

AS
HISTORY
7041/2N

Revolution and dictatorship: Russia, 1917–1953

Component 2N The Russian Revolution and the Rise of Stalin, 1917–1929

Mark scheme

June 2023

Version: 1.0 Final



Mark schemes are prepared by the Lead Assessment Writer and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all associates participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every associate understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each associate analyses a number of students' scripts. Alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, associates encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Lead Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

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Level of response marking instructions

Level of response mark schemes are broken down into levels, each of which has a descriptor. The descriptor for the level shows the average performance for the level. There are marks in each level.

Before you apply the mark scheme to a student's answer read through the answer and annotate it (as instructed) to show the qualities that are being looked for. You can then apply the mark scheme.

Step 1 Determine a level

Start at the lowest level of the mark scheme and use it as a ladder to see whether the answer meets the descriptor for that level. The descriptor for the level indicates the different qualities that might be seen in the student's answer for that level. If it meets the lowest level then go to the next one and decide if it meets this level, and so on, until you have a match between the level descriptor and the answer. With practice and familiarity, you will find that for better answers you will be able to quickly skip through the lower levels of the mark scheme.

When assigning a level, you should look at the overall quality of the answer and not look to pick holes in small and specific parts of the answer where the student has not performed quite as well as the rest. If the answer covers different aspects of different levels of the mark scheme you should use a best fit approach for defining the level and then use the variability of the response to help decide the mark within the level, ie if the response is predominantly Level 3 with a small amount of Level 4 material it would be placed in Level 3 but be awarded a mark near the top of the level because of the Level 4 content.

Step 2 Determine a mark

Once you have assigned a level you need to decide on the mark. The descriptors on how to allocate marks can help with this. The exemplar materials used during standardisation will help. There will be an answer in the standardising materials which will correspond with each level of the mark scheme. This answer will have been awarded a mark by the Lead Examiner. You can compare the student's answer with the example to determine if it is the same standard, better or worse than the example. You can then use this to allocate a mark for the answer based on the Lead Examiner's mark on the example.

You may well need to read back through the answer as you apply the mark scheme to clarify points and assure yourself that the level and the mark are appropriate.

Indicative content in the mark scheme is provided as a guide for examiners. It is not intended to be exhaustive and you must credit other valid points. Students do not have to cover all of the points mentioned in the Indicative content to reach the highest level of the mark scheme.

An answer which contains nothing of relevance to the question must be awarded no marks.

Section A

- 0 1** With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, which of these two sources is more valuable in explaining why Stalin won the power struggle after Lenin's death?

[25 marks]

Target: AO2

Analyse and evaluate appropriate source material, primary and/or contemporary to the period, within the historical context.

Generic Mark Scheme

- L5:** Answers will display a very good understanding of the value of the sources in relation to the issue identified in the question. They will evaluate the sources thoroughly in order to provide a well-substantiated conclusion. The response demonstrates a very good understanding of context. **21–25**
- L4:** Answers will provide a range of relevant well-supported comments on the value of the sources for the issue identified in the question. There will be sufficient comment to provide a supported conclusion but not all comments will be well-substantiated, and judgements will be limited. The response demonstrates a good understanding of context. **16–20**
- L3:** The answer will provide some relevant comments on the value of the sources and there will be some explicit reference to the issue identified in the question. Judgements will however, be partial and/or thinly supported. The response demonstrates an understanding of context. **11–15**
- L2:** The answer will be partial. There may be either some relevant comments on the value of one source in relation to the issue identified in the question or some comment on both, but lacking depth and having little, if any, explicit link to the issue identified in the question. The response demonstrates some understanding of context. **6–10**
- L1:** The answer will either describe source content or offer stock phrases about the value of the source. There may be some comment on the issue identified in the question but it is likely to be limited, unsubstantiated and unconvincing. The response demonstrates limited understanding of context. **1–5**
- Nothing worthy of credit. **0**

Indicative content

Note: This content is not prescriptive and students are not obliged to refer to the material contained in this mark scheme. Any legitimate answer will be assessed on its merits according to the generic levels scheme.

