
A-LEVEL PHILOSOPHY

7172/2: Metaphysics of God and Metaphysics of Mind
Report on the Examination

7172
June 2022

Version: 1.0

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Introduction

What follows is a question-by-question commentary on the trends in performance of students on component 7172/2: Metaphysics of God and Metaphysics of Mind. In the course of this commentary, reference is made to student responses, the question paper, the assessment objectives, the specification and associated readings, and the generic Mark Scheme. In compiling this report the observations of the lead examiner have been supplemented by the evidence provided by senior examiners and their team members. The point of comparison for this exam paper will be the last full series of exams (Summer 2019), which was also the inaugural year for this reformed specification.

Summary Findings

There is a great deal to be positive about after this return to a full public examination in the philosophy A Level. On the basis of the data collected at the time of writing this report, the (mean) average performance rose this year to above 50% compared with 2019 (where the mean was just below 50%). The qualitative judgements of examiners would support this statistical indication that the standard of performance was as high if not higher this year, which is most impressive given the context for these exams. It should also be acknowledged, however, that at the very lowest end of the performance scale, more students failed to attempt questions this year on nine of the ten items of assessment compared with 2019.

On average, students performed better this year on the Metaphysics of Mind than the Metaphysics of God on all but one question type: the essays, testing AO1 and AO2, where there was a significant disparity. This is explained in part by the significant number of students who did not even attempt the essay question on the Metaphysics of Mind, or else they wrote nothing of relevance and thereby did not receive any marks (these two scenarios accounted for almost 10% of response). But there was evidence of higher performance on AO2 this year on both themes, across the board on the Metaphysics of God and at the higher end of the performance scale on Metaphysics of Mind. More students accessed the top band of marks (21-25) on both themes compared with 2019. In the past we have encouraged students to evaluate ‘early and often’, including trying to find the strengths in positions that they ultimately want to argue against. The evidence suggests that more and more students are now doing this. Although some students continue to use exaggerated evaluative remarks about ‘incredibly weak/strong’ arguments which are not supported by the reasons provided, on the whole students are sticking to the key skills of clearly stating their argument(s), presenting counter arguments(s), and producing brief evaluative summary judgements, with more integrated summaries in the overall conclusion. Some students at the higher end of performance, those in or approaching top band, could benefit from being more explicit about the weight they are giving to particular arguments and the reasons for doing so.

One general observation made by examiners this year centred on a perceived decline in the quality of handwriting. There are always illegible scripts escalated to senior examiners, but this was more pronounced this year. This was most apparent in the essays, and it impacted students at all levels. Examiners can only credit material they can read, and it was a concern that some students are not fulfilling their potential because of the clarity of their written communication.

Assessment Objectives:

AO1: Demonstrate knowledge and understanding of the core concepts and methods of philosophy, including through the use of philosophical analysis.

AO2: Analyse and evaluate philosophical argument to form reasoned judgements.

Section A: Metaphysics of God

01: State the definitions of 'God' used by (a) Anselm and (b) Descartes in their ontological arguments. [3 marks]

This question assessed students' ability to recall and present the definitions of God (testing AO1 only), used by two philosophers on the specification, within the context of ontological arguments. Student did remarkably well, with 3 being the most frequently awarded mark (for over 40% of students). The overall impression was that Descartes's definition God as 'a supreme perfect being' was handled best by students, but students also did very well on Anselm's: 'a being great than which nothing can be conceived'.

Where students lost marks, it was typically because they only managed one precise definition and the other was either wrong or imprecise. Answers which were not sufficiently full, or lacked precision, included, for example: Anselm supposedly defining God as the 'greatest being we can conceive of'; and Descartes supposedly defining God as a 'perfect being'.

Redundancy was more of an issue this year than in 2019, but that is understandable because there is so much within the question: two major philosophers, their ontological arguments, and definitions of God by those philosophers in the context of those specific arguments. As such, examiners were instructed to exercise tolerance on redundancy where accurate remarks were made about ontological arguments, so long as the definitions themselves were clear and not blurred with additional and unnecessary material.

At the lower end of performance (1 mark), students confused Descartes's ontological argument with his trademark argument, but they were sometimes able to pick up points for fragments of relevant material on Descartes and/or or Anselm.

