AQA

A-level
PHILOSOPHY
7172/2

Paper 2   The metaphysics of God and the metaphysics of mind

Mark scheme

June 2022

Version: 1.0 Final Mark Scheme

Mark schemes are prepared by the Lead Assessment Writer and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers.   This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all associates participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination.   The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every associate understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each associate analyses a number of students' scripts.   Alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for.   If, after the standardisation process, associates encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Lead Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper.   Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

Further copies of this mark scheme are available from aqa.org.uk

Level of response marking instructions

Level of response mark schemes are broken down into levels, each of which has a descriptor. The descriptor for the level shows the performance at the mid-point of the level. There are marks in each level. For the 3 and 5 mark questions that have only 1 mark in each level you need only apply step 1 below.

To support you in your marking, you will have standardisation scripts. These have been marked by the Lead Examiner at the correct standard. Generally, you will have a standardisation script to exemplify the standard for each level of the mark scheme for a particular item.

Before you apply the mark scheme to a student's answer read through the answer and annotate it (as instructed) to show the qualities that are being looked for. You can then apply the mark scheme.

Step 1 Determine a level

Start by reading the whole of the student's response and then, using the mark scheme level descriptors and the standardisation scripts, place the response in the level which it matches or best fits.

When assigning a level you should look at the overall quality of the answer and not look to pick holes in small and specific parts of the answer where the student has not performed quite as well as the rest.

Step 2 Determine a mark

Once you have assigned a level you need to decide on the mark. Start with the middle mark of the level and then look at the student's response in comparison with the level descriptor and the standardisation script. If the student's response is better than the standardisation script, award a mark above the mid-point of the level. If the student's response is weaker than the standardisation script, award a mark below the mid-point of the level.

For the 25 mark questions examiners should bear in mind the relative weightings of the assessment objectives and be careful not to over/under credit a particular skill. This will be exemplified and reinforced as part of examiner training.

Guidance

You may well need to read back through the answer as you apply the mark scheme to clarify points and assure yourself that the level and the mark are appropriate.

Indicative content in the mark scheme is provided as a guide for examiners. It is not intended to be exhaustive and you must credit other appropriate points. Students do not have to cover all of the points mentioned in the Indicative content to reach the highest level of the mark scheme.

An answer which contains nothing of relevance to the question must be awarded zero marks.

Section A

The Metaphysics of God

| 0 | 1 |

State the definitions of 'God' used by (a) Anselm and (b) Descartes in their ontological arguments.

[3 marks]

AO1 = 3

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
3	A full and correct answer, given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or minor imprecision.
1	Relevant, but fragmented, points.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

(a) Anselm defines God as "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" (*Proslogion* 2).
- o   NB: If students use 'imagined' this should be considered an imprecision: it can have experiential/perceptual connotations which is inconsistent with the *a priori* form of the argument, whereas 'conceived' (or 'thought') clearly has the appropriate cognitive/conceptual connotations.
- o   If students say 'greatest conceivable being' this is also an imprecision: it suggests that God falls within the powers of human cognition generally (or of Anselm's or "the fool's" specifically) and Anselm does not claim this; indeed, he explicitly denies it later in the *Proslogion*.

(b) Descartes defines God as "a supremely perfect being" (*Meditations* 5th).
- o   NB: Given the context, students may well frame their response as 'Descartes has an idea of God as a being with all perfections (or supremely perfect being)…', and that is absolutely fine.

NB:
- In order to access **full marks,** students must state both definitions in accordance with the relevant level (top band) descriptors, as exemplified above.
- Students who give both definitions in accordance with the top-level descriptors but misattribute them (ie in the sense that they just get them the wrong way round) should be awarded **two marks.**
- Responses containing one definition which meets the aforementioned criteria, and contains some credit worthy material on the other (but it isn't full, or may it be imprecise), should be awarded **two marks**.
- Responses containing one definition which is (at least) substantively correct *and attributed to the correct philosopher*, but contains nothing credit worthy on the other, can only be awarded **one mark**.
- Responses with fragments of relevant material on both definitions can be awarded **one mark,** *where they assign that relevant material to the appropriate philosopher*.
- Students who briefly mention that the ontological argument is an (*a priori*) argument for the existence of God should *not* be penalised for redundancy: it is named in the question, and

students may not want to leave anything out. Any inaccurate, unclear or evaluative remarks about ontological arguments *should* be taken into account when awarding marks, however.

Additional indicative content for three marks

- Anselm understands God as a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. Descartes understands God as a supremely perfect being.
- For Anselm God is "that than which a greater [being] cannot be conceived' (*Proslogion* 3). For Descartes God is a being "with all perfections" (*Meditations*, 5th).
- Descartes defines God as a being who lacks no perfection(s), whereas Anselm defines God as a being so great than we cannot (possibly) think of a greater one.

Indicative content for two marks

- Anselm defines God as that than which nothing greater can be conceived. Descartes defines God as a perfect being.
- Descartes defines God as a being with all perfections. Anselm defines God as the greatest (possible) being.
- Anselm understands God as a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. Descartes understand God as a supreme being.

Indicative content for one mark

- Anselm understands God as a being than which nothing greater can be conceived.
- Descartes defines God as a supremely perfect being.
- Anselm understand God as the greatest being. Descartes understands God as a perfect being.

Indicative content for zero

- Anselm defined God as 'a perfect being'. Descartes defined God as 'an unlimited being'
- They defined God as a perfect (eg omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent) being.
- The ontological argument is an *a priori* argument for the existence of God.