Students must deploy knowledge of the historical context to show an understanding of the relationship between the sources and the issues raised in the question, when assessing the significance of provenance, the arguments deployed in the sources and the tone and emphasis of the sources. Descriptive answers which fail to do this should be awarded no more than Level 2 at best. Answers should address both the value and the limitations of the sources for the particular question and purpose given.

In responding to this question, students may choose to address each source in turn or to adopt a more comparative approach in order to arrive at a judgement. Either approach is equally valid and what follows is indicative of the evaluation which may be relevant.

Source A: in assessing the value of this source as an explanation, students may refer to the following:

Provenance and tone

- Trotsky was a leading member of the Party and Stalin's chief rival for the leadership in 1924, therefore he was well-placed to comment on Stalin's strengths. Given that he was a rival of Stalin's, his acknowledgement of more positive points, e.g. that Stalin has 'the deserved reputation of an old revolutionary' also adds weight to what he has to say
- This appears a remarkably far-sighted source from Leon Trotsky. Being written in the late 1930s, the source could well be influenced by hindsight and Trotsky's experiences beyond 1924. It is also unlikely that the reported conversation occurred verbatim, adding to the source's limitations.
- Trotsky was only speaking to a supporter so had no reason to exaggerate. That the source was supposedly Trotsky's words from 1924 is interesting in that it reveals that Trotsky had apparently realised at this early stage of the power struggle that Stalin was in the strongest position.
- Trotsky writes in a rather bitter tone. His references to 'worms' and 'shifty characters' reveal his true feelings about Stalin and his supporters, and that Stalin had already outmanoeuvred his main rival by 1924.

Content and argument

- the source suggests that Stalin worked hard to appeal to all types of people including the Nepmen and kulaks who were thriving under the NEP. Stalin supported the NEP in 1924 against Trotsky. Stalin's policy of 'Socialism in One Country' proved to be more popular than Trotsky's 'Permanent Revolution' – this it could be said that Stalin spoke 'their language'.
- Trotsky suggests Stalin's reputation as an old revolutionary was deserved: Stalin had been active in the Bolshevik party in 1917 (and earlier) unlike Trotsky. However, Stalin made more of this than was strictly the case – associating himself with Lenin and delivering the oration at Lenin's funeral (despite Lenin's derogatory words about him in his Testament)
- Trotsky refers to his organisational skills and his readiness to win over the unscrupulous; Stalin was certainly methodical; the growth of the bureaucracy suited him; as General Secretary he was able to bring in his own supporters and gain more power over decision-making; he used this to full effect in attacking Trotsky and his other rivals in the 1920s and winning votes in Party congresses.
- Trotsky refers to Stalin's 'will and daring', but this seems a suspiciously prescient observation from Trotsky in 1924 as one of Trotsky's major errors was to underestimate Stalin for far too long, regarding

him as a 'grey blur'. This could detract from the value of the source as an example of the influence of hindsight.

Source B: in assessing the value of this source as an explanation, students may refer to the following:

Provenance and tone

- the account provided by the Swiss communist, Jules Humbert-Droz is valuable because he was close to Bukharin, one of Stalin's rivals for the leadership, and therefore privy to Bukharin's honest thoughts. Although Humbert-Droz has his own view of Bukharin's plans, he reports without trying to justify his personal disapproval.
- the source was written in 1971 as part of Humbert-Droz's memoirs, which could suggest that the original conversation had not been remembered or recorded accurately. However, there is nothing to suggest any undue warping of the facts and the references in the report would verify its authenticity.
- it is significant that Humbert-Droz visited Bukharin in February 1929 shortly before Bukharin was deprived of his government posts and expelled from the Politburo. Coming at the end of the struggle for power, this could be more valuable. However, the key developments may already have taken place, e.g. the proposed alliance with Kamenev and Zinoviev came to nothing.
- the tone is quite factual with the writer stating that theirs was a 'frank' conversation but the writer is also quite self-effacing, letting Bukharin's viewpoint come through and pointing out that Bukharin 'knew better than I'. The implied disapproval of divisions within the party is revealing of a key aspect of Stalin's rise to power.

