

AS
HISTORY
7041/2P

The Transformation of China, 1936–1997

Component 2P The emergence of the People’s Republic of China, 1936–1962

Mark scheme

June 2022

Version: 1.0 Final



Mark schemes are prepared by the Lead Assessment Writer and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all associates participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every associate understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each associate analyses a number of students' scripts. Alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, associates encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Lead Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

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Level of response marking instructions

Level of response mark schemes are broken down into levels, each of which has a descriptor. The descriptor for the level shows the average performance for the level. There are marks in each level.

Before you apply the mark scheme to a student's answer read through the answer and annotate it (as instructed) to show the qualities that are being looked for. You can then apply the mark scheme.

Step 1 Determine a level

Start at the lowest level of the mark scheme and use it as a ladder to see whether the answer meets the descriptor for that level. The descriptor for the level indicates the different qualities that might be seen in the student's answer for that level. If it meets the lowest level then go to the next one and decide if it meets this level, and so on, until you have a match between the level descriptor and the answer. With practice and familiarity you will find that for better answers you will be able to quickly skip through the lower levels of the mark scheme.

When assigning a level you should look at the overall quality of the answer and not look to pick holes in small and specific parts of the answer where the student has not performed quite as well as the rest. If the answer covers different aspects of different levels of the mark scheme you should use a best fit approach for defining the level and then use the variability of the response to help decide the mark within the level, ie if the response is predominantly Level 3 with a small amount of Level 4 material it would be placed in Level 3 but be awarded a mark near the top of the level because of the Level 4 content.

Step 2 Determine a mark

Once you have assigned a level you need to decide on the mark. The descriptors on how to allocate marks can help with this. The exemplar materials used during standardisation will help. There will be an answer in the standardising materials which will correspond with each level of the mark scheme. This answer will have been awarded a mark by the Lead Examiner. You can compare the student's answer with the example to determine if it is the same standard, better or worse than the example. You can then use this to allocate a mark for the answer based on the Lead Examiner's mark on the example.

You may well need to read back through the answer as you apply the mark scheme to clarify points and assure yourself that the level and the mark are appropriate.

Indicative content in the mark scheme is provided as a guide for examiners. It is not intended to be exhaustive and you must credit other valid points. Students do not have to cover all of the points mentioned in the Indicative content to reach the highest level of the mark scheme.

An answer which contains nothing of relevance to the question must be awarded no marks.

Section A

- 0 1** With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, which of these two sources is more valuable in explaining the political situation in China in 1936?

[25 marks]

Target: AO2

Analyse and evaluate appropriate source material, primary and/or contemporary to the period, within the historical context.

Generic Mark Scheme

- L5:** Answers will display a very good understanding of the value of the sources in relation to the issue identified in the question. They will evaluate the sources thoroughly in order to provide a well-substantiated conclusion. The response demonstrates a very good understanding of context. **21-25**
- L4:** Answers will provide a range of relevant well-supported comments on the value of the sources for the issue identified in the question. There will be sufficient comment to provide a supported conclusion but not all comments will be well-substantiated, and judgements will be limited. The response demonstrates a good understanding of context. **16-20**
- L3:** The answer will provide some relevant comments on the value of the sources and there will be some explicit reference to the issue identified in the question. Judgements will however, be partial and/or thinly supported. The response demonstrates an understanding of context. **11-15**
- L2:** The answer will be partial. There may be either some relevant comments on the value of one source in relation to the issue identified in the question or some comment on both, but lacking depth and having little, if any, explicit link to the issue identified in the question. The response demonstrates some understanding of context. **6-10**
- L1:** The answer will either describe source content or offer stock phrases about the value of the source. There may be some comment on the issue identified in the question but it is likely to be limited, unsubstantiated and unconvincing. The response demonstrates limited understanding of context. **1-5**
- Nothing worthy of credit. **0**

Indicative content

Note: This content is not prescriptive and students are not obliged to refer to the material contained in this mark scheme. Any legitimate answer will be assessed on its merits according to the generic levels scheme.

Students must deploy knowledge of the historical context to show an understanding of the relationship between the sources and the issues raised in the question, when assessing the significance of provenance, the arguments deployed in the sources and the tone and emphasis of the sources. Descriptive answers which fail to do this should be awarded no more than Level 2 at best. Answers should address both the value and the limitations of the sources for the particular question and purpose given.

In responding to this question, students may choose to address each source in turn or to adopt a more comparative approach in order to arrive at a judgement. Either approach is equally valid and what follows is indicative of the evaluation which may be relevant.