Notes:

- Material in parentheses is not required for students to reach levels exemplified in the indicative content.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

| 0 | 2 | Explain the design argument from analogy as presented by Hume.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Students may begin with some remarks on the nature of design arguments in general; for example, saying that they are '*a posterior* (teleological) arguments for the existence of God'. Some may also define analogies; for example, as a 'comparison between things for the purpose of explanation or understanding'.
- But the central challenge of this question is to explain a version of the design argument presented (but not accepted/endorsed) by Hume. Hume presents it for the purpose of then objecting to it and concluding that it is unpersuasive for a variety of reasons. Students do *not* need to make it clear that Hume did not endorse this argument, but they may, and if they do then they should not be penalised for redundancy.
    - NB. Having said that, any actual evaluation of the argument (ie Hume's response) is to be treated as redundant.
- Students may or may not treat the argument from analogy as an argument for the existence of God: they may focus purely on the case for an intelligent designer, and that would be fine.
- It is an *a posteriori* argument: an argument where at least one premise is a posteriori/justified on the basis of experience.
- It is an analogical argument: such an argument is one in which, on the basis of x and y being similar in certain respects, the conclusion is drawn that they will be similar in a yet further respect. In this case, the argument draws an analogy between the properties that human-made objects have and the properties found in nature/natural objects and uses this to conclude that they must have a similar cause (ie a designer/God).
- Hume focuses on what Swinburne would later describe as 'spatial order' or 'regularities of copresence'. This refers to patterns of order within something in space at one instant of time (eg the arrangements of the parts of the human body, the eye, or a cell) which allow a function to be performed. It is fine for students to explain the argument in this way (direct or implied anachronisms not withstanding).
- As an analogical argument, the argument is typically treated as inductive. Students who explicitly state the logical form of the argument should word their presentation of the argument in a manner which is consistent with that; for example, avoiding 'necessary' conclusions in supposedly 'inductive' (and therefore probabilistic) arguments.

The argument Hume presents has the following form (this is just one way of setting it out):
- P1: Human artefacts (eg, cameras, machines, organisations – Hume discusses a watch and a knitting-loom) have certain 'teleological' properties ('spatial order': ie complexity, order, parts working towards a purpose, etc)
- P2: Nature itself (and natural entities within it: eg eyes) also has these same 'teleological' properties ('spatial order': ie complexity, order, parts working towards a purpose, etc)
- P3: Human artefacts have these teleological properties because they have been designed by an intelligent being
- P4: Similar effects/properties typically have similar causes/explanations
- C1: Therefore, nature/natural entities have these teleological properties because they have been designed by an intelligent being (ie God).

Students can get full marks based on the latter if their answer meets the levels of response criteria. However, Hume also includes the following argumentation:
- P5: Natural entities are much more complicated than human artefacts
- P6: This greater complexity requires greater intelligence
  - This is concluded on the basis of P4 above: cf. Hume: "Since therefore the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the author of nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man; though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work, which he has executed" (*Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, Pt. 2).
- C2: Therefore an intelligent being/designer exists which has much greater intelligence than a human (ie God).

Notes:

This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

| 0 | 3 | Explain how Russell objects to the cosmological argument by arguing that it commits the fallacy of composition. |

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Russell's objection is directed at cosmological arguments (he was specifically objecting to Copleston's argument which is similar in form to Leibniz's argument from contingency and the principle of sufficient reason).
- Broadly speaking cosmological arguments are arguments for the existence of God as the one unique (first) cause/reason/explanation of some alleged general fact about reality.
- Students might put this in the context of a specific cosmological argument, or explain it more generally. Either is fine. But successful answers must show why the 'fallacy of composition' is (for Russell) a problem for this family of theistic arguments, and this presupposes some understanding of those arguments.

What is a 'fallacy of composition'?

- An argument commits the so-called 'fallacy of composition' if the proponent wrongly concludes that something is true of the whole from the fact that it is true of all of the parts of that whole.
- Students may give examples (other than the cosmological argument itself) to explain. Here are some examples of the fallacy:
  o   All bricks in the wall are cube-shaped therefore the whole wall is cube-shaped
  o   (Russell's example) "Every man who exists has a mother...therefore the human race must have a mother" *(Debate with Copleston)*.

Why does (Russell think that) the cosmological argument commits this fallacy?

- Russell is objecting to cosmological arguments that (he thinks) move from (a) premises about what is true of all of the parts of reality to (b) conclusions about the whole that those parts make up.
- In Copleston's version of the cosmological argument he says that if the universe contains only contingent beings, it is itself contingent and must have a cause or explanation. Russell replies that our concept of cause is one we "we derive from our observation of particular things" and that it is therefore "not applicable to the total" ; "to reason in this way is to commit the fallacy."
- As an objection to specific cosmological arguments this might be put in any of the following ways:
  o   **Contingency**: from the fact that parts of the universe are contingent *we cannot conclude* that the universe as a whole is contingent (and therefore needs a necessary cause/explanation: God).

- o **Requirement for explanation**: from the fact that the parts of the universe are contingent and so require (and have) an explanation *we cannot conclude* that the universe as a whole is contingent and so requires (and has) an explanation (in the form of a necessary reason: God).
- o **Requirement for a cause**: from the fact that the parts of the universe require (and have) a cause *we cannot conclude* that the universe as a whole requires (and has) a cause (in the form of a necessary first cause: God).

Notes:

This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

| 0 | 4 | Explain Flew's view on religious language **and** explain how Hare responds to this using the notion of a 'blik'.

[12 marks]

AO1 = 12

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
10–12	The answer is set out in a precise, fully-integrated and logical form. The content is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. Points are made clearly and precisely. Relevance is sustained, with very little or no redundancy. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
7–9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. The content is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. Any lack of clarity with respect to particular points is not sufficient to detract from the answer. Relevance is largely sustained. There may be some redundancy, though not sufficient to detract from the answer. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
4–6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct and most points are made clearly. Relevance is not always sustained and there is some redundancy. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the response.
1–3	There are some relevant points made, but no integration. Some points are clear, but there is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- This is a two-part question, and so students who only explain 'Flew's view of religious language', cannot progress beyond the 4-6 band: at most, they are only completing half of the work required for this assessment item.
- The same rule applies to students who only explain 'Hare' and his 'notion of a blik', but this is perhaps harder envisage, given the form of the question and the context of Hare's argument as a direct response to Flew.

Explain Flew's view on religious language...