Some students answered the question with reference to attributes associated with the God of classical theism: omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence, necessity etc. Because of the specific context for Anselm and Descartes definitions of God, there were no marks available for those answers.

02: Explain the design argument from analogy as presented by Hume. [5 marks]

This question assessed students' ability to demonstrate their knowledge and understanding (AO1) of one of Hume's arguments for the existence of God (or a of the designer of the universe). Students performed better on this question than the corresponding item of assessment in 2019: arguments for and against the existence of God continue to be more accessible than issues concerning religious language. The mean average increased and more students were awarded maximum marks. The most successful answers focussed on the logic of Hume's won argument and not design arguments more generally.

The best answers (accessing 4 and 5 marks) tended to focus on ‘spatial order/regularity’. They often had quotes from the relevant text, Hume’s *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, although that certainly wasn’t required to access full marks. Having demonstrated their knowledge of the nature of arguments from analogy, these students proceeded to draw comparisons between designed artefacts and features of the natural world, suggesting that ‘like effects have like causes’, and that the cause of the design features of the natural world would also be an intelligence, but one ‘possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work’. Illustrations included clocks, computers, human eyes and other biological features of nature.

Lower down the performance scale (3 marks), but still showing commendable knowledge and understanding, students explained the principles of analogy underpinning Hume’s argument, but they tended to produce more generic design arguments, or arguments blurred with Paley’s, rather than the argument as presented by Hume.

Those accessing 1 or 2 marks showed some generic knowledge about design arguments, or arguments from analogy, but little else. One of the more common errors was to present Hume’s objections to design arguments from analogy. There were no marks available for this, but students were given some credit for implicit knowledge of design arguments and arguments from analogy emerging from these responses.

03: Explain how Russell objects to the cosmological arguments by arguing that it commits the fallacy of composition. [5 marks]

This item required students to demonstrate their knowledge and understanding of a famous objection to cosmological argument by Russell (testing AO1). On average students found this more challenging than question 02, and considerably more so than the corresponding item on 2019 (on the paradox of the stone). Having said that, over 50% of students scored 3 or more marks. Successful answers showed an understanding of the cosmological argument (or some version of it) and the nature of the fallacy.

Those students accessing full marks tended to start with a general definition of cosmological arguments, or else they outlined one specific one. Either approach was acceptable. There were excellent counts of Leibniz’s argument from contingency / the principle of sufficient reason, or Aquinas’s third way, which are especially relevant to Russell’s objection. These students explained the fallacy as an error in assuming that what is true of all members/parts must be true of the set/whole: so, because every part of the universe may be contingent and require a reason/cause, the universe as a whole must be contingent and require a (necessary) reason/cause. This error was sometimes illustrated using Russell’s own example: all members of the human race have a mother, but it would be an error to infer from this that the human race as a whole has a mother. Sometimes students used serviceable but less precise examples drawing on human performance: all members of a football (or other sporting) team may be ‘good’, but it would be a mistake to infer from this that the team must be ‘good’.

Students at on 3 marks captured the substantive content of the objection, but it was not as precisely targeted on the cosmological argument, or else there was some blurring with a more general problem of hastily generalising from incomplete data.

Lower down, at Level 1 or 2, students showed some knowledge of cosmological arguments but little or nothing on the objection. There were attempts to apply arguments defending the possibility

of an infinite regress, and arguments of the form: 'even if the universe does require a cause because of its composition, it does not have to be the God of classical theism'.

04: Explain Flew's view on religious language and explain how Hare responds to this using the notion of a 'blik' [12 marks]

This question required a more expansive demonstration of philosophical knowledge, understanding and analysis (AO1), whereby were students required to explain a famous perspective on religious language (by Flew) and explain how Hare responds to this.

On average of students found it slightly harder to score marks on this question than on the corresponding question in 2019, when there was a record number of students accessing the top band of marks. Again, this was a case of students handling arguments for/against the existence of God better than issues concerning religious language. Although the mean average was still over 50% of available marks this year, and a majority of students got to at least 7 marks.

Most students were able to access the 4-6 band on the strength of their explanation of Flew's view of religious language, where there were many good accounts of the parable of the gardener. But they found it harder to get the same level of detail and precision on Hare's response. Sometimes students would give a good account of the parable of the paranoid student, and identify their paranoid perspective as a 'blik', but they were not able reintegrate that with the question of religious language and its status as meaningful discourse. This explains why fewer students were able to progress to the top band (10-12 marks) compared with 2019.