Content and argument

- the source refers to the contact that has been made between Bukharin (on the right) and the Zinoviev-Kamenev faction (on the left). To 1927, Bukharin and his supporters had worked with Stalin to defeat Trotsky and the 'United Opposition', which included Zinoviev and Kamenev, but when Stalin attacked rightist economic policy in 1928, Bukharin considered combining forces with his erstwhile enemies against Stalin
- the report shows that Bukharin had finally become aware of the threat posed by Stalin's ambition; Bukharin had previously underestimated Stalin, believing him a friend who shared his own economic ideas (in the Duumvirate of 1926/27). In 1928 Stalin had revealed his true colours, refusing to share power, attacking Bukharin's economic views. The value of the source is as a snapshot of the position in Feb 1929.
- Humbert-Droz reports his disapproval of Bukharin's last-ditch attempt to ally with Zinoviev and Kamenev; Bukharin's desperation can be seen in his admittance that this was a 'bloc without principles'; he knew how Trotsky and Zinoviev had been hounded and expelled from the Party, and Kamenev from the Central Committee, and having finally seen through Stalin, his former friendship had turned to hate
- the report explains the attempt to form a bloc as a marriage of convenience for the sole purpose of 'getting rid of Stalin'. In practice Bukharin did not go through with the alliance and shortly after this meeting he was deprived of his government posts and expelled from the Politburo (November). In all this Stalin showed the upper hand, taking advantage of Lenin's ban on factions; the source's prime value is in showing Bukharin's desperation.

In arriving at a judgement as to which source might be of greater value, students may argue that Source A provides the more rounded picture of Stalin's personality and the strengths which enabled him to succeed – not least his 'will and daring'. Others may, however, suggest that Source B offers more specific evidence of the complex and unscrupulous manner by which Stalin overcame his rivals by dividing them and using ideology to his own advantage without a firm commitment either way. It might

also be argued that Source B is written by the more disinterested party, although Trotsky had the advantage of being in the middle of the power-struggle and of having the greater personal understanding of Stalin – honed further by the time he was writing.

Section B

0 2 'It was the weaknesses and failures of the Provisional Government established in March 1917 that led to its collapse in October/November 1917.'

Explain why you agree or disagree with this view.

[25 marks]

Target: AO1

Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Generic Mark Scheme

- L5:** Answers will display a good understanding of the demands of the question. They will be well-organised and effectively communicated. There will be a range of clear and specific supporting information showing a good understanding of key features and issues, together with some conceptual awareness. The answer will be analytical in style with a range of direct comment leading to substantiated judgement. **21–25**
- L4:** Answers will show an understanding of the question and will supply a range of largely accurate information which will show an awareness of some of the key issues and features. The answer will be effectively organised and show adequate communication skills. There will be analytical comment in relation to the question and the answer will display some balance. However, there may be some generalisation and judgements will be limited and only partially substantiated. **16–20**
- L3:** The answer will show some understanding of the full demands of the question and the answer will be adequately organised. There will be appropriate information showing an understanding of some key features and/or issues but the answer may be limited in scope and/or contain inaccuracy and irrelevance. There will be some comment in relation to the question. **11–15**
- L2:** The answer will be descriptive or partial, showing some awareness of the question but a failure to grasp its full demands. There will be some attempt to convey material in an organised way although communication skills may be limited. There will be some appropriate information showing understanding of some key features and/or issues, but the answer may be very limited in scope and/or contain inaccuracy and irrelevance. There will be some, but limited, comment in relation to the question and statements will, for the most part, be unsupported and generalist. **6–10**
- L1:** The question has not been properly understood and the response shows limited organisational and communication skills. The information conveyed is irrelevant or extremely limited. There may be some unsupported, vague or generalist comment. **1–5**
- Nothing worthy of credit. **0**

Indicative content

Note: This content is not prescriptive and students are not obliged to refer to the material contained in this mark scheme. Any legitimate answer will be assessed on its merits according to the generic levels scheme.