Source A: in assessing the value of this source as an explanation, students may refer to the following:

Provenance and tone

- as a widely published book written by the GMD leader which clearly focused on his opinion on past events, the source has value in showing how Jiang wanted the position of China in 1936 to be seen, rather than being a candid account of events
- though in May 1936 the GMD had the 'upper hand' over the CCP in China, by 1957 it had been driven from the mainland and faced the ongoing threat of a Communist invasion. Jiang's attempts to justify GMD actions and paint them in a favourable light will affect the value of the source
- the tone of the source is arrogant ('the Communist armed forces had to be disbanded'), valuable in showing how Jiang's high handedness as GMD leader had been a major source of contention in 1936.

Content and argument

- Jiang viewed the CCP as the greater threat to China's stability in 1936, being keen to ensure that the Red Army was 'disbanded'. This can be seen in both Jiang's actions towards the CCP at the time – GMD forces had driven the CCP from most of China and surrounded their base in Yan'an – and in his famous proclamation that Communism was a 'disease of the heart' whilst the Japanese were only a 'disease of the skin'
- the GMD believed itself to be in firm control of most of China in 1936, with Jiang feeling strong enough to dictate terms to the CCP and making reference to himself as 'Generalissimo'. Whilst GMD control did extend across most of China's major cities, in fact in many areas, warlords remained in charge and this, together with the Japanese presence in Manchuria and the CCP base in Yan'an, suggests that Source A exaggerates the GMD's authority at the time
- Source A suggests that the GMD was willing to reach an agreement with the CCP providing it agreed to their terms as set out in the source. This is only of limited value, however, as in practice Jiang was not prepared to negotiate with the Communists in any meaningful way, so much so that in December 1936 he was held captive in Xian by one of his own commanders until he agreed, in principle, to a 'Second United Front' against Japan.

Source B: in assessing the value of this source as an explanation, students may refer to the following:

Provenance and tone

- as a document intended for very limited circulation among the CCP leadership, Source B is highly valuable for showing Mao's true views of the condition of China in 1936, since he did not have to consider public opinion or sensitivities and instead it provides a candid view of the CCP's attitudes at the time
- by September 1936 the CCP's position in China was relatively weak, surrounded as they were by GMD forces and with Jiang's ongoing refusal to halt military action or to join forces against the threat of Japan. This adds value to the source as it shows how Mao planned to overcome the position the CCP found itself in; it is bound to want to reach an accommodation with the GMD
- the tone of the source is frank ('this attitude will capture the people's support'), valuable in showing Mao's self-interested strategy to undermine support for the GMD and strengthen the CCP's position in China.

Content and argument

- that China's condition was unstable in 1936, with Mao viewing the Japanese presence as a highly significant threat and the 'main enemy of the Chinese people'. Mao had good reason to consider the Japanese a threat and aim for united GMD/CCP resistance to them, since by 1936 they had consolidated their hold over Manchuria and in the following year Japanese troops launched an attack on China itself
- that Mao held the GMD in poor regard, believing the NRA to be disloyal and that GMD resolve to combat Japan was limited. In this, Mao was correct and the source is valuable in being a realistic appraisal of the GMD's position. The NRA's poorly treated conscripts were no match for Communist or Japanese forces, and Jiang's policy towards Japan – at least until 1937 – was one of 'compromise', with the bulk of GMD forces in fact directed against the CCP
- that despite seeking a conciliation with the GMD, Mao was adopting policies to undermine Jiang's regime in the longer term. The CCP claim to represent a democratic future China seen in this source is an example of this but has to be approached critically, since Mao's views of mass mobilisation and 'democratic centralism' had little to do with true democracy.

In arriving at a judgement as to which source might be of greater value, students might argue that the existence of Source B proves that Jiang's attempts in Source A to reach a compromise with the CCP were half hearted and so Source B is of greater value. Alternatively, they might conclude that holistically both show the inevitable alignment of both towards the threat of Japan and the X'ian Incident later than year. Any valid and supported judgement is acceptable according to the arguments made.

Section B

0 2 'Nationalist weaknesses were the main reason for Communist successes in the Chinese Civil War in the years 1946 to 1949.'

Explain why you agree or disagree with this view.