It wasn't necessary to situate Flew (or Hare) in the cognitivism v non cognitivism debate, and some of the best didn't. They focussed purely on the question of whether or not religious language was meaningful and why. Those who did take the former approach tended to cast Flew as a cognitivist and Hare as a non-cognitivist, with accurate characterisations of those philosophical stances on religious language. Some of the best explicitly identified the details of Flew's parable as paralleling religious discourse, when evil ('weeds') are explained away about by the 'mysterious ways' of God ('the invisible gardener'), until their claims 'die the death of a thousand qualifications'. On the other side of the question, these high performing students were able to move from the parable of the paranoid student, and the impact their overarching perspective had on their lives at university, to talking about how religious attitudes shape the lives of individuals (their values, priorities, and behaviours) in meaningful ways. Few students, even among the best, made the points that blik's were attitudes which were with either insensitive to empirical evidence or else shaped what counted as evidence for those who hold them.

At the lower end (4-6 marks) students produced less accurate accounts of Flew's parable. They often had, for example, two explorers discovering a 'well-tended' or 'beautifully kept' garden. There was often redundant material, too, on verificationism and comparisons were Ayer's position. These students were not able to say very much on Hare beyond attempting to defining 'blik's' and pointing out that he, unlike Flew, thought that religious language was meaningful.

At the bottom end (1-3 marks) there were confusions between Flew and Ayer's views on religious language. Other students were able to identify Flew and Hare with the appropriate stances on the meaningfulness of religious language, but they were not able to develop this in any detail. Other responses got bogged down in attempts to define cognitivism and non-cognitivism, often

(mistakenly) identifying non-cognitivism with the view that religious language is meaningless. Redundant remarks on realism and anti-realism were also a feature of some of these responses.

Question 05: Does the existence of evil disprove the existence of God? [25 marks]

The question (testing AO1 and AO2) invited a discussion of one of the major challenges to the existence of God on the specification: the existence of evil. The mean average was higher than on the corresponding question in 2019, and more students accessed the top range of marks (21-15). At the time of writing, the most frequently awarded score for this question was 15, and the 11-15 band the most frequently accessed. Students took a whole range of approaches, answering definitely in the affirmative, in the negative, and in more qualified and nuanced ways. Students mostly discussed the philosophers and arguments on the specification, but Augustine featured regularly, and there were occasional discussions of sceptical theism, process theology, and even Manichean responses to evil.

Students in the 11-15 band typically indicated their line of argument at the outset, and often showed detailed knowledge and understanding of the logical problem of evil (inconsistent triad) and evidential problem (empirical evidence of the scale and distribution of suffering), and a clear grasp of possible responses: Plantinga's free will defence in response to the logical problem; Hick's soul making theodicy in response to the evidential problem. Although some deployed Hick very effectively in response to both. Students who did not progress beyond 11-15 were often unable to generate sustained evaluation, with argument and counter argument. Some found it hard, for example, to produce arguments defending views that they had no sympathy with). For other students, there were imprecisions in the handling of particular arguments, their detail in content and their logical form. The best students were able to make the distinction, for example, between offering a logically possible reason for natural evil (e.g. the free agency of supernatural beings) and a plausible reason. But many were not able to draw the distinction between logically possible and empirically well supported. Some students also got very confused in their discussion of first, second, and third order goods/evils (drawing on Mackie). The relationship between these goods and evils, however they were numbered, often wasn't very clear. Lower down this level students often mischaracterised defences or theodicies as arguments for the existence of God.

Those students progressing into the 16-20 band were able to sustain an evaluative approach, focussing in particular on those arguments which they identified as more crucial to their conclusion: for example, the unequal distribution of suffering and (seemingly) pointless evils visited on the innocent. Students were typically able to draw on Hick to test the strength of these objections, in terms of, for example, the relative nature of our estimation of evil, epistemic distance, and eschatological considerations. Those accessing the top band of marks would sometime state at the outset what conditions would have to be met for the existence of evil to disprove the existence of God, and/or what the conditions of successful defence or theodicy are. This then guided the logical progression of their essay. Some of the best made precise and detailed distinctions between the nature of theodicies and defences, whereas others used these terms interchangeably but without clouding the logic of specific arguments. These students often drew well integrated provisional conclusions throughout their essay, and kept bringing the discussion back to the fundamental tension between the existence (or extent) of evil and the nature of God as classically understood. Some focussed exclusively on the 'God of the philosophers', and the conceptual issues arising from that tradition. Others took the God of the philosophers to also be referring to the 'God of Abraham', and fused philosophical arguments with biblically based arguments. That is perfectly acceptable, so long as the appropriate rigour in logic is maintained. Augustine's theodicy was often discussed alongside Plantinga's as forming the basis for the latter's free-will defence. There was robust