- Flew draws on the principle of falsification to assess the status of religious language. He makes the following claims (expressed below as an argument). It is not expected that students will cover all these points, and nor do they have to present it as a formal argument, but they may do.
  o P1: If an utterance U is a genuine (cognitively meaningful) assertion (expressing a proposition) then its meaning is equivalent to the meaning of the denial of its negation (ie the meaning of not-U)
  o C1: Therefore, U is meaningful (/meaningless) if not-U is meaningful (/meaningless)
  o P2: For not-U to be meaningful there must be possible/conceivable (empirical) conditions that [for the speaker] would support not-U and, therefore, would count against/oppose U
  o P3: For (many) religious utterances there are no such possible/conceivable (empirical) conditions; no conditions that would "count against [them], or which would induce the speaker to withdraw

[them] and to admit that it had been mistaken" / which s/he "would regard as...being incompatible with...[their] truth" ('Theology and Falsification: The University Discussion').
  - o Here Flew gives the example of 'God exists' and 'God loves me', both of which seem unfalsifiable given that whatever possible conditions obtain or are conceived of (eg horrendous undeserved evil), the speaker will/would not withdraw their claim. In this way, whatever evidence is or could possibly be presented, the person would continue to make the claim (either by denying the evidence, or by claiming that the evidence is compatible with their claim).
      - o NB: Saying that a religious claim is unfalsifiable does not (just) mean that there are no actual circumstances (current or future) which would prove it to be false, but that there are *no possible* circumstances in which it is false.
  - o Flew also uses Wisdom's parable of the gardener where, for the person who utters "There is a gardener that tends this clearing" (the 'Believer'), there seems to be no possible evidence that s/he will allow to count against it. Wisdom describes – in stages – keeping watch, putting up an electrified barbed-wire fence, using bloodhounds, setting up electric fences. None of these methods yields any evidence of the gardener. In the face of all this counter-evidence, the original utterances are gradually changed until it becomes "there is a gardener, invisible, intangible, insensible, to electric shocks, a gardener who has no scent and makes no sound". This is a process Flew calls "death by a thousand qualifications".
  - o C4: (Many) religious utterances do not make genuine (ie (cognitively) meaningful assertions (ie do not express propositions).

NB: Reflecting back on his famous essay, Flew denied that he was ever trying to offer a comprehensive theory of religious language, and he never makes that claim within the essay. It is not necessary for students to situate his argument within the 'cognitivist v non cognitivist' debate, but it is likely that some will. If they do, accept either of the following interpretations.
  - Non cognitivist: where this is understood in the negative sense that some (common) religious utterances are not truth-apt, failing as they do to express propositions / cognitive belief states in accordance with Flew's own criteria: possible falsification.
  - Cognitivist: Flew sees little (if any) value in interpreting religious language as "anything but assertions" (where the alternatives are "crypto-commands", "wishes" or "disguised ethics"): this approach cannot be made "properly orthodox" or "practically effective".
      - o Later in life Flew himself expressed propositions/cognitive belief states about a creator/designer God (although this is not relevant to the argument Hare was responding to in the 'University Discussion').

<u>...and explain how Hare responds to this using the notion of a 'blik'.</u>

  - Hare agrees that (many) religious utterances are unfalsifiable, so Flew is right to say that they are not assertions (as he understands them).
  - But the fact that a religious believer makes certain utterances (eg 'God exists') without allowing any possible states of affairs to count against them does not mean that they are not saying anything meaningful.
  - Crucially, it does not mean that there is no real difference between a religious person and an atheist in terms of what they say about God (analogous to the explorer who says 'there is a gardener' and the one who says 'there is no gardener').
      - o The explorers in the parable of the gardener discuss the issue at hand "with interest, but not with concern…It is because I mind very much about what goes on in the garden in which I find myself, that I am unable to share the explorers' detachment." (Hare, 'The University Discussion').
  - Flew is mistaken (according to Hare) in treating religious utterances as if they offered "some sort of explanation, as scientists are accustomed to use the word".
  - Hare introduces the term 'blik' as an alternative way of characterising religious language. The disagreement between the theist and the atheist, therefore, is a difference in their blik:

- o Bliks are attitudes/beliefs towards/about reality: "[B]liks [are] about the world".
- o Bliks are not sensitive to empirical evidence (neither grounded in it, verified by it, nor falsified by it): "a blik does not consist in an assertion or system of them" since they are "compatible with any finite number of...tests" and "differences between bliks about the world cannot be settled by observation of what happens in the world".
    - o Hare credits Hume with identifying the importance of bliks, and he explains the latter within the context of Hume's scepticism about our capacity to prove the "ordinary man's blik about the world".
- o Bliks are nonetheless meaningful in so far as they determine what counts as evidence and affect what we believe and do: "our whole commerce with the world depends upon our bliks about the world"; "it is very important to have the right blik"; "[I]t is by our blik that we decide what is and what is not an explanation".
- Hare gives various examples of bliks (including):
- o A 'lunatic' student who has the following ("insane") blik: "All dons want to kill me", maintained regardless of the evidence against and absence of evidence for this view of things; indeed, all the evidence is interpreted through the prism of the student's blik, such that contradictory evidence is interpreted as supporting his overarching view of dons.
- o Someone who has the following (typically reliable) blik: "my movements of the steering-wheel will always continue to be followed by corresponding alterations in the direction of the car". This stance is not without reason: it may be based on knowledge of "the sort of thing that would have to go wrong for the steering to fail - steel joints would have to part, or steel rods break…but how do I know that this won't happen? The truth is, I don't know; I just have this blik".
- o Someone who has the following blik (one detrimental to explaining, predicting or planning anything): "Everything that [has] happened, happened by pure chance", an utterance which is "compatible with anything" in the observable world.

NB: Students do not have to place Hare within the context of the 'cognitivist v non cognitivist' debate, but it they do…
- It is likely that they will identify him as a non-cognitivist, which is the standard view: religious utterances are (at least typically) not assertions / not truth-apt.
- On the other hand, Hare's own use of the term "belief" (a cognitive state) in relation to "bliks", and his emphasis on the importance of having "the right blik" as opposed to the "wrong blik" (eg about dons) does not suggest a position detached from questions of truth (about the way the world is), even if that truth can never be demonstrated. Students who reflect those more ambiguous features of his argument in their answers should not be penalised.
- What really matters is that if students explicitly treat Hare as a non-cognitivist, that should be reflected in their presentation of his argument.

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

| 0 | 5 | Does the existence of evil disprove the existence of God?

