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# AS HISTORY 7041/2P

The Transformation of China, 1936–1997

Component 2P The emergence of the People’s Republic of China, 1936–1962

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**Mark scheme**

June 2023

Version: 1.0 Final



2 3 6 A 7 0 4 1 / 2 P / M S

Mark schemes are prepared by the Lead Assessment Writer and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all associates participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every associate understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each associate analyses a number of students' scripts. Alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, associates encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Lead Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

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## Level of response marking instructions

Level of response mark schemes are broken down into levels, each of which has a descriptor. The descriptor for the level shows the average performance for the level. There are marks in each level.

Before you apply the mark scheme to a student's answer read through the answer and annotate it (as instructed) to show the qualities that are being looked for. You can then apply the mark scheme.

### Step 1 Determine a level

Start at the lowest level of the mark scheme and use it as a ladder to see whether the answer meets the descriptor for that level. The descriptor for the level indicates the different qualities that might be seen in the student's answer for that level. If it meets the lowest level then go to the next one and decide if it meets this level, and so on, until you have a match between the level descriptor and the answer. With practice and familiarity, you will find that for better answers you will be able to quickly skip through the lower levels of the mark scheme.

When assigning a level, you should look at the overall quality of the answer and not look to pick holes in small and specific parts of the answer where the student has not performed quite as well as the rest. If the answer covers different aspects of different levels of the mark scheme you should use a best fit approach for defining the level and then use the variability of the response to help decide the mark within the level, ie if the response is predominantly Level 3 with a small amount of Level 4 material it would be placed in Level 3 but be awarded a mark near the top of the level because of the Level 4 content.

### Step 2 Determine a mark

Once you have assigned a level you need to decide on the mark. The descriptors on how to allocate marks can help with this. The exemplar materials used during standardisation will help. There will be an answer in the standardising materials which will correspond with each level of the mark scheme. This answer will have been awarded a mark by the Lead Examiner. You can compare the student's answer with the example to determine if it is the same standard, better or worse than the example. You can then use this to allocate a mark for the answer based on the Lead Examiner's mark on the example.

You may well need to read back through the answer as you apply the mark scheme to clarify points and assure yourself that the level and the mark are appropriate.

Indicative content in the mark scheme is provided as a guide for examiners. It is not intended to be exhaustive and you must credit other valid points. Students do not have to cover all of the points mentioned in the Indicative content to reach the highest level of the mark scheme.

An answer which contains nothing of relevance to the question must be awarded no marks.

**Section A**

- 0 1** With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, which of these two sources is more valuable in explaining problems facing China at the end of the Civil War?

**[25 marks]**

*Target: AO2*

*Analyse and evaluate appropriate source material, primary and/or contemporary to the period, within the historical context.*

**Generic Mark Scheme**

- L5:** Answers will display a very good understanding of the value of the sources in relation to the issue identified in the question. They will evaluate the sources thoroughly in order to provide a well-substantiated conclusion. The response demonstrates a very good understanding of context. **21–25**
- L4:** Answers will provide a range of relevant well-supported comments on the value of the sources for the issue identified in the question. There will be sufficient comment to provide a supported conclusion but not all comments will be well-substantiated, and judgements will be limited. The response demonstrates a good understanding of context. **16–20**
- L3:** The answer will provide some relevant comments on the value of the sources and there will be some explicit reference to the issue identified in the question. Judgements will however, be partial and/or thinly supported. The response demonstrates an understanding of context. **11–15**
- L2:** The answer will be partial. There may be either some relevant comments on the value of one source in relation to the issue identified in the question or some comment on both, but lacking depth and having little, if any, explicit link to the issue identified in the question. The response demonstrates some understanding of context. **6–10**
- L1:** The answer will either describe source content or offer stock phrases about the value of the source. There may be some comment on the issue identified in the question but it is likely to be limited, unsubstantiated and unconvincing. The response demonstrates limited understanding of context. **1–5**
- Nothing worthy of credit. **0**

## Indicative content

**Note: This content is not prescriptive and students are not obliged to refer to the material contained in this mark scheme. Any legitimate answer will be assessed on its merits according to the generic levels scheme.**

**Students must deploy knowledge of the historical context to show an understanding of the relationship between the sources and the issues raised in the question, when assessing the significance of provenance, the arguments deployed in the sources and the tone and emphasis of the sources. Descriptive answers which fail to do this should be awarded no more than Level 2 at best. Answers should address both the value and the limitations of the sources for the particular question and purpose given.**

In responding to this question, students may choose to address each source in turn or to adopt a more comparative approach in order to arrive at a judgement. Either approach is equally valid and what follows is indicative of the evaluation which may be relevant.