evolution of both. Although most of the better ones seemed to argue that evil does disprove the existence of God, there were outstanding responses taking both sides on this debate. And judged the term 'disprove' was too high a bar for philosophers to clear on this question, and instead argued that the existence of evil casts doubt on the existence of God given certain definitions of the divine nature.

Students at the lower end of the assessment scale (6-10 marks) would sometimes lay out the problem of evil in general terms in the introduction, and then proceed straight to explaining the defences and theodicies. This did not allow for integration between the specific versions of the problem that these defences and theodicies were responding to. Crucial divine attributes were also sometimes left out of the discussion (either omnipotence or omni-benevolence) such that the problem of evil was implicit rather than explicit in the discussion of issues arising from the defences or theodicies.

At the lowest scoring end of the assessment scale (1-5) students only manage a generic outline of the problem of evil, or the issues were confused with the paradox of the stone and the Euthyphro dilemma. Some approached the question as if it concerned the origin of evil and whether or not God created it.

Section B: Metaphysics of Mind

06: What is a philosophical zombie? [3 marks]

This question (testing AO1 only) required students to explain a concept on the specification which is at the heart of a thought experiment in the philosophy of mind. Students answered this question exceptionally well, scoring an even higher mean average than on question 01, and much higher than the corresponding question of the paper in 2019. In fact, students found it easier to score marks on this question than on any other on the exam, with over 55% attaining maximum marks.

Some students began or ended with brief background remarks on the origins of the thought experiment in the work of Chalmers and arguments for property dualism (or against physicalism). This was fine but certainly not necessary. Students at the top end of the performance scale typically answered by describing a 'philosophical zombie' as 'physically identical' to a human being, or a 'physical duplicate' of a human being. They then identified 'consciousness', 'qualia' or 'phenomenal experience', as the one feature missing from the philosophical zombie which distinguished them from a 'normal human being'.

Students most commonly lost a mark by failing to specify that the identity between a human being and philosophical zombie was physical identity. Instead, they presented the zombie as being behaviourally, functionally, or metaphysically identical. Others overextended the distinguishing feature missing from the philosophical zombie as 'lacking a 'mind' or 'mental states', and sometimes they explicitly included 'intentionality'.

Redundancy was not a particular problem with this question, but some did write too much background information on the dualism v physicalism debate where mistakes occasionally crept in and a mark was lost.

At the lowest end of scoring (1 mark), some students knew that the philosophical zombie lacked quality but they were not able to say anything about the (physical) properties shared with human beings.

07: Explain the ‘inverted qualia’ objection to functionalism. [5 marks]

This question (testing AO1 only) required students to explain an objection to one of the major theories in the philosophy of mind on the specification: the ‘inverted qualia’ objection to functionalism. Successful answers required some understanding of functionalism and the concept of inverted qualia. Students found it harder to score marks on this question than the corresponding item of assessment in 2019, although over 55% scored 3 or more marks and nearly 16% scored maximum marks.

Students accessing 3 often had a narrow view of functionalism in terms of functions of the physical body or brain, but they were still able to apply the ‘inverted qualia’ scenario sufficiently well to show that functionalism seems to leave something important out of its account of the mind.

Surprisingly few students actually used the definition on the specification: ‘all mental states can be reduced to functional roles which can be multiply realised’. But whatever definition was used, students who scored 4 or 5 marks showed a good grasp of functionalism, either demonstrated at the outset of their response or in the course of their explanation of the objection. They made the key point that the conceivability of a consistent/systematic inversion in phenomenal experience (e.g. of colour) between functionally identical individuals perceiving the same mind independent objects (e.g. grass) shows that qualia are not functional properties and functionalism cannot be a complete account of the mind.