[25 marks]

AO1 = 5, AO2 = 20

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
21–25	The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is sustained. The student demonstrates detailed and precise understanding throughout. The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of it stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument. Crucial arguments are clearly identified against less crucial ones. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
16–20	The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is largely sustained. The content is correct and detailed – though not always consistently. The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments supporting it. Arguments are generally stated in their strongest forms. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated clearly, integrated coherently and defended. There may be trivial mistakes, as long as they do not detract from the argument. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
11–15	A clear response to the question, in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent. The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated. A conclusion and reasons are given and those reasons clearly support the conclusion. There might be a lack of clarity/precision about the logic of the argument as a whole. Arguments and counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance. Not all arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Stronger and weaker arguments are noted and there are attempts to identify the weight to be given to different arguments, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the argument.
6–10	The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but not fully coherently. The content is largely correct, though there are some gaps and a lack of detail. Relevant points are recognised/identified, but not integrated. Alternative positions are identified, but not precisely. Counter-arguments might be stated in weak forms or even slightly misrepresented. Arguments and counter-arguments are juxtaposed, so similarities and contrasts identified, rather than their impact being clear. Philosophical language is used throughout, though not always fully correctly and/or consistently.

1–5	There is little evidence of an argument. There may be missing content, substantial gaps in the content or the content may be one-sided. There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made. There may be some connections between the points, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion. There is some basic use of philosophical language.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Positions a student might adopt

- **Yes:** The existence of evil does disprove the existence of God (logical/deductive version of the problem of evil succeeds – God's existence is logically incompatible with the evil that exists in the world).
- **Yes:** The existence of evil does disprove the existence of God (evidential/inductive version of the problem of evil succeeds – God's existence is unlikely given the (nature/amount/distribution of) evil that exists in the world).
- **No:** The existence of evil does not disprove the existence of God (any/all versions of the problem of evil discussed fail for some specified reason/s).
- **No:** The existence of evil does not disprove the existence of God *if* we reject particular assumptions about the nature of God (under classical theism) or about the precise meaning of the classical attributes (eg 'supreme goodness').

The problem of evil

- Students may well begin by explaining and illustrating what evil is, perhaps distinguishing between moral evil and natural evil:
  - Moral evil: pain or suffering which results from the intentional actions (and/or negligence) of human beings
  - Natural/physical evil: pain or suffering which does not result from the intentional actions (and/or negligence) of moral agents but arises in the course of natural processes (eg injury and disease, grief, suffering caused by natural disasters etc.).
- The best students will explain (or clearly outline) the problem of evil and may refer to either or both of the following issues in the course of their answer.
  - (1) The logical problem of evil: an omnipotent, omniscient, and supremely good God is logically incompatible with the existence of evil (eg drawing on Mackie). Students may say that this is a 'deductive argument'.
    - Students may refer instead to the 'inconsistent triad (eg drawing on Epicurus/Hume), framing the logical problem as a tension between God's 'supreme goodness', 'supreme power' and the 'existence of evil'.
      - NB: students who treat 'omnipotence' as inclusive of 'omniscience' should not be penalised; likewise, those students who style the 'inconsistent triad' as a conflict between all three divine attributes ('omnipotence, omniscience, and supreme goodness'), given the existence of evil, ought not to be penalised either.
  - (2) The evidential problem: a supremely good God is incompatible with the extent/distribution/amount of evil and renders such a God's existence unlikely/improbable. Students may say that this is an 'inductive argument'. Students may develop this along the lines of an 'argument from particularly horrendous and/or pointless evils', which could draw on specific examples of suffering.
- Responses to the problem of evil may be framed as 'defences' (attempts to show that it is logically possible for both evil and God to exist) or 'theodicies' (attempts to explain how both evil and God can

co-exist: justifying the existence and traditional attributes of God in the face of evil). If students want to make a clear distinction between the two in the service of their argument, then that is high level understanding that should be credited. But students should not be penalised if they use the terms 'defence' or theodicy' generically to refer to any response to the problem of evil which upholds the existence of God or the rationality of belief in God.

Evaluative points

NO: A supremely good, all-powerful and all-knowing God would create people with free will (as only then will their choices have moral value), even if this leads to (or at least risks) the existence of evil: evil on this view is the fault of human beings who exercise their free agency in harmful ways.
  o   Students may deploy Plantinga's free will defence: even an omnipotent God cannot create a world without evil and confer 'morally significant' freedom on creatures. Some may develop this argument along modal lines and discuss 'transworld depravity'.
  o   The free will dimension of Augustine's theodicy may be discussed in this context (with or without its biblical dimensions).
  o   Students may expand on the latter (with or without the biblical dimensions) and apply 'free will' to the problem posed by natural evil: natural evil here might be explained by the free choices made by supernatural beings (eg fallen angels/the Devil), so even apparently natural evil has a moral dimension.
  o   Students might specify that it must be free will understood in a libertarian sense (which leaves room for arguing against free will defences by saying that that concept of free will is either incoherent or inapplicable as we live in a deterministic universe).
NO: Arguing that the 'soul-making' defence can be used to show that a supremely good God would be right to create/permit evil in order for people to grow morally and spiritually and achieve higher-order goods that rely on the presence of evil:
  o   Students may discuss Hick, Swinburne and Irenaeus in this context
  o   They may discuss Hick specifically in response to the 'evidential problem' that evil is required to keep God sufficiently 'hidden' and to maintain 'epistemic distance' so that faith/belief and virtue is of more value than it would be operating in the overwhelming presence of God (this issue of 'divine hiddenness' cuts both ways, of course: for some, the 'hiddenness' of God from ordinary perceptual knowledge when combined with the existence of evil constitutes powerful evidence against the existence of God).
YES: Arguing that the existence of evil shows that God does not and, indeed, could not possibly exist: there is a logical problem of evil, and this deductive argument against the existence of God is decisive.
  o   Some students will utilise Mackie's attack on the idea that evil is due to human free will: ie his argument that a world with human beings that always choose freely to do good is a logically possible world, and so it is the world that an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God ought to have created.
  o   Some will also draw on Mackie's distinction between 'first order and second order goods and evils', arguing that any attempt by the theist to make second order goods (eg courage) dependent on first order evils (eg pain) just leads to an infinite regress of higher-order evils providing the occasions for higher-order goods. The maximisation of evil (even to achieve higher goods) is surely – so this argument goes – incompatible with an omnibenevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent God.
YES: Arguing that the existence of evil, and more specifically its extent and distribution, shows that it is likely/more probable that God does not exist: there is an evidential problem of evil, and this inductive argument against the existence of God is successful.
  o   Some students may use Rowe's evidential argument, drawing on extreme cases of human and animal suffering to argue that the most rational position to adopt in the face of such evil is to reject belief in the God of classical theism, which is rendered highly improbable by such cases.
  o   A certain degree of natural evil may be attributed to human freedom (eg decisions which damage the environment or hurt non-human creatures), but this is insufficient to justify the existence of God as classically understood.