[25 marks]

Target: AO1

Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Generic Mark Scheme

- L5:** Answers will display a good understanding of the demands of the question. They will be well-organised and effectively communicated. There will be a range of clear and specific supporting information showing a good understanding of key features and issues, together with some conceptual awareness. The answer will be analytical in style with a range of direct comment leading to substantiated judgement. **21-25**
- L4:** Answers will show an understanding of the question and will supply a range of largely accurate information which will show an awareness of some of the key issues and features. The answer will be effectively organised and show adequate communication skills. There will be analytical comment in relation to the question and the answer will display some balance. However, there may be some generalisation and judgements will be limited and only partially substantiated. **16-20**
- L3:** The answer will show some understanding of the full demands of the question and the answer will be adequately organised. There will be appropriate information showing an understanding of some key features and/or issues but the answer may be limited in scope and/or contain inaccuracy and irrelevance. There will be some comment in relation to the question. **11-15**
- L2:** The answer will be descriptive or partial, showing some awareness of the question but a failure to grasp its full demands. There will be some attempt to convey material in an organised way although communication skills may be limited. There will be some appropriate information showing understanding of some key features and/or issues, but the answer may be very limited in scope and/or contain inaccuracy and irrelevance. There will be some, but limited, comment in relation to the question and statements will, for the most part, be unsupported and generalist. **6-10**
- L1:** The question has not been properly understood and the response shows limited organisational and communication skills. The information conveyed is irrelevant or extremely limited. There may be some unsupported, vague or generalist comment. **1-5**
- Nothing worthy of credit. **0**

Indicative content

Note: This content is not prescriptive and students are not obliged to refer to the material contained in this mark scheme. Any legitimate answer will be assessed on its merits according to the generic levels scheme.

Arguments supporting the view that Nationalist weaknesses were the main reason for Communist successes in the Chinese Civil War in the years 1946 to 1949 might include:

- whilst on paper the NRA appeared stronger than the PLA – at least in the early stages of the war – they were beset by numerous disadvantages. Their poorly motivated conscripts were frequently malnourished and prone to desertion. PLA guerrilla attacks – followed by a major conventional offensive in 1947 – sapped Nationalist morale, and many NRA units simply lacked the will to fight
- the NRA suffered from serious strategic and tactical weaknesses during the Civil War. Jiang was not an able military leader and made serious mistakes, such as committing the bulk of the NRA to a campaign in Manchuria, and most NRA generals were appointed through nepotism rather than talent. The Nationalists found it difficult to respond to highly organised CCP action against its positions and strongholds
- the GMD's hold on the regions of China it controlled was weak. By 1946 it had failed to implement democracy or any other of its Three Principles, and it had little support among the urban population. Most peasants associated the GMD with oppressive landlords – often reliant on brutal landlord militia to retain control – and so welcomed the Communists with open arms. This lack of support seriously undermined the GMD war effort in what was in many ways a political struggle
- GMD corruption at all levels plagued its war effort. Local commanders frequently purloined their troops' pay and supplies sapping morale, and regional governors frequently failed to pass on tax revenues, making it difficult for Jiang to sustain the war effort. Self-interested cronyism at the highest levels also made the GMD ineffective compared to their Communist opponents.

Arguments challenging the view that Nationalist weaknesses were the main reason for Communist successes in the Chinese Civil War in the years 1946 to 1949 might include:

- the GMD were in a much stronger position than the CCP – on paper, at least – in the early stages of the Civil War. They controlled much of China and had benefited from significant American aid by 1946, with the Americans supporting the GMD advance into Manchuria. Numerically they were superior to the CCP in both men and materiel. Given this clear military and territorial advantage, Nationalist weaknesses cannot be the only explanation for their defeat
- the role of foreign powers was an important factor in CCP victory. American aid lessened as the war progressed and stopped altogether in 1948 as GMD-US relations deteriorated, and CCP propaganda portrayed the Nationalists as a foreign-backed power. The PLA gained substantially from Soviet support, both in terms of supplying captured Japanese equipment and in training PLA officers. Foreign intervention – and the lack of it – worked to the CCP's advantage
- Communist tactics were far superior to those of their Nationalist counterparts. Early tactical withdrawals – such as from Yan'an – spread GMD forces thin, and under Lin Biao the PLA transitioned from an effective guerrilla force in the early stages of the war to being able to mount effective offensives against GMD positions with highly motivated troops. This military superiority enabled the PLA to capture Beijing by the start of 1949, sealing the GMD's fate
- the CCP was better placed to win the 'hearts and minds' of the Chinese people and so win the political aspects of the Civil War. Communist propaganda, engaging the people in mass participation and the respect shown to the peasants by the PLA all won the Communists support in the areas it liberated from GMD control, helping to secure victory.