Lower down the assessment scale, 1-2 marks, students confused functionalism with behaviourism. The inverted qualia thought experiment was sometimes confused with colour blindness, and some students actually represented qualia as either one of the functional ‘inputs’ or ‘outputs’.

08: Explain why the asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other people’s mental states is problematic for philosophical behaviourism. [5 marks]

This question (testing AO1 only) required students to explain a problem facing another one of the major theories in the philosophy of mind on the specification: behaviourism, and the problematic asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other people’s mental states. The most successful response needed to show an understanding of behaviourism and the nature of this specific problem. On average, students were better able to access marks on this item of assessment than question 07, and on the corresponding item on the 2019 paper.

Students often started with much stronger definitions of behaviourism (compared with the definitions of functionalism in response to question 02), with some of the best giving precise accounts of both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ behaviourism. Students who got to 3 marks built on their definition(s) to show why there is a difference between self-knowledge and knowledge of other people’s mental states, and at least indicate why this might be a problem for behaviourism. Although the asymmetry at this level was often characterised in terms of degree not kind, and the point of departure was sometimes the counterintuitive notion that, ‘according to behaviourism others would know more about our own mental states than we do’, which is not really the point. But they were still able to show that the difference in knowledge shouldn’t really arise if behaviourism is true.

Students who were able to access the higher marks (4 or 5) demonstrated one or more differences in kind between self-knowledge (e.g. introspective, immediate, certain, infallible) and knowledge of other people’s mental states (e.g. observational, inferential, speculative, fallible). This, they went

on to say, is a problem for behaviourism. For the latter, the meaning/content of language about mental states relates (only) to physical/bodily states and so the knowledge-claims about my own mind would have to be the same (in terms of their nature/justification) as the knowledge-claims about the minds of others. This asymmetry shows that they are not the same, and so philosophical behaviourism cannot be correct

At the lower end (1-2 marks) students often confused the issue with the problem of other minds (associated with dualism) or the multiple realisability of mental states. There were also renditions of super Spartan and perfect actor thought experiments.

09: Explain the 'knowledge/Mary' argument (for property dualism) and the response that Mary gains acquaintance knowledge rather than propositional knowledge [12 marks]

This question constituted a more wide ranging test of AO1, requiring students to demonstrate knowledge, understanding and analysis with respect to a famous critique of physicalism / argument for property dualism (the 'knowledge/Mary argument'), and a response designed to defend physicalism. Students performed better on average than on the corresponding question on the 2019 paper.

Like assessment item 04 on this exam paper, this was very much a question of two halves, with most students accessing the 4-6 band with their ability to explain the 'knowledge/Mary' argument (for property dualism). Some of the best answers began with a precise definition of property dualism and or presented the argument as an attack on physicalism. They were clear that the knowledge that Mary acquired when she emerged from the black and white room, and saw colours for the first time, was knowledge about something nonphysical (qualia), because she already possessed all the physical facts/knowledge about colour vision before she left her black and white environment.

Students often failed to get beyond half marks, or only just scraped into the 7-9 band, because of their failure to extract any detail out of the response, sometimes doing little more than reiterating that 'Mary gains acquaintance knowledge rather than propositional knowledge', which counters property dualism / defends physicalism. There were also confusions between 'acquaintance knowledge' and 'ability knowledge', although some managed effectively to show how acquaintance knowledge could lead to ability knowledge: eg having become experienced seeing the colour red, Mary would then be able to pick out red from among other colours. Some students remained in the 4-6 band because they were confused about the nature of propositional and acquaintance knowledge: some got their definitions the wrong way around, whereas others associated propositional knowledge with a greater degree of certainty rather than with a distinctive type of knowledge.

Nearly 20% of students accessed the top band of marks (10-12, which is impressive. These responses built on precise and detailed accounts of the 'knowledge/Mary' argument by distinguishing acquaintance knowledge (knowledge 'of') with propositional knowledge (knowledge 'that'). Supportive illustrations often focussed on a distinction between knowing facts about people and then becoming personally familiar with them through a direct meeting. No extra facts about the person are learned. Likewise, Mary's first personal experience of colour gave her a familiarity which she previously lacked, but this was familiarity with propositional facts she had already acquired while in the black and white room. As such, all propositional knowledge remains physical and the criticism from property dualism fails.