NO: If God does not have one or more of the classical attributes traditionally ascribed to the divine nature, then the problem of evil dissolves.
- Some may argue that God is not omnipotent and/or omniscient and so the problem of evil does not arise for those who have this concept of God – eg within process theology or open theism.
- Some may argue that the goodness of God is not be confused with moral goodness: the latter is an attribute of creatures not of their creator (eg Aquinas): goodness is co-extensive with being ('reality' or 'existence'), and God is supremely good in so far as God is *Ipsum esse subsistens* (subsistent being itself).
- The best students who take this kind of approach will nevertheless engage with the problem of evil as a real issue for some traditional/classical conceptions of God, even if in the end they reject those conceptions.

NO: Arguing that the existence of evil does not mean that God does not exist: given God's omnipotence, omniscience, and supreme goodness, this must be the 'best of all possible worlds' (ie Leibniz).
- Students may also appeal to Leibniz's claim that it is wrong to assume that human happiness is the sole standard by which the goodness of worlds is to be judged.

NO: Arguing that natural evil is a necessary result of the laws of nature. These laws are for a greater good as they are prerequisites for events to take place in a regular way within the context of a material/physical world that supports our existence.

NO: Arguing that goodness (in some sense) requires evil:
- The possibility of goodness logically requires the possibility of evil.
- The actual existence of goodness requires the actual existence of evil.
- An appreciation of goodness requires experience of evil (that possessing the concept of goodness relies on possessing the concept of evil).

NEITHER: Arguing that the existence of evil is not (rationally) compatible with God's existence but that this should not count against belief in God: we should still have faith in the face of such paradoxes, suspend our reason and believe 'by virtue of the absurd' (eg Kierkegaard).

Notes:

- Students should not be unduly penalised for misattributing arguments/views (where it does not confuse the point they are trying to make). For example: the persistent misattribution of arguments/views would be an inaccuracy that would justify not awarding an answer full marks, but it should not be regarded as a reason for excluding it from the top band (assuming everything else meets the requirements of the level descriptors).
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

Section B

The Metaphysics of Mind

| 0 | 6 | What is a philosophical zombie?

[3 marks]

AO1 = 3

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
3	A full and correct answer, given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or minor imprecision.
1	Relevant, but fragmented, points.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- A philosophical zombie (or p-zombie) is a metaphysically possible (or at least conceivable) being which appears in thought experiments in the philosophy if mind, often as an argument for property dualism / against (reductive) physicalism. The latter should not be penalised for redundancy, but the focus of this particular question is on the nature of this hypothetical being.
- A philosophical zombie is:
  (1) physically identical to / a physical duplicate of a (normal/conscious) human being (ie has all and only the same physical properties as a normal/conscious human being), but...
  (2) lacks any of the following:
- consciousness
- qualia
- qualitative mental states/experiences
- phenomenal properties
- conscious mental states.

NB:
- Point (1) and any one example from point (2) is sufficient for **full marks** to be awarded.
- Students awarded **two marks** may make one point correctly and precisely (let's say point 1), but be imprecise on the second. For example, claiming that a philosophical zombie lacks a 'mind' or 'mental states' is not to be taken as synonymous with 'consciousness' (or its equivalents above); nor should students imply that lacking consciousness is an instance of 'unconsciousness' (eg while sleeping).
- Students awarded **one mark** may hit both points but in an imprecise and fragmentary way.

Additional examples of indicative content for three marks

- An (exact) physical duplicate of a person, existing in another possible world, but without (phenomenal) consciousness.
- A being that is physically and functionally identical (where the physical facts fix the functional facts) but lacks qualitive mental states.

Examples of indicative content for two marks

- A p-zombie is a conceivable being used to argue for property dualism (against physicalism). This being is functionally (or behaviourally) identical in every way to an ordinary human being. The only difference is that this being lacks qualia.
- A physical duplicate (anatomically identical) of a (conscious) human being but lacking certain mental states.

Examples of indicative content for one mark

- A physical duplicate of a (conscious) human being.
- A being without consciousness/qualia.
- A metaphysically possible being used to argue for property dualism (and against physicalism)

Examples of indicative content for zero

- A possible/conceivable being.
- A being much like a human person but without a mind.

Notes:

- Material in parentheses is not required for students to reach levels exemplified in the indicative content.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

| 0 | 7 | Explain the 'inverted qualia' objection to functionalism.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- In the AQA Specification this objection is summed up as: "The possibility of a functional duplicate with different qualia (inverted qualia)".
- A successful answer to this question will demonstrate some knowledge of functionalism in order show why certain critics consider the 'inverted qualia' objection to be decisive.
- Some of the best students will go straight into the objection, and show their understanding of functionalism in the course of their explanation. But it is likely that many students will begin with some remarks on functionalism and (possibly) qualia.

NB: To progress to Level 3 or beyond (ie get three marks or more) students *must* address the 'inverted qualia' objection specifically.

Functionalism:

- Functionalism: 'all mental states can be reduced to functional roles which can be multiply realised' (AQA Specification).
- Students may also make reference to a causal network: a mental state is defined by its place in a causal network of environmental inputs, behavioural outputs and other mental states (as inputs and outputs).
- Functionalist theories claim that mental concepts should be treated as functional concepts (like 'clock') rather than as non-functional concepts (like diamond). Mental states are therefore multiply realisable: multiple functionally identical (functionally isomorphic) set-ups could realise a particular mental state.
- Functionalism is neutral on the traditional ontological question of 'substance' (the dualism v physicalism/materialism debate), but functionalists tend to be physicalists.