Arguments supporting the view that it was the weaknesses and failures of the Provisional Government established in March 1917 that led to its collapse in October/November 1917 might include:

- the Provisional Government had inherent weaknesses in its make-up; it was not elected, was largely composed of the traditional ruling groups and many of its members believed in waiting for a popular (constituent) assembly before making vital policy decisions; it shared power with the Petrograd Soviet in the 'Dual Authority', which increased its weakness
- the Provisional Government was committed to continuing the war; this was deeply unpopular and caused the resignations of Milyukov and Guchkov in May and brought four socialists into the cabinet, dividing it further; the Brusilov offensive failed in June and the government suffered from the fallout
- the Provisional Government lacked effective leadership; neither Prince Lvov (aristocratic landowner and former constitutionalist) nor Kerensky (from July) could command respect; the Soviet offered no alternative leadership; Kerensky showed poor judgement, underestimating his enemies, and making crucial mistakes in October/November; his government's involvement with Kornilov was a grave error; and giving arms to the Red Guards only swelled the popularity of their Bolshevik enemies
- the Provisional Government failed to carry out necessary reforms, particularly land redistribution, which proceeded anyway without official authority; there was insufficient social reform to appease the left-wing, the government struggled to maintain order and it was unable to prevent military desertions.

Arguments challenging the view that it was the weaknesses and failures of the Provisional Government established in March 1917 that led to its collapse in October/November 1917 might include:

- the deteriorating economic situation in 1917 was beyond the control of the Provisional Government; the war had raised the cost of living, fuelling social distress; it was the broader long-term deficiencies of the economy with its problems of supply and distribution, coupled with poor industrial relations that undermined the government of 1917
- the Provisional Government was not responsible for the war which had brought military conscription, deprivations and rationing, while strategic failures had led to desertions; it was the war itself that provoked the social discontent that led to the collapse of the 'provisional' authority established in March 1917
- the Provisional Government was undermined by its many opponents; initially the SRs' popularity made the government wary of holding open elections; from April 1917, the return of Lenin helped turn the Bolsheviks into a mass workers' opposition party promising the 'peace, bread and land' that people wanted; the Bolshevik leadership and organisation under Lenin and Trotsky was strong and; ideological commitment bound the Bolsheviks together and accounts for their success
- the Provisional Government was not entirely ineffectual; it began well with a series of reforms, sought a middle-way between left and right-wing government with the intention of providing elections for a future democratic regime and took some decisive action, eg in July when it curbed popular rioting, forcing Lenin into exile and weakening the opposition.

The collapse of the Provisional Government in October/November 1917 could not have been foreseen in March, but the new government suffered major weaknesses from the outset. Students are likely to suggest that these inherent weaknesses, exacerbated by its failures between March and October, contributed to its demise. However, they should also be aware that broader contextual factors, not least inherited economic and social problems and the war, played no small part in undermining the

government. It was broader factors such as these, quite apart from their own strengths, that enabled the opposition groups – and principally the Bolsheviks – to topple the government. Reward any well-balanced argument that puts the reasons for the Provisional Government's collapse at the heart of the response and avoids too much general description of the events of 1917.

0 3 'The Kronstadt rising was the most important reason why Lenin adopted the New Economic Policy in March 1921.'

Explain why you agree or disagree with this view.