**Source A: in assessing the value of this source as an explanation, students may refer to the following:**

### Provenance and tone

- as a confidential record, Source A is likely to reflect Soviet attitudes towards China in the aftermath of the Civil War very accurately and so is valuable for that, since the document does not need to consider Chinese sensitivities. That said, given Stalin's involvement there is a vested interest in portraying the USSR in a dominant position that might skew the focus of the record
- by late June 1949 the outcome of the Civil War was certain; Shanghai had been taken by the Communists in the preceding month and Peng's final campaign against the remnants of GMD forces was well underway. Source A has value as it comes from a time when victory was a fait accompli and attention was turning to the reconstruction of China under the Communists
- the tone of the source is high handed ('China should not put off'), valuable in showing the extent to which China was dependent on the USSR in the aftermath of the Civil War, and how the USSR felt it was able to influence events in China at the time.

### Content and argument

- China had relied on the USSR for 'enormous aid' in order to defeat the GMD and was dependent on Soviet support in the aftermath of the Civil War; the source is valuable in showing this dependence. Indeed, Soviet aid would be vital in the aftermath of the Civil War, in particular the use of Soviet specialists to help repair infrastructure and implement agricultural planning
- the source has value in showing the extent to which the USSR felt able to dictate the pace of events in China following the Civil War, with Stalin not only offering financial aid to China, but also advising as to the next steps of consolidating Communist power in China, warning of 'delay'. The source does not mention the huge Soviet presence in Manchuria in 1949, but this was a spectre over Mao's regime after the Civil War and the source is valuable in showing the potential pitfalls of a close relationship between China and the USSR
- Source A is also valuable in showing that much of the territory Mao aspired to remained outside of his control even after the Civil War ended. Stalin's urging of Mao to proceed with the 'occupation on Xinjiang' is an example of how that region – together with Tibet – were not yet under Communist control and would be the subject of military and pacification campaigns in late 1949 and 1950. The source has value in showing that regional issues remained even after the Civil War ended.

**Source B: in assessing the value of this source as an explanation, students may refer to the following:**

**Provenance and tone**

- unlike public proclamations from Mao or state organs like the People's Daily, Source B's audience is limited to the CCP hierarchy rather than the people themselves. It is therefore valuable since it will provide a frank assessment of China's position at the time rather than a propaganda piece intended to paint the regime in a positive light
- by June 1950 the CCP had been able to take steps to consolidate its position in China. Jiang had fled to Taiwan late the preceding year, around the same time as the PRC had been formally established. Source B has value since it was produced at a time when the CCP had enjoyed control of China for some months and so was capable to providing a realistic assessment of China's position in the aftermath of the Civil War, rather than an immediate 'knee jerk' reaction
- the tone of the source is cautious ('remains serious'), valuable in showing the genuine limitations to Communist control in the aftermath of the Civil War and that much work remained to be done.

**Content and argument**

- Source B has value in showing the economic issues that China needed to overcome in the aftermath of the Civil War. Mao writes of 'economic construction' and of 'serious unemployment', and this was certainly the case after the Civil War, as long years of internal conflict and Japanese occupation had ravaged China's economy. In a country where industrial output had halved over the preceding ten years there was an urgent and pressing need to improve the economic position of China, which Source B is valuable in showing
- the position in China in the aftermath of the Civil War was uneven, and Source B is valuable in its references to these 'complex' conditions. In the 'old liberated areas' Mao refers to such – such as Yan'an, where the Communists had held sway for some time – the CCP's position after the Civil War was more secure than in areas like the eastern cities and the south. This is why Mao can claim 'agrarian reform is completed' in some areas, whilst for most of China it was not yet underway
- despite the Civil War having ended some months ago, the GMD remained present in some parts of China and Source B is valuable in showing this through Mao's references to 'bandits'; a term the CCP frequently used to describe GMD remnants in China after the Civil War. These issues were brought into even sharper relief in China by the end of this month, when war broke out in Korea and the need to suppress remaining GMD forces in China became more pressing, and urgent.

In arriving at a judgement as to which source might be of greater value, students might argue that Source B is more valuable, since it shows that significant issues remained despite (or because of) the Soviet support highlighted in Source A and which had been in place for some months by the time Source B was produced. Alternatively, they might argue that Source A is more valuable, since Source B merely confirms how important the Soviet aid and support referred to in Source A truly was.

**Section B**

**0 2** 'China strengthened its relationship with its neighbours (Korea, Tibet, Taiwan and the USSR) in the years 1949 to 1952.'