Qualia

- 'Intrinsic (and non-intentional/representational) phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible' (AQA Specification).
- The 'what-it-is-likeness' of an experience / the properties in virtue of which there is something it is like to undergo the experience.

- The non-intentional (and/or non-representational) experiential character/quality of conscious states (or sense data).
- Intrinsic, nonphysical, ineffable properties of mental/conscious states (Dennett).

The 'inverted qualia' objection to functionalism:

- If functionalism is right to identify mental states with the functional/causal roles they play, then a functional duplicate of me (ie one for whom the same inputs lead to the same outputs) must have the same mental states as I do. However, we can conceive of a being who is my functional duplicate but who has different – indeed inverted – mental states from me. Mental states can therefore not be identical to functional states/causal roles.

- Here is one way of presenting the argument (in standard form), though there are other ways it could be presented.
  - P1: It is conceivable that two functionally identical beings/systems could have [systematically] inverted qualia with respect to each other (the 'inversion scenario')
    - This is normally thought of in terms of colour experience (where it would be a spectrum inversion) but can be in terms of other sense modalities.
    - They would always act in the same way as me – they would say all of the same sentences, pick out all of the same objects given the same requests etc.
  - P2: If something is conceivable then it is logically/metaphysically possible
  - C1: *Therefore,* this 'inversion scenario' (described above) is logically/metaphysically possible.
  - P3: If the 'inversion scenario' is logically/metaphysically possible, then phenomenal properties are not functional properties
  - C2: Therefore, phenomenal properties are not functional properties and so functionalism is not a complete account of the mind.
- Some students might use the <u>possibility</u> of the scenario as the starting point (not using the argument above from conceivability to possibility) and this is fine so long as they make it clear why this possibility causes a problem for functionalism.
- Students might give an example to illustrate this (eg 'When seeing a tomato Jim experiences the colour qualia that Jeff would experience when seeing a banana, and vice versa').

Notes:

This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

| 0 | 8 | Explain why the asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other people's mental states is problematic for philosophical behaviourism. |

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- A successful answer to this question will have to demonstrate some knowledge of philosophical behaviourism in order show why some philosophers consider the asymmetry problematic.
- Some of the best students will go straight into the problem of the asymmetry and show their understanding of philosophical in the course of their explanation. But it is likely that many students will begin with some remarks on philosophical behaviourism.

Philosophical behaviourism:

- Students may draw on either version of philosophical behaviourism below. These definitions are taken from the AQA Specification:
  - o "'Hard' behaviourism: all propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning to propositions that exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states/movements (including Carl Hempel)."
  - o "'Soft' philosophical behaviourism: propositions about mental states are propositions about behavioural dispositions (ie propositions that use ordinary language) (including Gilbert Ryle)."

The asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other people's mental states

The claim (taken to be obviously true by those objecting) is that there are important differences in kind (not in degree) between our self-knowledge (one's knowledge of one's own mind) and (attempted) knowledge of other people's minds. Aspects of this asymmetry that students might appeal to in this context are found in the table below.

NB:
- Students can answer this question using any of the content from the rows below. Some students will often try to explain two or more aspects of asymmetry, and its problematic implications, but it is also possible for students to take one aspect and develop it fully, explaining it with logical precision and (possibly) supplementing it with illustrations (although examples are not a necessary requirement), and thereby gain full marks.

- For students progressing beyond Level 3, it is important that they go beyond simply outlining (and/or illustrating) the asymmetry and defining philosophical behaviourism: they will actually explain *why it is problematic* for philosophical behaviourism.

	Self-knowledge	**(Attempted) knowledge of other minds**
1	Direct and non-inferential; acquired directly through introspection.	Indirect and inferred from behavioural observations from perception.
2	Certain: it is impossible to doubt claims made about one's own mind.	Uncertain: It is possible to doubt claims made about another's mind.
3	Infallible: one cannot be wrong about one's knowledge-claims about one's own mind.	Fallible: one can be wrong about one's knowledge-claims about other people's minds.
4	Incorrigible: no-one could ever be in a position to correct you with regard to your knowledge-claims about your own mental states.	Corrigible: someone could be in a position to correct you with regard to your knowledge-claims about another person's mental states (most likely the other person him/herself).
5	Completeness/transparency: there is nothing about one's own mind that one does not know.	Incompleteness/non-transparency: there may well be, and might necessarily be, aspects of another's mind of which you do not have knowledge.
6	Possible/actual: most claim that we can have knowledge of at least some of our own mental states.	Impossible: some might argue that, presuming certain definitions of knowledge, it is impossible to have knowledge of the minds of others.

Why this asymmetry is problematic for philosophical behaviourism

- If philosophical behaviourism is true then there cannot be the asymmetry outlined above.
- This is because the meaning/content of mental propositions relates (solely) to physical/bodily states and so the knowledge-claims about my own mind would have to be the same (in terms of their nature/justification) as the knowledge-claims about the minds of others.
  - Ryle seems aware of this implication (though not seeing it as decisively problematic) in terms of rows 1 and 5: "The sorts of things that I can find out about myself are the same as the sorts of things that I can find out about other people [row 5], and the methods of finding them out are much the same [row 1]" (*Concept of Mind*, chap. 6).
- In order for this to be a problem for behaviourism it must (presumably) be obvious that there is the asymmetry outlined above, at least to some extent.

Notes:

This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

| 0 | 9 | Explain the 'knowledge/Mary' argument (for property dualism) **and** the response that Mary gains acquaintance knowledge rather than propositional knowledge.

[12 marks]

AO1= 12

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
10–12	The answer is set out in a precise, fully-integrated and logical form. The content is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. Points are made clearly and precisely. Relevance is sustained, with very little or no redundancy. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
7–9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. The content is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. Any lack of clarity with respect to particular points is not sufficient to detract from the answer. Relevance is largely sustained. There may be some redundancy, though not sufficient to detract from the answer. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
4–6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct and most points are made clearly. Relevance is not always sustained and there is some redundancy. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the response.
1–3	There are some relevant points made, but no integration. Some points are clear, but there is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- This is a two-part question, and so students who only explain the first part, 'the knowledge/Mary argument', cannot progress beyond the 4-6 band: at most, they are only completing half of the work required from this assessment item.
- The same rule applies, in principle, to students who only discuss the argument that 'Mary gains acquaintance knowledge rather than propositional knowledge', but this is harder to envisage given the form of the question.