[25 marks]

Target: AO1

Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Generic Mark Scheme

- L5:** Answers will display a good understanding of the demands of the question. They will be well-organised and effectively communicated. There will be a range of clear and specific supporting information showing a good understanding of key features and issues, together with some conceptual awareness. The answer will be analytical in style with a range of direct comment leading to substantiated judgement. **21–25**
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- L3:** The answer will show some understanding of the full demands of the question and the answer will be adequately organised. There will be appropriate information showing an understanding of some key features and/or issues but the answer may be limited in scope and/or contain inaccuracy and irrelevance. There will be some comment in relation to the question. **11–15**
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- L1:** The question has not been properly understood and the response shows limited organisational and communication skills. The information conveyed is irrelevant or extremely limited. There may be some unsupported, vague or generalist comment. **1–5**
- Nothing worthy of credit. **0**

Indicative content

Note: This content is not prescriptive and students are not obliged to refer to the material contained in this mark scheme. Any legitimate answer will be assessed on its merits according to the generic levels scheme.

Arguments supporting the view that the Kronstadt rising was the most important reason why Lenin adopted the New Economic Policy in March 1921 might include:

- Lenin claimed the Kronstadt rising was ‘the flash which lit up reality’; a rebellion by 30000 sailors represented a worryingly large-scale display of opposition; Lenin was concerned about the excessive force needed to crush the revolt and announced a new policy in order to prevent further uprisings and secure Bolshevik rule
- the Kronstadt sailors had been Lenin’s loyal supporters at the time of the October/November 1917 revolution and many fought for the Reds in the Civil War; this confirmed that it was government policies, rather than ideological beliefs, that had provoked their revolt and needed to be addressed
- the Kronstadt sailors issued a manifesto in March 1921 which hit at the heart of the regime – it demanded an end to one-party communist rule – ‘Soviets without Bolsheviks’ – and complained of the Bolsheviks’ use of the Cheka, and reliance on ‘executions and bloodthirstiness’ in attempts to force production of grain and goods; the message was clearly anti-War Communism and threatened to destroy Lenin’s government; only a radical change of economic policy would appease the rebels
- the Kronstadt sailors were in close contact with the Petrograd workers and the rebellion exacerbated existing divisions within Bolshevik ranks fuelling Aleksandra Kollontai’s Workers’ Opposition group, which was hostile to the intensification of War Communism.

Arguments challenging the view that the Kronstadt rising was the most important reason why Lenin adopted the New Economic Policy in March 1921 might include:

- Lenin’s government had found it increasingly difficult to implement War Communism: it had necessitated the militarisation of the workplace and the implementation of terror in the countryside in order to force grain requisitions; this had destroyed much of the Bolsheviks’ former popularity; the policy was proving politically damaging and was less justifiable or necessary as the Civil War was coming to an end
- the Civil War and effects of War Communism meant that by 1921 many factories, unable to obtain raw materials, had ceased production; workers were illegally fleeing Petrograd, where rations were cut; there were strikes and riots, while support for the Mensheviks and SRs had increased; Martial law was introduced in January 1921, but Lenin had been forced to rely on the Cheka to crush demonstrations as some soldiers disobeyed orders; this swelled the Workers’ Opposition group and put pressure on Lenin to adopt a different policy
- a poor harvest meant that supplies of grain were down to dangerous levels, yet War Communism depended on buoyant requisitions; there was famine in many rural areas leading to reports of cannibalism; War Communism was not sustainable – a way had to be found of getting the economy moving again
- in late 1920 and the early months of 1921, the famine brought a large number of peasant revolts, the most serious being in Tambov province (August 1920–June 1921) where a large peasant army, supported by Green forces, attacked requisitioning; the disturbance spread across south-eastern Russia, necessitating a large Red Army operation; the government could not afford to be so reliant on the military and sustain such heavy military costs.

Students should be able to explain the link between the Kronstadt rising in March 1921 and Lenin’s decision to launch the New Economic Policy at the Tenth Party Congress the same month. The timing and Lenin’s own explanation would give credence to those who wish to argue that this rising was the most important reason why Lenin adopted the New Economic Policy. However, other factors should be taken into consideration and many will suggest that it was the coincidence of a range of different

troubles, rather than any one single factor that led Lenin to embark on a new course. Should an alternative reason be singled out as the most important, it is likely to be the broad economic argument, but reward any reasoned consideration that places the Kronstadt rising in context and leads to a supported judgement.