Explain why you agree or disagree with this view.

**[25 marks]**

*Target: AO1*

*Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.*

**Generic Mark Scheme**

- L5:** Answers will display a good understanding of the demands of the question. They will be well-organised and effectively communicated. There will be a range of clear and specific supporting information showing a good understanding of key features and issues, together with some conceptual awareness. The answer will be analytical in style with a range of direct comment leading to substantiated judgement. **21–25**
- L4:** Answers will show an understanding of the question and will supply a range of largely accurate information which will show an awareness of some of the key issues and features. The answer will be effectively organised and show adequate communication skills. There will be analytical comment in relation to the question and the answer will display some balance. However, there may be some generalisation and judgements will be limited and only partially substantiated. **16–20**
- L3:** The answer will show some understanding of the full demands of the question and the answer will be adequately organised. There will be appropriate information showing an understanding of some key features and/or issues but the answer may be limited in scope and/or contain inaccuracy and irrelevance. There will be some comment in relation to the question. **11–15**
- L2:** The answer will be descriptive or partial, showing some awareness of the question but a failure to grasp its full demands. There will be some attempt to convey material in an organised way although communication skills may be limited. There will be some appropriate information showing understanding of some key features and/or issues, but the answer may be very limited in scope and/or contain inaccuracy and irrelevance. There will be some, but limited, comment in relation to the question and statements will, for the most part, be unsupported and generalist. **6–10**
- L1:** The question has not been properly understood and the response shows limited organisational and communication skills. The information conveyed is irrelevant or extremely limited. There may be some unsupported, vague or generalist comment. **1–5**
- Nothing worthy of credit. **0**

**Indicative content**

**Note: This content is not prescriptive and students are not obliged to refer to the material contained in this mark scheme. Any legitimate answer will be assessed on its merits according to the generic levels scheme.**

**Arguments supporting the view that China strengthened its relationship with its neighbours (Korea, Tibet, Taiwan and the USSR) in the years 1949 to 1952 might include:**

- China was able to exert control over Tibet in this period, which had been claimed by Jiang but not controlled, suggesting China in this period was more successful in adopting a 'forward' foreign policy with its neighbours. China's largest regional rival – India – accepted China's control of Tibet as a *fait accompli* in 1951, a successful strengthening of China's position with a strong neighbour
- it could be argued that Chinese intervention in the Korean War demonstrated Chinese regional strength in relation to its neighbours. China was able to fight the UN coalition forces to a standstill on the peninsula by 1952 and so ensure the presence of a Communist neighbour in the form of North Korea. This could be seen as successful as it established the perception of China as a strong military power in the region
- China was able to secure the support of its most powerful neighbour – the USSR – in this period through the 1950 Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. This provided China with vital economic and military support and strengthened the PRC's hand in its dealings with the United States
- China assumed a strong position over Taiwan in this period, with Jiang forced to abandon any short-term plans to attempt to invade the Chinese mainland. In the early part of the period the United States made no firm commitment to the defence of the island, and the Chinese position could be seen as successful since it was Taiwan's position, rather than its own, that was under threat between 1949 and 1952.

**Arguments challenging the view that China strengthened its relationship with its neighbours (Korea, Tibet, Taiwan and the USSR) in the years 1949 to 1952 might include:**

- despite posturing over the issue of Taiwan, Chinese policy towards the island could be seen as unsuccessful. Taiwan remained the state internationally recognised as China by Western powers throughout this period, and held China's seat in the United Nations. The PLA's invasion of Jinmen in late 1949 failed, and demonstrated that China had no realistic way of invading the island or Taiwan proper, and it remained a regional thorn in the PRC's side
- although Soviet aid and military support strengthened China, it came at a heavy price. The 1950 Treaty gave the USSR extra-territorial rights in China – for example concessions in Manchuria – was seen by many senior CCP officials as similar to the 'unequal treaties' of China's past, and was a source of discord between the two nations in the longer term. China's acceptance of Soviet dominance in their relationship could be seen as an unsuccessful way to deal with a neighbour
- although China appeared to have exerted control over Tibet, in fact there were serious limitations to this. Resistance in Tibet and fears of Indian reactions led to the pace of change there being far slower than Mao intended, so what appeared to be successful regional expansion was in fact less successful than it appeared
- Chinese involvement in the Korean War exposed both the limitations of Soviet support for and increased US opposition to the PRC and its regional policies. Soviet military involvement in the Korean War had been minimal, and China had borne the brunt of the expenditure, and the casualties. Increased US concern over Chinese intentions in the region led to greater US support for Taiwan, and a permanent naval presence in the straits that thwarted rather than advanced Chinese policy towards its neighbours.