Explain the 'knowledge/Mary' argument (for property dualism)...

- The 'knowledge' argument (by Jackson) aims to establish that conscious experience involves non-physical phenomenal properties (qualia): ie it aims to establish property dualism. It is therefore an anti-physicalist (or anti-materialist) and anti-reductionist argument.
- Qualia are the introspectively accessible subjective/phenomenal features of mental states (the properties of 'what it is like' to undergo the mental state in question). For many, qualia would be defined as the intrinsic/non-representational properties of mental states.
- The 'knowledge' argument rests on the claim that someone with complete physical knowledge could still lack knowledge about 'what it is like to see red' (or green, etc.) (ie the 'qualia').

- If physicalism is true, physical facts provide a complete account of knowledge but in the case of the knowledge/Mary argument, there is something in Mary's knowledge that remains unaccounted for, so physicalism is false.
- Reference to the story of' Mary' is not an absolute requirement since the question is primarily about the 'argument', but it is likely that some explanation of the story will help with the clarity and fullness of the response, and it is highly likely that many students will approach this part of the question through that thought experiment.
- In Jackson's own account, "Mary is a brilliant scientist who…is forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor…" ('Epiphenomenal Qualia'). Many students will recount some version of this scenario. The details may different so along as the logic is clear and correct.
- But some students may outline the argument in step-by-step form (possibly even in the abstract, ie with little or no reference to Mary or to Jackson's story). Alternatively, they might outline the argument using the Mary story (or one of their own stories constructed in the same philosophical spirit – eg about Jeff, an expert on the olfactory system), and this is fine so long as the argument is clear. Finally, of course, they may do both of these things.
- Here is a step-by-step argument outline (though, of course, it need not be explained in this order or format):
  - P1: Mary knows all the physical facts about human colour vision before her release
  - P2: Mary learns a new fact about human colour vision on her release (a phenomenal fact)
  - C1: Therefore, there are non-physical facts about human colour vision
  - (P3: Non-physical facts are facts about non-physical phenomenal properties)
  - (C2: Therefore, there are non-physical properties and physicalism is false).
- Alternatively, the argument could be perfectly well put in terms of properties rather than facts from the start.
- There are other ways of expressing this argument, many of which involve significantly less precision. The levels of response should be used to reflect such expressions.
- On a related note, it would be an element of imprecision for students to merely say things such as, 'Mary knows everything before her release' or 'Mary learns what red is' or 'Mary didn't know what red is' without any further qualification of what this means exactly.
- Although the argument was put forward as an argument for property dualism, some students could (justifiably) claim that, if successful, the argument (also) proves substance dualism since one cannot be a property dualist without being a substance dualist (perhaps because non-physical properties must be (or at least are likely to be) properties of non-physical things/substances).

...and the response that Mary gains acquaintance knowledge rather than propositional knowledge

- The response involves admitting that something does indeed happen that day to Mary, when she is released from her black and white environment, but that it does not involve an increase in propositional knowledge; rather, she gains what we can call 'acquaintance knowledge' (more on this below).
- This then means that P2 (as it has been presented above) is false.
- This then renders the facts of the (imagined) case of Mary consistent with physicalism, and means that property dualism (or indeed substance dualism) no longer follows.
- Acquaintance knowledge in general is knowledge of something through a (direct) awareness/experience of it. There are three important points to note about it:
  - (1) This is not the same as propositional knowledge (so 'knowledge of' is not 'knowledge that').
  - (2) Gaining knowledge by acquaintance can be seen (and in this case will be seen) as possible without this being necessarily accompanied by additional related propositional knowledge. It is important for this response not just that Mary *does* gain acquaintance knowledge which is distinct from propositional knowledge, but that she *does not* gain propositional knowledge.

- o (3) Acquittance knowledge is not to be confused with ability knowledge: the latter is a distinct form of knowledge included within the AQA Specification. Having said that, if students indicate certain things that someone might be able 'to do' because they have acquired acquittance knowledge (and the latter is clearly understood), then this should not be penalised.

- So Mary gains no new propositional knowledge and instead gains acquaintance knowledge – she becomes acquainted for the first time with physical properties that she already had complete propositional knowledge about – and this means that the argument does not disprove physicalism (and thereby increase the likelihood of some form of dualism).

Notes:

This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

| 1 | 0 | To what extent is eliminative materialism correct?

[25 marks]

AO1 = 5, AO2 = 20

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
21–25	The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is sustained. The student demonstrates detailed and precise understanding throughout. The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of it stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument. Crucial arguments are clearly identified against less crucial ones. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
16–20	The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is largely sustained. The content is correct and detailed – though not always consistently. The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments supporting it. Arguments are generally stated in their strongest forms. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated clearly, integrated coherently and defended. There may be trivial mistakes, as long as they do not detract from the argument. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
11–15	A clear response to the question, in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent. The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated. A conclusion and reasons are given and those reasons clearly support the conclusion. There might be a lack of clarity/precision about the logic of the argument as a whole. Arguments and counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance. Not all arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Stronger and weaker arguments are noted and there are attempts to identify the weight to be given to different arguments, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the argument.
6–10	The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but not fully coherently. The content is largely correct, though there are some gaps and a lack of detail. Relevant points are recognised/identified, but not integrated. Alternative positions are identified, but not precisely. Counter-arguments might be stated in weak forms or even slightly misrepresented. Arguments and counter-arguments are juxtaposed, so similarities and contrasts identified, rather than their impact being clear. Philosophical language is used throughout, though not always fully correctly and/or consistently.

1–5	There is little evidence of an argument. There may be missing content, substantial gaps in the content or the content may be one-sided. There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made. There may be some connections between the points, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion. There is some basic use of philosophical language.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Students might explain eliminative materialism as the position that some or all common-sense ('folk-psychological') mental states/properties do not exist and/or our common-sense understanding of mind is radically mistaken. This thesis is defended most notably by Patricia Churchland and Paul Churchland (although students may associate Dennett with a tendency in that direction, especially concerning qualia).

