism’)
  - This objection from Block is sometimes known as the absent qualia objection and it might be phrased in terms of the conceivability / possibility of creatures that are functionally identical to humans, but lack qualia.
  - It is better put in terms of ‘qualia’ than ‘mind’/’consciousness” (given that people mean various things by mind/consciousness; things that might be less controversially achievable by the Chinese ‘mind’).
- Should students decide to set it out more formally, they might argue:
  - P1: Consideration of the China thought experiment shows that it is possible for two functional duplicates to differ mentally such that one (the human) has qualia while the other (the population of China) does not.
  - P2: If it is possible for two functional duplicates to differ mentally such that one has qualia and the other does not then functionalism is false.
o C: Therefore functionalism is false.

- This argument could be put deductively in terms of logical possibility, or inductively in terms of the scenario being most likely physically possible.

Note: This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.
Outline mind-brain type identity theory and explain how the issue of multiple realisability challenges this view.

AO1 = 12

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Indicative content

Mind-brain type identity theory:
- Claims that mental states/properties are ontologically reducible to (identical to) physical/neural states/properties …
- ... but statements about mental states/properties are not equivalent in meaning to any statements physical/neural states/properties (it is not an analytic reduction)
- Students may explain this using analogies such as the morning star and evening star, or Clark Kent and Superman.
- They may make reference to the Frege sense-reference distinction (“pain” and “neural state X” may have the same reference but a different sense).
- This theory claims says that there is type identity (i.e. a particular type of mental state (A) is identical to a particular type of neural state (Y)).
- This means that all people who are in (A) are, ipso facto, in (Y) – this is a denial of multiple realisability.

Multiple realisability challenges the type part of type identity theory:
- The issue may be put in terms of actual empirical evidence or hypothetical/conceivable scenarios (or both).
- Empirical: Evidence suggests that people can have the same type of mental state without having the same type of neural state. No two people’s brains are sufficiently similar. It also seems likely that animals might share some types of mental state with humans without having a sufficiently similar neural anatomy.
- Hypothetical: (1) We can imagine creatures as yet unknown (aliens) who might have a mental state (e.g. pain) but have a completely different physical constitution to us; (2) The same goes for computers and robots that may be able to think, remember etc without having any organic matter at all.

- It can be set out as follows in argument form, though this is not required:
  o P1: Each type of mental state is multiply realizable through more than one distinct type of physical state.
  o P2: If each type of mental state is multiply realizable through more than one distinct type of physical state, then it cannot be identical to any specific type of physical state.
  o C1: Therefore, no type of mental state is identical to any specific type of physical state.
  o P3: According to type identity theory, each type of mental state is identical to a specific type of physical state.
  o C2: Therefore, type identity theory is false.

Note: This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.
Does philosophical behaviourism give the correct account of mental states?

AO1 = 5, AO2 = 20

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Marks</th>
<th>Levels of response mark scheme</th>
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| 21-25 | The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is sustained.  
The student demonstrates detailed and precise understanding throughout.  
The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of it stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended.  
Arguments and counter-arguments are stated in their strongest forms.  
Reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument. Crucial arguments are clearly identified against less crucial ones.  
Philosophical language is used precisely throughout. |
| 16-20 | The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is largely sustained.  
The content is correct and detailed – though not always consistently.  
The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments supporting it.  
Arguments are generally stated in their strongest forms. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated clearly, integrated coherently and defended.  
There may be trivial mistakes, as long as they do not detract from the argument.  
Philosophical language is used correctly throughout. |
| 11-15 | A clear response to the question, in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent.  
The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated.  
A conclusion and reasons are given and those reasons clearly support the conclusion. There might be a lack of clarity/precision about the logic of the argument as a whole.  
Arguments and counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance. Not all arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Stronger and weaker arguments are noted and there are attempts to identify the weight to be given to different arguments, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion.  
Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the argument. |
Indicative content

Students should respond in the form of an argument, to a clear conclusion. They might argue:

- that philosophical behaviourism does give the correct account of mental states
- that philosophical behaviourism does not give the correct account of mental states.

- Students might explain philosophical behaviourism in either or both of the following ways (and some may consider the relative merits of both formulations in the course of the essay):
  - 'Hard' behaviourism: all propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning to propositions that exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states/movements (eg Carl Hempel).
  - 'Soft' behaviourism: propositions about mental states are propositions about behavioural dispositions (ie propositions that use ordinary language) (eg Gilbert Ryle).
- It is a physicalist account of the mind.

- Philosophical behaviourism does give the correct account of mental states:
  - Verificationism in support of philosophical behaviourism: in order for talk/communication about the mind to be meaningful, it needs to be empirically verifiable and must, therefore, describe events that are publically observable.
  - This is what explains our ability to learn mental vocabulary.
  - In this way, some see philosophical behaviourism as bypassing the ‘problem of other minds’ that faces other theories (notably dualism/s).
  - As a materialist theory, philosophical behaviourism does not face any issues that arise from the interaction of the non-physical with the physical.
• Philosophical behaviourism does not give the correct account of mental states:

• The distinctness of mind and behaviour:
  o A 'conceivability' argument (analogous to the usual one) can be applied as an argument against philosophical behaviourism (if the mind were just behaviour then we would not be able to conceive of mind existing without behaviour)
    ▪ Issues, including:
      ▪ Mind without behaviour is not conceivable
      ▪ What is conceivable may not be logically possible
      ▪ What is logically possible tells us nothing about reality.
  o A 'philosophical zombies' argument (analogous to the usual one) can be applied as an argument against philosophical behaviourism (if the mind were just behaviour then we would not be able to conceive of behaviour existing without mind).
    ▪ Issues, including:
      ▪ A 'philosophical zombie' / a ‘zombie’ world is not conceivable
      ▪ What is conceivable may not be logically possible
      ▪ What is logically possible tells us nothing about reality.
  o Hilary Putnam’s ‘Super-Spartans’ and perfect actors.

• Issues relating specifically to qualia:
  o Qualia are defined by their intrinsic properties yet behaviourism analyses (away) mental states into relational properties (behavioural dispositions) and so fails to capture qualia.
  o The ‘inverted’ qualia objection might be used in this context – ie the conceivability / possibility of behavioural duplicates that are qualia inverts.

• Definitional problems
  o Philosophical behaviourists face an issue defining mental states satisfactorily due to circularity (be this 'general' circularity (mental states cannot be analysed without reference to other mental states) or 'specific' circularity (the definition of mental state A will require reference to other mental states as part of its analysis which, when themselves defined, will ultimately require reference to A).
  o Philosophical behaviourists face an issue defining mental states satisfactorily due to the multiple realisability of mental states in behaviour (there is no specific way that one acts when in pain, and there are many, arguably infinite, possibilities).

• Causation
  o Philosophical behaviourism gives an inadequate account of mental causation (what answer can a behaviourist give to the question, “Why did he raise his hand?”; “He wanted to ask a question and so raised his hand” no longer describes a causal sequence).

• Self-knowledge
  o The asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other people’s mental states shows that philosophical behaviourism is false (philosophical behaviourism might even imply that I might sometimes know others’ minds better than my own if I have a better view of their behaviour and its subtleties than I have of my own).

As the focus of this question is primarily AO2 do not penalise students for misattributing arguments.

Note: This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.