Whilst other factors played a significant role in the Communist victory, it was Nationalist weaknesses that often brought these into play, and so this was the most important reason. For example, the deteriorating relationship between the Americans and Chiang was brought about by US frustration at GMD corruption, and CCP policies and attitudes found greater traction among the Chinese people owing to their past treatment at the hands of the GMD.

0 3 'The main disagreements between China and the USSR, in the years 1953 to 1962, were ideological.'

Explain why you agree or disagree with this view.

[25 marks]

Target: AO1

Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Generic Mark Scheme

- L5:** Answers will display a good understanding of the demands of the question. They will be well-organised and effectively communicated. There will be a range of clear and specific supporting information showing a good understanding of key features and issues, together with some conceptual awareness. The answer will be analytical in style with a range of direct comment leading to substantiated judgement. **21-25**
- L4:** Answers will show an understanding of the question and will supply a range of largely accurate information which will show an awareness of some of the key issues and features. The answer will be effectively organised and show adequate communication skills. There will be analytical comment in relation to the question and the answer will display some balance. However, there may be some generalisation and judgements will be limited and only partially substantiated. **16-20**
- L3:** The answer will show some understanding of the full demands of the question and the answer will be adequately organised. There will be appropriate information showing an understanding of some key features and/or issues but the answer may be limited in scope and/or contain inaccuracy and irrelevance. There will be some comment in relation to the question. **11-15**
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- L1:** The question has not been properly understood and the response shows limited organisational and communication skills. The information conveyed is irrelevant or extremely limited. There may be some unsupported, vague or generalist comment. **1-5**
- Nothing worthy of credit. **0**

Indicative content

Note: This content is not prescriptive and students are not obliged to refer to the material contained in this mark scheme. Any legitimate answer will be assessed on its merits according to the generic levels scheme.

Arguments supporting the view that the main disagreements between China and the USSR, in the years 1953 to 1962, were ideological might include:

- Mao interpreted Khrushchev's actions as being directly critical of his method of rule leading to ideological differences. Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech' was seen by the Chinese leader as directly at least partly towards him and led to a worsening of relations between the men
- there were ideological disagreements and differences about the way the Communist powers should approach the Western world. Mao favoured a more confrontational approach than Khrushchev and disliked the policy of 'peaceful co-existence' with the West, seeing it as a sign of weakness. China publicly criticised 'peaceful co-existence' in 1960, widening the differences
- ideological disagreements over the Great Leap Forward caused major differences between the USSR and China. In Soviet eyes it was a rejection of their methods and Khrushchev criticised it as ideologically inappropriate. The Leap highlighted ideological differences between the two Communist powers and led to a serious deterioration in relations
- disagreements emerged as China became more powerful, since it was no longer content to let the USSR be seen as the ideological leader of the Communist and the developing world. It emerged as a leader of the developing world after the Bandung Conference of 1955 and this, together with interventions like Albania in 1960, caused further strain on Sino-Soviet relations.

Arguments challenging the view that the main disagreements between China and the USSR, in the years 1953 to 1962, were ideological might include:

- the unequal relations between the two countries were a source of disagreement. In the earlier part of this period, relations were based around the Sino-Soviet Treaty. This soured relations between Mao and Khrushchev since the treaty established China as the 'junior partner' in the relationship and seemed reminiscent of the 'unequal treaties' of the past. Mao could not accept what he saw as high-handed treatment by the Soviets
- China became strong in its own right during this period. After the end of the Korean War in 1953, China became more confident in its own abilities and no longer needed the vast quantities of military aid it had received from the USSR. Mao was increasingly prepared to act independently of the USSR and this strained relations between him and Khrushchev moving forward
- the precarious relationship between the two nations' leaders also led to disagreements. When Khrushchev visited China in 1958 Mao deliberately heaped a number of insults on the Soviet delegation, including a humiliating meeting between Khrushchev and Mao at a swimming pool. This deepened the personal animosity between the two Communist leaders, with Khrushchev swift to denounce Mao on a number of issues between 1958 and 1962
- the lack of Soviet support for China, both in response to the US placing missiles in Taiwan and during the border conflicts with India in the early 1960s, demonstrated to Mao that the USSR was a reluctant and unreliable ally and led to Beijing distancing itself from Moscow and conducting itself independently of the USSR. This was a strategic rather than ideological disagreement.

Ideological disagreements between China and the USSR became more pronounced during this period, especially as China grew in power, but the difficult personal relationship between Mao and Khrushchev was also a key source of disagreement between the two and a case could be made that ideology was simply used to justify the tensions caused by this relationship, and the unequal power position between the two nations at the start of the period.