NB:
- It is important that students do not conflate eliminative materialism with reductive theories of mind generally or mind-brain identity theories specifically (though there may be occasional blurring/slips in even very strong essays).
- For example, the eliminative materialist does not claim that mental states *are* brain states (eg that pain is c-fibres firing), but that the mental states we postulate (eg 'beliefs,' 'desires,' etc) do not exist at all and therefore do not 'map on to the world' (there is nothing in reality which the vocabulary refers to).

- Students could take a variety of positions on eliminative positions:
  - **CORRECT:** Eliminative materialism is true
  - **INCORRECT:** Eliminative materialism is untrue
  - **CORRECT TO SOME EXTENT:** A less definitive response is also possible whereby the qualified successes or failures of eliminative materialism are emphasised: eg only intentional mental states such as 'beliefs' should be eliminated whereas the phenomenology of more basic mental states cannot be eliminated (or vice versa); or eliminative materialism may succeed in showing the scientific imprecision or explanatory limitations of 'folk psychology', but the retention of the latter is to be preferred in some (if not all) contexts.

CORRECT

- As a preliminary, some students may give reasons for preferring materialist/physicalist conceptions of mind, citing the success of the physical sciences or problems with dualism. The better answers will engage with the details of eliminative materialism when discussing these problems, and not simply assume/assert the success of materialism/physicalism in general.
- Because of the centrality of eliminating common sense concepts about mental states, arguments in favour of eliminative materialism are likely to focus on the strength of objections to this (radical) proposal.
- Folk-psychology is an empirical theory (it postulates 'mental states', such as 'beliefs' and 'desire', to explain and predict behaviour).
- Any good empirical theory must satisfy a number of criteria to avoid elimination:
  - There cannot be too many explanatory failures
  - there must be growth and promise of future development
  - the theory must cohere with other empirical (scientific) theories.
- According to the Churchlands, folk-psychology does not fulfil any of those criteria:

- o There are explanatory failures: folk-psychology cannot offer (scientifically) satisfactory explanations of mental illness, creative imagination, pre-linguistic learning, sleep, or memory.
  - o Growth and promise: folk psychology is 'stagnant' and 'infertile.' There hasn't been any growth and development for thousands of years.
  - o Coherence: folk psychology doesn't cohere with other empirical theories such as particle physics, atomic and molecular theory, organic chemistry, evolutionary theory, physiology, and neuroscience (one key reason being that folk-psychology is committed to intentionality which is mysterious and doesn't feature in any other natural science).
- When arguing for the plausibility of eliminating folk psychological terms, students are likely to offer examples of the elimination of other widely utilised empirical theories, which they draw from the history of science: phlogiston, elan vital, caloric etc.
- Demons and states of demonic possession may also be referred to as entities and explanatory theories once posited to explain mental illness which subsequently have been eliminated in favour of neuro-psychological accounts.
- For all these historical examples, it is important that students understand that they are analogies and do not slip into associating outmoded (scientific) ideas with deficiencies within folk-psychology itself.

INCORRECT

- Some students will respond to the theory as prima facie implausible, based on the confidence they/we can have in our intuitive understanding of the mind.
- For students taking this latter line, our certainty about the existence of our mental states takes priority over other (sceptical) considerations (eg Descartes' point that we cannot doubt that we have mental states since they are immediately obvious to us and introspectively available).
- Folk psychology has good predictive and explanatory power (and so is the best hypothesis when understanding the mind and human behaviour): eg I am successfully able to predict and explain that my friend will be at the party tonight because I know that he/she believes that there is a party tonight, and I have good grounds for believing that he/she desires to go to it.
- The articulation of eliminative materialism as a theory is self-refuting: the act of articulating a theory seems to presuppose that this theory is recommended for belief by those articulating it, and yet according to this theory there are no beliefs. Does the eliminative materialist believe that there are no beliefs? If so, that would seem to be self-refuting. If they do not believe it, then why are they advancing it? Students may argue that the position collapses into incoherence.
- Folk psychology has grown and been transformed in the study of quantitative (and computational) psychology, and studies suggest that the mental states we postulate do map onto the brain so folk-psychology is more coherent with other empirical sciences than eliminative materialism suggests, even if there is much that we still do not understand about the mind.
- Folk psychology also plays a crucial role in some evidence-based treatment of mental illness: eg cognitive behavioural therapy, some of which is concerned with the role of beliefs in maintaining (and overcoming) psychological pain.

CORRECT TO SOME EXTENT

- Eliminative materialism successfully shows that so called intentional mental states do not exist, but it cannot show that non-intentional mental states do not exist since their phenomenal qualities (qualia) are immediately obvious to us and beyond reasonable doubt.
- Or vice-versa – here students might make reference to Dennett's arguments ('intuition pumps') against qualia (eg the coffee-tasting argument, or his 'alternative neuroscience' argument).
- It might be conceded that the theory does appear self-refuting, but that is because we are so entrenched in forms of understanding dictated by folk-psychology, and so we find it difficult to imagine not thinking in those terms. Students who take this line may argue that the critique of folk psychology is a necessary first step in the process of dismantling imprecise ways of conceiving the mind, but it would be naïve to think we can simply 'step out' of this way of thinking about the mind having shown its scientific limitations.

Notes:

- According to eliminative materialism not only is there nothing in reality to which our folk-psychological vocabulary refers, but it is unhelpful and misleading to use our folk-psychological vocabulary. This stands in contrast to 'fictionalism' [sic] which claims that our folk psychological vocabulary is helpful although it doesn't successfully refer to mental states (it is a 'useful fiction'). Students should not be penalised, however, for conflating these positions (for instance by arguing for something like: 'eliminative materialism is true in a fictionalist form' (whether or not they use the latter term itself)).
- Students should not be unduly penalised for misattributing arguments/views (where it does not confuse the point they are trying to make). Persistent misattribution of arguments/views would be an inaccuracy that would justify not awarding an answer full marks, but this should not be regarded as a reason for excluding it from the top band (assuming everything else meets the requirements of the level descriptors).
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.