Whilst on the face of it China had developed a strong position in its relationship with surrounding areas that strengthened the PRC regionally, under the surface there were significant limitations to this that threatened to cause long term problems, for example over Taiwan and China's relationship with the



USSR. Consequently, China was only superficially successful in its dealings with its neighbours in this period.

**0 3** 'Mao's power in China significantly increased in the years 1952 to 1958.'

Explain why you agree or disagree with this view.

**[25 marks]**

*Target: AO1*

*Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.*

**Generic Mark Scheme**

- L5:** Answers will display a good understanding of the demands of the question. They will be well-organised and effectively communicated. There will be a range of clear and specific supporting information showing a good understanding of key features and issues, together with some conceptual awareness. The answer will be analytical in style with a range of direct comment leading to substantiated judgement. **21–25**
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- L1:** The question has not been properly understood and the response shows limited organisational and communication skills. The information conveyed is irrelevant or extremely limited. There may be some unsupported, vague or generalist comment. **1–5**
- Nothing worthy of credit. **0**

**Indicative content**

**Note: This content is not prescriptive and students are not obliged to refer to the material contained in this mark scheme. Any legitimate answer will be assessed on its merits according to the generic levels scheme.**

**Arguments supporting the view that Mao's power in China significantly increased in the years 1952 to 1958 might include:**

- the purges of Gao Gang and Rao Shushi in 1953 both demonstrated that Mao's leadership had increased to a point that he could remove those in the Party whom he felt challenged him, and strengthened it by expelling those in the CCP's leadership that favoured policies that ran counter to Mao's. It demonstrated that Mao had now developed the significant power to move against those establishing regional power bases or those who favoured an overly close relationship with the USSR
- the 'Anti Hu Feng Campaign' of 1955 led to a wave of action against intellectuals who had dared to criticise aspects of the CCP and Mao's leadership and increased Mao's power in significant ways, both by removing those who had expressed disagreement with him and suppressing such opposition in others. Many thousands of intellectuals were publicly criticised or forced to make humiliating self-criticisms
- the Anti-Rightist campaign in the wake of the Hundred Flowers campaign demonstrated the extent of Mao's power and further increased it. He was able to orchestrate a widespread action against intellectuals across China that led to hundreds of thousands of arrests, self-criticisms and imprisonments which further strengthened Mao's leadership in a significant way by eliminating existing and stifling potential opposition
- the successes of the First Five Year Plan were attributed to Mao and gave him the credibility to launch the Great Leap Forward, which emanated directly from Mao and was sustained and continued with zeal despite its clear shortcomings. This was a significant increase in power as Mao was able to direct and continue such radical and damaging economic policy demonstrating the strength of his power in both the PRC and China by 1957.

**Arguments challenging the view that Mao's power in China significantly increased in the years 1952 to 1958 might include:**

- despite the clear power and authority Mao possessed in this period, China was at least in principle led through a system of 'collective leadership' in which other senior CCP officials held significant power in their own right. It was this system that gave men like Gao – and later Peng Dehuai – the potential to amass power themselves and challenge Mao's leadership. These potential threats show the limitations to Mao's power between 1952 and 1958
- developments in 1956 also exposed potential limitations to Mao's power. Mao feared for his position in the wake of Khrushchev's 'secret speech', which criticised Stalin's personality cult and oppressive leadership style, which Mao took as a criticism of his own leadership style. Subsequently, the Eighth Party Congress saw considerable support for collective leadership and references to Mao were removed from the CCP's constitution. These events arguably weakened Mao's power rather than increased it
- the Hundred Flowers campaign also revealed limitations to Mao's power, rather than it increasing. The campaign itself was delayed due to a lack of support for it in the Politburo, and much of the wave of criticism that it unleashed focused on Mao's style of leadership and some even called for Mao's resignation
- by the end of the period, the failures of the Great Leap Forward were realised and much of this was attributed to Mao. This discredited his leadership and in response, he resigned from his position as Chairman of the PRC. Whilst this was a largely symbolic role it represented a waning rather than a waxing of Mao's power and suggested it did not increase in a significant way.

On balance, a case could be made that Mao's power did indeed significantly increase across this period and whilst the Great Leap Forward caused him to step back from a key position, this had only arisen because his leadership of the PRC was so strong by the later part of this period. Most of the challenges arose not from genuine power bases and opposition to Mao but rather from his own paranoia.

General comments made about the progress of the CCP in the 1950s will be rewarded if they are focused on how these enhanced Mao's position, although not as much as essays that maintain a direct focus on Mao's political position throughout.