At the lower end of the assessment scale (1-3 mark) students sometimes knew some of the details about the ‘knowledge/Mark’ scenario, but they actually presented Mary as gaining acquaintance rather than (or in addition to) propositional knowledge while still in the black and white room. Others only managed some more or less accurate remarks on property dualism and/or physicalism.

10: To what extent is eliminative materialism correct? [25 marks]

This question (testing AO1 and AO2) assessed students’ ability to assess the merits of one of the physicalist positions on the specification. Eliminative materialism, most closely associated with Paul and Patricia Churchland, was also the focus of the corresponding question on the 2019 paper. And the quality of student performance broadly tracked that seen in 2019. Statistically, this question was the hardest question on the exam to score marks on. Once again, however, over 20% of students managed to access marks of 16 marks or more, and more students accessed the top band (21-25) this year.

More typically, students scored high up in the 6-10 band or low down in the 11-15. Eliminative materialism was sometimes blurred with mind-brain identity theories (because of their shared emphasis on neuroscience), and it was not unusual to find eliminative materialism characterised as a radical ‘reductive’ theory, despite the fact most knew perfectly well that its chief feature is the hypothesis that mental states as we commonly understand them (within folk psychology) do not exist or are misunderstood and should be eliminated. These responses sometimes had a very generic concept of folk psychology (e.g. as ‘thoughts and feelings’). Ancient, discredited, and superseded scientific theories (caloric, miasma, even Newton’s theory of gravity) were frequently and mistakenly taken to be examples of folk psychology that had already been discarded, rather than as analogies from within the history of science which are suggestive of what might happen to folk psychology in the future. The intuitive nature of mental states as characterised by folk psychology was often appealed to as a reason to maintain folk psychology, and the charge that eliminative materialism is self-refuting was covered with varying degrees of precision. The frequent response, offered on behalf of the Churchlands, was that that the self-refuting argument is ‘question begging’. Some applied that response very well, but it wasn’t always clear that students knew what ‘question begging’ means, and sometimes it was clear that they did not know what it means. Some essays argued that it was impractical to abandon folk psychology from ordinary human discourse and replace it with scientific terminology, which is a reasonable enough concern, but it misunderstands what eliminative materialists are claiming and the scientific and philosophical context of their claims. There were good arguments for the explanatory and predictive success of folk psychology, but explanation and prediction were frequently blurred, with examples of the former offered as illustrations of the latter.

Few students, regardless of their overall performance, were explicit that philosophers such as Paul Churchland treat folk psychology as a theory of mind. Those that did acknowledge this opened up new avenues for evaluation, questioning whether that characterisation is accurate. The best essays tended to argue that eliminative materialism is (probably) not correct, and that folk psychology should not be abandoned, while repudiating some of the more common objections to eliminative materialism: such as the aforementioned claim that the theory is ‘self-refuting’, or that our mental states are just ‘self-evident / intuitively compelling’. The predictive and explanatory power of folk psychology, and its development within the history of mental health diagnosis and treatment, were often presented as most crucial arguments. They were well illustrated and robustly defended. Some responses did challenge the premise that folk psychology was a scientific theory, and offered sophisticated humanistic criticisms of the view that we should subject the mind to

forms of understanding modelled on the hard physical sciences (some referred to Wittgenstein in this context). Others focused on the failure of eliminative materialism to argue persuasively for the elimination of intentionality from our conceptions of the mind, arguing that intentionality lay at the root of the self-refuting objection (which some students argued could not be overcome).

Essays on the Metaphysics of Mind continue to attract response which juxtapose different theories of mind, rather than using other theories to critically engaged with the theory in question. So, with some essays in the 1-5 band, and some essays low down in the 6-10 range, students were claiming eliminative materialism failed because there were other 'more viable physicalist theories' out there: behaviourism, mind-brain identity theories etc. But the merits of physicalism were presupposed rather than defended, and the superiority of other theories tended to be asserted rather than argued for. There were a lot of very short essays in response to this question, which may be due to constraints on time and the impact of answering question in the order they appear on the exam: there is some evidence for this with students sometimes mentioning arguments in their essay plans which they never actually discussed within their essays.

Mark Ranges and Award of Grades

Grade boundaries and cumulative percentage grades are available on the [Results Statistics](#) page of the AQA Website.